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A INTRODUCTION 
“CDEF% GDHF” (IJ% 580-643) 
“Water can carry a boat or sink it” (Wei Zheng, 580-643 AD). 
1. WATER, AH WATER! 
The famous saying, “water can carry a boat or sink it”, by the Chinese Prime Minister 
Wei Zheng of the Tang-Dynasty (618-907 AD) uses the characteristics of water as a 
metaphor to describe the relationship between a ruler and his/her people. People are 
symbolised by water which can be utilised and beneficial for the ruler; the ruler is 
symbolised by the boat which relies on the water to carry it. However, water can be a 
double cross. Once the harmony between water and the boat is disturbed, water brings 
destruction.  
This relationship concept can be transferred to the relationship between water and 
human beings. Water is indispensable for human life as not only does it provide natural 
resource services essential for the development of human civilisation, but also nurtures 
intellectual inspiration. In Chinese literature one can find countless poems using water 
as a metaphor. In one of the most famous poems written by Li Bai (701-762 AD), water 
is used as metaphor for the endlessness of sorrows:  
“Although I draw my knife across the water, the river continues to flow. When I raise my 
cup to lessen my sorrows, the sorrows only grow” (Allan, 1997: 29). 
Philosophers such as Confucius (551-479 BC) meditated on the source of life and 
exclaimed: “Water, ah water!” trying to find the fundamental principles of life (Allan, 
1997: 31). Maybe the Chinese have conferred a unique meaning to water in the intel-
lectual domain; however, it is not only the Chinese who have shown a propensity 
towards water in the course of history. Pohl points out the significance of the natural 
event of flooding for human civilisations: “The frightening as well as fruitful floods of 
Euphrates and Tigris in Mesopotamia, and the floods of the Nile in Egypt or of the 
Yangtze and the Huanghe in China have greatly influenced the development of man-
kind” (Pohl, 2003: 202-203). Wittfogel even contends that the need for irrigation and 
flood protection is a decisive factor which lays the foundation for the formation of 
society (Wittfogel, 1955: 44-45). 
A INTRODUCTION 1 WATER, AH WATER! 
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In addition to the environmental services and intellectual inspiration water and flood 
events provide for humankind, the power of water also manifests itself in destruction. 
Floods often have great negative impacts on human well-being. They cause loss of 
human life, economic damage, damage to eco-systems and historical and cultural sites 
and  aggravate human health problems. In the last decade of the 20th century, floods 
killed 100,000 people worldwide and affected over 1.4 billion people (Jonkman, 2005: 
151-152). According to Munich Re (Kron, 2003: 80), about one third of all reported 
damages and one third of all economic losses is flood-related. Over the last decades 
there have been more casualties due to flooding than have been caused by all other 
types of natural catastrophes taken together (Kron, 2003: 80). During the period from 
January 1975 to June 2002, freshwater flood events are reported to have killed 
176,864 people and affected 2.27 billion according to the International Disaster Data-
base. Less developed countries are especially affected by floods. Among the five 
floods with highest casualties during this time period, China is listed twice (see table 1) 
(Jonkman, 2005: 158). According to Burton et al., absolute losses from natural hazards 
are much greater in industrial than in developing societies, whereas proportional losses 
and deaths are extremely high in mixed and indigenous societies (Burton et al., 1993: 
238). However, wealthy countries are not exempted from flood disasters. Some of the 
most costly flood events occurred on the Rhine and its tributaries in 1993 and in Eng-
land during 1998 and 2000. The worst of all recent European floods occurred in East-
ern and Central Europe in 2002 (Wisner et al., 2004: 201). During this flood event on 
the Elbe River in Germany, 20 people died in Saxony, 110 were injured and tens of 
thousands of people were evacuated. The monetary loss amounted to billions of Euros 
(Unabhängige Kommission der Sächsischen Staatsregierung, 2002: 1). 
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Table 1: Overview of the five freshwater flood events with most people killed, Jan 1975 - 
June 2002 
Country Year Month Day Killed Total affected Description 
 
Venezuela 1999 12 19 30,000 483,635 flash and river floods 
and landslides around 
Caracas and other 
areas  
Afghanistan 1988 6  6345 166,831 floods in Badakhshan, 
Baghlan, Heart, Kabul, 
Jouzjan, Samangan, 
Takhar provinces 
China, P. 
Rep. 
1980 6  6200 67,000 floods in Sichuan, 
Anhui, Hubei 
India 1978 7  3800 32,000,000 floods in north and 
northeast India 
China, P. 
Rep. 
1998 8 6 3656 238,973,000 river floods combined 
with storms and land-
slides in Hubei, Hunan, 
Sichuan, Jiangxi, 
Fujian, Guanxi prov-
inces 
Source: Jonkman, 2005: 159 
 
Humankind can not eliminate the natural process of flooding and does neither want to 
forsake the use of water resources in flood prone areas, nor flood plains as a place of 
habitation. This means accepting a life with risks and benefits. But as time goes on, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the balance between the risk of flooding and 
the gain incurred by living close to water resources. There are several reasons for this: 
according to the IPCC 2007 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007), 
global climate change is causing more frequent and intensive flooding events; engi-
neering flood protection measures need steady maintenance and follow-up measures 
which affected societies are not willing to carry out; unsustainable land use practices 
increase the risk; urbanisation is putting a rising population number in jeopardy; devel-
opment of infrastructure increases the value of assets at risk (Bogardi, 2004: 6). Thus, 
flood mitigation is gaining more and more importance, posing an ever-challenging task.  
2. FLOOD MITIGATION  
Currently, there are two main discourses on flood disasters. The dominant view con-
siders flood as a natural phenomenon. The alternative discourse sees flood disasters 
as being jointly produced by the interaction between the physical hazard and social 
vulnerabilities. The latter discourse brings to the fore social relations, structures, 
A INTRODUCTION 2 FLOOD MITIGATION 
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institutions and governance as well as political processes in understanding flood 
disasters (Lebel et al., 2006b: 3, Dixit, 2003: 166, Stefanovic, 2003: 231, Few, 2003: 
47). As a consequence of differences in perspectives within these discourses, the 
implications for flood mitigation strategies differ as well. 
If the first approach is applied, the focus is on physical events. The implication for 
mitigation is the prediction of their magnitude and occurrence using hydrological and 
meteorological science. Technical measures such as dikes and dams are solutions to 
alleviate floods. However, these technical measures often intensify flood problems. 
Interventions to mitigate disasters are relief activities after the event has occurred. 
Such aid measures intend to restore the situation and help people to bounce back to 
their original “normal” life. Even when a flood disaster occurs repeatedly in the same 
area, the same relief and recovery aid measures are provided. Relief is currently the 
dominant approach which is championed by different actors such as regional govern-
ments and international donor agencies. However, this approach largely ignores the 
mitigation potential during the normal time between two flood events (Dixit, 2003: 166). 
This hazard-led approach does not involve the affected people in the decision-making 
about mitigation. Instead, mitigation is carried out in a bureaucratic manner through a 
top-down approach (Dixit, 2003: 166).  
Short-term reductionist strategies have their place at certain times and within certain 
scales. However, numerous studies reveal that disasters are not only the outcome of 
natural hazards, but also of socio-economic structures and political processes that 
make individuals and families vulnerable (Lebel et al., 2006a: 3, Wisner et al., 2004: 
216, Dixit, 2003: 166). This perspective is labelled as the “alternative approach” which 
focuses on how social systems operate to make people vulnerable to disasters. This 
approach recognises the fact that natural hazards do occur, but vulnerability is equally 
important for the outcome of a disaster (Dixit, 2003: 166, Heijmans, 2001).  
Due to asymmetric socio-economic relationships, for instance, those families which 
have no access to basic resources, such as land, food and education are particularly 
vulnerable. “Disasters are the unresolved problems of societies during ‘normal’ times, 
and these problems affect the way people are impacted by disasters” (Dixit, 2003: 168, 
Wisner et al., 2004: 206). Is it helpful to analyse these unbalanced relationships and 
social processes to identify the root causes of disasters? Dixit advocates it is vital to 
change those patterns of relationships and institutional arrangements which worsen 
vulnerability to disaster. To reduce vulnerability of different groups, families and indi-
viduals affected by disasters should be involved in all stages of decision-making and 
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implementation (Dixit, 2003: 168). Lebel also pointed out that viewing disaster solely as 
a technical problem ignores the importance of participation and transparency and 
conceals the politics of shifting risk to already vulnerable groups (Lebel et al., 2006b). 
Yet, public participation in flood mitigation has not been widely practiced; instead, the 
public are treated as irrelevant to the technical exercise of assessing and managing 
risk and designing institutional responses. Despite the knowledge and promotion by 
international agencies of community-based flood disaster management, national 
agencies remain sceptical about its implementation. Reasons for this scepticism lie in 
the fact that this approach requires “addressing fundamental issues of governance and 
social justice that may undermine positions of authority” (Lebel et al., 2006b: 3-4). 
In practicing public participation, simply informing the public is not sufficient. Neither 
would it be appropriate to use it as an opportunity to shift the burden on to communities 
for actions that should have been the responsibility of public authorities. The aim of 
participation should be empowerment of marginalised and vulnerable groups in deci-
sion-making around whom and what should be at risk (Lebel et al., 2006b: 4). 
Whilst public participation in river basin management is strongly advocated by the 
scientific community (Jansky, 2002, Wisner et al., 2004, Lebel et al., 2006b, Dixit, 2003, 
Bradbury, 1989, Tierney et al., 2001, Krasovskaia et al., 2006), case studies in many 
Asian areas such as Nepal, Vietnam, and Thailand show that the dominant response to 
flood mitigation has been hierarchical and guided by the motivation to control both 
water and people. Consequently, flood mitigation is translated into structural measures 
which have been proved to be insufficient (Dixit, 2003, Lebel et al., 2006b, Lebel et al., 
2008). Dixit concludes: “That the appropriate response to flooding lies in providing 
unhindered drainage is an intellectual blind spot because of the political-economic 
incentives of structural flood control measure” (Dixit, 2003: 174).  
The role of the state in the creation and distribution of risks needs to be given much 
greater emphasis. Governments are seen as important actors in hazard mitigation. 
However, they are often facilitators of risky organisational and institutional practices; at 
the same time they are also autonomous actors pursuing their own interests and 
creating risk in the process (Tierney, 1999: 234). 
The state’s involvement in producing risks is tied to its role in reproducing the neo-
liberal political economy of growth. The state promotes conditions which are favourable 
to economic expansion and a positive business climate. Government agencies at all 
levels are eager to promote economic growth, even if growth is accompanied by higher 
levels of risk. Likewise, regulations that might reduce risks cannot be implemented 
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without difficulties, if those regulations are not in line with powerful economic interests 
(Tierney, 1999: 234). 
Lebel et al. often observed “risk redistribution” instead of risk mitigation in their case 
studies on flood mitigation. In these case studies, interventions reduce risks for one 
group while increasing them for another. Lebel et al.’s study describes a common 
phenomenon of risk redistribution in order to protect major cities. For instance, the 
protection of the central business district of Bangkok frequently put the surrounding 
suburbs and upstream districts or farmlands at risk by using them as retention areas. 
Due to lacking prior involvement of the farmers and compensation mechanisms, a 
serious conflict was provoked (Lebel et al., 2008: 3). At the same time, the information 
made available to the urban population emphasised structural measures which protect 
the interests of local elites in urban areas. The social and environmental impacts of 
such measures on affected areas are not mentioned (Lebel et al., 2008: 4). Disasters 
are less counteracted where there is no social mobilisation and therefore no political 
interest to mitigate. On the contrary, when the big business sector is threatened, 
politicians are likely to take action (Lebel et al., 2008: 11). 
In addition, the reliance on structural measures leads to crisis driven management, 
since engineering measures can fail. Simultaneously, more building and investment 
behind dike systems are generated due to the structural protection, in return, more 
people and assets are put at risk (Lebel et al., 2008: 5).  
Holling et al. also investigate the question of why flood control and irrigation develop-
ments create large ecological and economic costs, and increasing vulnerability. They 
contend the failure of managing renewable resources is that uncertainty in nature is 
presumed to be replaced by certainty of human control. Social systems benefit from 
human accomplishments, but in the meantime this success creates its own failure. This 
explains why flood control creates vulnerability. Effective flood control leads to human 
settlement densities in fertile flood plains, consequently investments increase. When a 
severe flood eventually overwhelms physical structures such as dams and/or dikes, the 
social and economic structures are interrupted and have to be restructured again 
(Holling, 2002: 6). 
Significant flood events in the past decade have triggered a rethinking process about 
mitigation strategies, especially those flood events in the developed world which led to 
the collapse of confidence in engineered flood prevention in these countries (Wisner et 
al., 2004: 201). Cutter believes that the ideology of conquering and taming nature (the 
inherited European ideal that man can actually control nature), rather than living in 
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harmony with it, was and still is the driving force in the production of physical vulner-
ability in metropolitan areas (Cutter, 2005: 2). As a result, rethinking past flood mitiga-
tion strategies, the thought of enabling rivers to flow freely and the approach of “living 
with floods” arose (Wisner et al., 2004: 201-203). 
However, this “new” approach is not completely new. During the Chinese Western Han 
Dynasty (206 BC-24 AD) flood disasters occurred frequently. From 39 BC to 11 AC 
there was a flood disaster on average every seven years due to dike breaches. The 
most affected area at that time was Jizhou (today’s Heibei and south-west of Shandong 
province) which was already densely populated back then. The economy in the area 
was prosperous and the density of townships was the highest in China. Yet, the econ-
omy was often severely affected by flood disasters. Thus, the Emperor called for 
officials and scholars to develop flood mitigation strategies (Tan et al., 2005: 49).  
One of the most famous strategies was recommended by Jia Rang. He proposed three 
different approaches which he categorised into best, moderate and worst practices. He 
considered the first approach as the best approach which, at the core, dictated that 
human beings “should not compete with water for land” (.KCLM). He suggested 
relocating people living between the Taihang Mountains and the dike along the north-
ern river bank of the Yellow River so that the river could flow freely. Jia’s worst practice 
would be to build dikes and fight with floods. He argued that not only was it unfeasible 
to renovate and build dikes, but that, contrary to their purpose, structural measures 
were costly and also detrimental to flood management. Thus, he considered this 
approach to be the most unfeasible one. The moderate approach which combines dike 
building and creation of retention areas was considered to be the most practicable 
approach (Tan et al., 2005: 49). 
Although Jia Rang’s flood mitigation strategy of allowing rivers to flow freely has be-
come a canonical work in the Chinese flood management history, neither his best 
practice nor his moderate approach have ever been seriously practiced (Tan et al., 
2005: 49). Already in the early China of the Western Han period, Jia Rang’s opponents 
argued that his best policy was not applicable due to the advanced economic develop-
ment and population density.  
Today, two thousand years later, Western academics and flood managers have rein-
vented Jia Rang’s thoughts. At the same time, the Chinese water management authori-
ties at the national level have also started to advocate the “new” idea of “leaving flood 
space to flow”. Still, despite the growing understanding of disasters, losses of life and 
property from flood disasters remain unacceptably high and are increasing. Institutional 
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changes which intend to reduce the risks of flood-related disasters have not been 
successful. Lebel et al. and Dixit point out several reasons for this: the emphasis is still 
placed on emergency relief instead of prevention; therefore institutions fail to reduce 
vulnerabilities to prevent disaster. They stressed the failures of approaches that see 
disaster management as a technical problem calling for expert judgments and system-
atically excluding interests of the most socially vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the 
overemphasis on structural measures contributed more to a re-distribution of risks in 
time and place than risk reduction. The lack of integration of flood management into 
normal development planning in flood-prone regions is another reason for the failure to 
reduce flood risk (Lebel et al., 2006b: 8, Dixit, 2003).  
Under such circumstances, an extensive study investigating why these failures in flood 
mitigation persist seems to be a significant beginning. Examining flood risk perception 
and communication/discourse is essential to understand this persistence, since differ-
ent mitigation strategies result from competing understandings and interpretations of 
flood risk. To know how risk is construed by different actors is essential to understand 
why some strategies are pursued and others ignored.  
Krasovskaia contends that one of the central roles in non-structural mitigation meas-
ures belongs to the assessment of flood risk perception. Since a response to the flood 
risk depends on how it is perceived, perception studies deserve to become an integral 
activity in flood assessment (Krasovskaia et al., 2006: 1/8). Especially in China, natural 
hazard research focuses mainly on the analysis of the physical processes of the 
specific event, resulting in the publication of voluminous reports to provide an overview 
of the major hazards in China. It is important to note that perceptions are frequently 
ignored when analysing natural hazards in China (Wong and Zhao, 2001: 191-192). 
Thus, there is a special need for research on flood risk perception and discourse. 
3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING 
David Alexander states that culture shapes the collective and individual reaction to the 
threats, risks and impacts of disasters. One can reason that culture is a fundamental 
determinant of vulnerability and socio-economic impact of disaster. In fact, culture is 
paramount in decision-making as whether to mitigate a natural hazard or ignore it. 
Often the decision is not based on how dangerous the hazard is in absolute or objec-
tive terms, but rather on how it is perceived (Alexander, 2000: 73).  
To understand risk perception, context and culture factors are vital: “It is a mistake to 
view the perception of hazards and disasters in isolation from competing demands on 
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people’s attention from other events” (Alexander, 2000: 79). Natural disasters emerge 
within a complex set of interactions between human and environmental factors. Under-
standing human factors such as values, assumptions and forms of behaviour is central 
to the task of wiser, more informed decision-making (Stefanovic, 2003: 245). 
The Yokohama message, summary of the outcome of the World Conference on Natu-
ral Disaster Reduction in 1994, advocates: “Community involvement and their active 
participation should be encouraged in order to gain greater insight into the individual 
and collective perception of development and risk, and to have a clear understanding 
of the cultural and organizational characteristics of each society as well as of its behav-
iour and interactions with the physical and natural environment. This knowledge is of 
the utmost importance to determine those things which favour and hinder prevention 
and mitigation or encourage or limit the preservation of the environment for the devel-
opment of future generations, and in order to find effective and efficient means to 
reduce the impact of disasters” (World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, 
1994: 1).  
Integrating all perspectives such as the economic and technical analysis and risk as a 
social construct is necessary for both the analysis of risk experience and the prescrip-
tion of risk policies in order to do justice to the phenomenon of risk in societies. Al-
though many still believe that risk policies should be based solely on technical and 
economic considerations, there is a strong case to involve social and cultural sciences 
in the discussion to understand the complexity of the behaviour of individuals and 
groups towards risk (Renn, 1998: 65).  
4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Proceeding on these assumptions, a cultural comparative study on risk perception and 
communication/discourse appears to be a suitable approach to understand the prob-
lems in flood mitigation (McDaniels and Gregory, 1991: 103-104). Therefore, this study 
aims to determine the commonalities and differences in flood risk perception and 
communication and to understand how these differences are embedded in cultures and 
thus to understand the problems in flood mitigation. It will identify cultural blind points 
which are not tangible within a single cultural perspective. Furthermore, the study 
investigates the transferability of good practice and lessons learnt in different cultures 
and the potential of improved flood mitigation strategies.   
Flood perception studies usually focus on the perception of laymen. The perception of 
decision-makers, in contrast, is only poorly investigated (Krasovskaia et al., 2006: 2). 
A INTRODUCTION 5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
 
 19 
To complement existing studies, this thesis focuses on the perception and risk commu-
nication of decision-makers and experts in flood management. Perception is under-
stood as risk discourse which reflects different ways of construing flood risk of different 
actors. 
The research questions this research endeavours to answer are: 
1. How do different actors involved in flood management in China and Germany per-
ceive flood risk? 
2. How is the perception of these actors embedded in their respective cultures? 
3. How is flood risk communicated among these actors and to the general public?  
4. Which cultural features are reflected in flood risk communication in China and 
Germany? 
5.  STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS   
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. After the first introductory chapter, a brief 
description of risk as a manifold concept gives an overview of different perspectives of 
risk in current discourse. These perspectives are of great relevance to the research, 
because differences in perspectives result in different policy implications which lead to 
different problems and challenges in flood mitigation. Using the concept of disaster 
cycle, this chapter illustrates the complexity of flood mitigation due to actors’ different 
risk perceptions. As a consequence, different actions are taken in various risk man-
agement phases within a disaster cycle. In chapter C the general features of the 
chosen field sites in China and Germany will provide information on the geographical, 
demographical as well as socio-economic factors. In addition, the existing structural 
measures in these two field sites are elucidated. Chapter D elaborates on the methods 
applied in this research and the challenges posed by the field research followed by a 
description of the set of data and the role of the researcher. The empirical research 
results are illustrated in chapter E. This chapter is divided into two main parts: In the 
first part risk perception is illustrated by different problem dimensions, each of which is 
discussed in subchapters illuminating risk perception from various perspectives. Risk 
discourse of the actors as the focus of the data analysis does not only reveal differ-
ences and commonalities between Chinese and German actors; the analysis also 
endeavours to show how these differences are ingrained and embedded in cultural 
practices from a historical and genetic perspective. The data presentation and analysis 
are juxtaposed in the synopsis at the end of each subchapter to provide an overview of 
comparison of each discussed aspect. In the second part of chapter E, risk communi-
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cation features are discussed. Similar to the first part of the chapter, differences and 
commonalities and their cultural roots are identified and elucidated. In chapter F a 
theoretical analytical framework will be introduced to provide a general benchmark for 
different cultural spaces. In this chapter, the main theoretical approaches in empirical 
risk perception research are introduced, namely the psychometric paradigm and the 
cultural theories on risk as well as their application in cultural studies. In chapter G the 
data analysis is linked to the cultural theory and thus, patterns of the research results 
can be identified through this lense. In addition, the explanatory power of the theory is 
explored on the basis of empirical data. Transferability, potential for generalisation and 
limitation of the research are discussed. In the last chapter the research results are 
summarised to answer the research questions and policy implications of the research 
are presented. 
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B NOTION OF RISK AND PROBLEM DIMENSIONS OF FLOOD 
MANAGEMENT  
1. RISK AS A MANIFOLD CONCEPT 
In the last decades risk research has become a lucrative business in the Western world. 
An “explosive increase” of risk research with numerous publications in different disci-
plines on the subject can be observed. However, a common denominator of risk 
definition has not yet been developed, not to mention an inherent risk theory (Banse 
and Bechmann, 1998: 151). 
Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at 
hand. Different options to reduce risks will be considered to be the best or most cost-
effective according to different definitions of risks, hence, different actions are desired 
to be taken. “Defining risk is thus an exercise in power” (Slovic, 2000: 411). 
For an example of everyday use of the concept of risk, one can refer to the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED) which provides two basic meanings for risk: 1. Hazard, 
danger; exposure to mischance or peril. 2. The chance or hazard of commercial loss, 
spec. in the case of insured property or goods. Also (freq. without article), the chance 
that is accepted in economic enterprise and considered the source of (an entrepre-
neur's) profit (Oxford English Dictionary, 2007). 
Thywissen includes various definitions of risk in her comparative glossary to show the 
diversity of risk definitions (Thywissen, 2006: 23-28). These definitions provide different 
risk notions of different scientific disciplines as well as institutions. The following exam-
ples are chosen for their representative value as far as different takes on the notion of 
risk are concerned and will therefore be interpreted as such later on: 
Swiss Re: “Used in an abstract sense to indicate a condition of the real world in which 
there is a possibility of loss; also used by insurance practitioners to indicate the prop-
erty insured or the peril insured against.”  
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP): “The probability of exposure to an 
event, which can occur with varying severity at different geographical scales, suddenly 
and [un]expectedly or gradually and predictably, and to the degree of exposure.”  
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Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich: “The probability of harmful consequences or expected 
losses resulting from a given hazard to a given element at danger or peril over a 
special time period.” 
United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO): “The objective (mathematical) 
or subjective (inductive) probability that the hazard will become an event. Factors (risk 
factors) can be identified that modify this probability. Such risk factors are constituted 
by personal behaviours, life-styles, cultures, environmental factors, and inherited 
characteristics that are known to be associated with health-related questions. Risk is 
the probability of loss to the elements at risk as the result of the occurrence, physical 
and societal consequences of a natural or technological hazard, and the mitigation and 
preparedness measures in place in the community. Risk is the expected number of 
lives lost, persons injured, damage to property and disruption of economic activity due 
to a particular natural phenomenon, and consequently the product of specific risk and 
elements at risk.” 
From the definitions of the Oxford English Dictionary to the collection of Thywissen’s 
glossary it is clear that defining risk is doubtlessly a challenging task, for “risk” has 
many layers in its semantic. The manifold meanings of risk are determined by various 
perspectives of the observers. The first meaning in the OED defines risk to be equal to 
“hazard, danger; exposure to mischance or peril”. This confirms the observation of 
Luhmann that in the largely English-language literature the words risk, hazard, and 
danger are available and are usually employed almost synonymously (Luhmann, 1993: 
22). Luhmann describes the reasons for the lack of distinction in the “voluminous 
literature on risk research” as carelessness in concept formation and linguistics 
(Luhmann, 1993: 22). The second meaning provided by the OED is identical with the 
one of Swiss Re. Risk is seen to be the probability of losses. This represents the 
perspective of the economic domain and specifically the insurance industry, as well as 
a dominant conception of risk in general (Kunreuther, 1996: 119). The international 
disaster management communities such as the United Nations include aspects such as 
probability, exposure, potential losses, and casualty as well as objective and subjective 
components of risk. The subjective and objective components of risk are significant, 
since the implication of the differences would mean different approaches to risk re-
search. There are different ways to classify these perspectives. In mainly German-
speaking risk research domain alone, Banse and Bechmann identified 11 different 
perspectives:  
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The insurance industry, the natural science and technical perspective, the decision 
theory (rational choice), psychological, economic perspectives, jurisprudence, sociol-
ogy, political science, cultural anthropology, social theory and the philosophical and 
ethical perspectives (Banse and Bechmann, 1998: 29-61).  
Bechmann summarizes three basic orientations: A formal-normative approach, a 
psychological-cognitive approach and a cultural-social approach (Bechmann, 1993). If 
one sees risk as an objective entity, its mitigation would be technical such as the 
formal-normative approach which is applied in insurance industry or engineering 
science. If one takes human dimensions and subjective components of risk into con-
sideration the psychological-cognitive and cultural-social approach seem to be more 
appropriate, although there is still further deviance in research approaches concerning 
subjective risk concepts. Conceptions such as vulnerability can be introduced within 
these later approaches. This taxonomy can be further simplified into two main concepts 
of risk which are of relevance for this specific research: The concept of risk as a physi-
cally given attribute and the concept of risk as social processes (Bradbury, 1989: 381).  
“The traditional, technical approach defines risk as the product of the probability and 
consequences (magnitude and severity) of an adverse event” (Bradbury, 1989: 382) 
(see the definitions of Swiss Re, UNEP and Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich). According to 
Otway and Thomas as well as Kates and Kasperson this concept of risk dominated the 
risk research domain until two decades ago (Bradbury, 1989). This risk concept “ob-
scured or overlooked” human judgement and treated risk as an objective fact which is 
free from values. Bradbury criticises the assumption that risk management decisions 
are rational to the extent that they are based on the realist, non-personal factors of 
technical analysis. She argues that technical approaches are inappropriate to address 
decision making within society, since societal rationality has additional dimensions. She 
points out the political and the ethical dimensions as two key dimensions to be consid-
ered: first, if there is a discrepancy between the experts’ opinions and the public de-
mand, what shall be done? Second, how to address the problems of values in expert 
judgement? 
The assumption that the technical analysis represents absolute rather than relative 
truth leads to the problem as how to relate society to risk issues (Bradbury, 1989). 
Social scientists argue, risk does not exist “out there”, independent of human minds 
and cultures waiting to be measured (Zwick, 2006: 89).  
Pohl elaborates the problem by departing from Luhmann’s distinction between the 
concepts of danger and risk. In this school of thought risk is related to human beings. If 
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potential loss can be attributed to a decision made by a human being, one speaks of 
risk; if it is triggered by an external stressor, one speaks of danger (Pohl, 1998: 156). 
Further on he elucidates this distinction adopting Luhmann’s example of an umbrella: 
Before the invention of the umbrella, there was only the danger to get wet when going 
out. Therefore it was dangerous to go out. Under such circumstances one usually only 
has danger awareness but no risk awareness, since the possibility to always stay at 
home is virtually not taken into consideration, in case it rains. Things have completely 
changed since the invention of the umbrella. One can no longer live without risks. The 
danger that one can get wet becomes the risk one takes, in that he does not take the 
umbrella with him. But yet, if he does take the umbrella with him, he takes the risk to 
leave it somewhere. The potential of danger is “out” there, but risk is only “produced” 
by humans. Even the avoidance of risk bears risk within it. Therefore, the choice lies 
between two decisions: one takes the umbrella but risks to lose it, or one takes the risk 
to get wet without taking the umbrella. Either choice will become a dilemma, and every 
decision is a risky undertaking (Pohl, 1998: 156).  
However, Pohl does not rule out the concept of subjective risk. Solid empirical findings 
(Geipel/Härta/Pohl, 1997) show that individuals over-estimate the flood risk due to their 
recent experience. It is a significant result of hazard research that lay people often 
over-estimate the potential damages of hazard events with a low probability but high 
impact. One can, therefore, speak of a distorted subjective risk perception. However, 
similar to Brandbury, he contends hazard research in the social science domain shall 
not stop there. The concept of risk is often “objectified” as a product of probability and 
damage potential. However, this approach misses the societal dimension in relation to 
risk. People assess risk in a social context and their assessment is embedded in their 
societal environment. To bring society into the picture of risk, hazard research in the 
social science domain shall contribute to the risk discourse. Within the risk discourse 
there can be diverse meanings which are conferred to risk e.g. God punishes man. But 
yet, this interpretation of risk has lost its significance in the modern society. This is 
where a decision component comes in. “Not the danger which originates from the 
nature is the enemy, but rather the decision-makers are the target. At least it is certain 
that the decision-makers are more approachable than the nature or the divine interven-
tion” (Pohl, 1998: 158).  
Bradbury goes even further stating: “the omission of key dimensions (political and 
ethical) leads to attempts to apply inappropriate solutions, that is, attempts to solve the 
wrong policy problem” (Bradbury, 1989: 383).  
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Since the technical approach cannot link risk and human society and its political and 
ethical dimensions, the concept of risk as social processes is seen as an important 
contribution to compensate for the shortcomings of the technical approach (Bradbury, 
1989: 394).  
Cultural scholars contend that risk and technology are not physical entities which exist 
independently from humans. They are social processes. Thus, the risk discussion 
shifted its focus on probabilities to the risk perceiver including both experts and lay 
persons. Consequently, social institutions and the social and cultural context in which 
risk is assessed and managed become the focus of attention. The notion of risk as a 
social construct is pronounced: “It is clear that truth does not exist independently of 
people, whether taken to be individuals, significant social groups in the general public, 
professional or political/industrial groups. It is people, and not independent facts, who 
constrain the way concepts are framed, questions posed, and research goals set. And 
it is people who design event and fault trees, close options, choose attribute sets, fund 
data collection, interpret and publish findings. Once the criterion of an absolute truth is 
abandoned, then surely no one can avoid the inference that people see the world 
differently and that these difference emerge from different experiences of differently 
constructed social worlds” (Bradbury, 1989: 389) (citing Otway and Thomas, 1982: 70). 
The major contribution of cultural literature on risk is the insight into the problems which 
have been neglected. It also provides insight into how to reformulate risk management 
and risk communication problems. Therefore, cultural insights provide “a firm theoreti-
cal foundation for an appropriate design of policy” (Bradbury, 1989: 390).  
Cultural approaches identify the problem of decisions with regard to social acceptability 
based on statistical probabilities. Bradbury notes that solving problems this way only 
leads to ignorance of deeper dimensions of the problems. Although cultural ap-
proaches recognise the importance of technical and economic approaches in delivering 
information for decision-making, they criticise the technical and economic analysis 
being used to drive decisions unaccompanied by other analytical frameworks. Cultural 
approaches argue that an improved technical analysis is not the key to improved risk 
management decisions. It is highlighted that decisions involve trans-scientific aspects 
in addition to scientific and technical questions, and that these trans-scientific questions 
cannot be answered by science. It is reasoned that the “level, acceptability and distri-
bution of risk involve questions of values, and since differing values are held by those 
affected, risk management decisions must take into account the political, social, and 
ethical, as well as the technical aspects of the policy problem” (Bradbury, 1989: 391). 
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According to the cultural approach, policy problems are addressed by taking into 
consideration different perspectives on risk and the value-laden nature of risk decisions. 
The role of public participation in decision-making is emphasised to guarantee the 
representation of different cultural perspectives. Policy problems shall be solved 
through negotiations amongst all socio-cultural groups including technical analysts,  
policymakers and the various groups involved in and affected by policy implementation. 
Managers should be able to understand their own stances and that of other groups on 
risk issues. Institutional means for adjustment should be developed. It can be con-
cluded from this viewpoint that risk acceptance and acceptability cannot be determined 
by technical analysis alone, but rather need to be negotiated among different cultural 
groups, “that is, socially constructed” (Bradbury, 1989: 391). Clark states, this is essen-
tially a question of policy analysis rather than science. The priority is placed on the 
consent of the governed to the process by which decisions are made. The competing 
claims as to what risk constitutes and how to reach a societal decision concerning the 
control of risk shall be equally represented by different groups sharing differing values. 
Similarly, Funtowicz and Ravetz advocate a “civilised dialogue of risks”. They formu-
lated an analysis with two dimensions: a factual and an evaluative dimension. They 
contend if both dimensions can be attributed low values, which mean that the data 
collection is well established and the stake is low, the technical approach can be 
applied. However, if both dimensions are assigned high values meaning that the data is 
not certain and the stake is high, then a dialogue must be initiated to resolve the 
problem “by political debate rather than civil war” (Bradbury, 1989: 392).  
According to Dunn (1982), knowledge is socially constructed on the basis of competing 
knowledge claims and the expansion of learning over time. This view has the implica-
tion that risk communication is part and parcel of the process of negotiation among 
alternative cultural perspectives, which also means, the negotiation of shared mean-
ings over time (Bradbury, 1989: 393).  
Several implications for politics are worth mentioning: The concept of social construc-
tion highlights the importance of a two-way process of knowledge sharing and negotia-
tion. This is different from the linear model of communication in which the public is to 
be blamed for lack of knowledge. It leads to different priorities in management strate-
gies. In the linear model the priority for management would be the publication of infor-
mation products; however, the two-way model would focus on the development of 
interaction between different actors. Information sharing is seen to be means instead of 
an end itself.  
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Communication is seen as an integral part of decision-making in which participation is 
essential. The dialogue with various groups of experts, private sector, civil society and 
organisations which express the public’s view is seen as part of the management 
process. The communication process is seen as a common enterprise of creating 
values and generating mutual meaning.  
The cultural concept of risk addresses the policy problem of risk and provides a larger 
framework for solutions than the technical approach. It advocates that risk manage-
ment should initiate dialogue through participation to address different societal/cultural 
groups. Communication is seen as an essential part of the dialogue (Bradbury, 1989: 
394).  
This view is shared by Kunreuther and Slovic and expressed in their joint paper on 
“Science, Values, and Risk”. They argue that since addressing risk controversies with 
more science is likely to exacerbate conflict, a process-oriented solution which intro-
duces more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision-making is 
proposed. This approach is to make the risk decision process more democratic. This 
solution, in line with the cultural approach, includes negotiation, mediation, and other 
forms of public participation. Risk is conceptualised as a game in which the rules must 
be socially negotiated within the context of specific decision problems. It also advo-
cates the involvement of interested and affected parties to define and play the game, 
thus “emphasising institutional, procedural, and societal processes rather than quanti-
tative risk assessments” (Kunreuther, 1996: 123-125). 
2. CHALLENGE IN FLOOD MANAGEMENT 
As shown in the last chapter, different understandings of the concept of risk lead to 
different policy implications and consequently different risk mitigation strategies. In the 
case of flood risk there are different fields of actions in which the respective risk con-
cept impacts what and how actions are taken and how problems are solved in taking 
these actions. In the following chapter the fields of action will be identified and prob-
lems in those fields will be elaborated on.  
Literature on risk management usually describes the management process as a cycle 
that encompasses various phases of actions such as mitigation, preparedness, re-
sponse and recovery. The actions taken in different phases are overlapping and 
interwoven (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, Swedish Rescue Service 
Agency, 2008, Geenen, 2008, Pfeil, 2000). Pohl views preparedness, adjustment and 
adaptation as the focus and the time dimension of risk management. In the case of 
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flood risk management actions at various levels can be taken in these phases (Pohl, 
2003: 202-203):  
In the phase of preparedness individual preventive measures such as flood retrofitting 
can be practiced as a short term measure; in an inter-mediate term (adjustment phase) 
both technical flood protection measures such as construction of dams and dikes as 
well as creation of retention areas and legislative components such as spatial plan 
regulation, construction codes, regulation of environmental and social protection can be 
implemented; the third phase which is considered to be the most important and chal-
lenging involves changes taking place only in a very long term. This includes local 
collective memory and the perception of the relationship beween man and nature (Pohl, 
2003: 202-203). 
In terms of space, a clear border of areas affected by flood events can be defined in 
comparison to other natural hazards. Risk management takes place within the affected 
areas. However, due to the fact that a flood event often does not only affect one com-
munity, local flood protection without taking into account the entire potentially flooded 
area is not the most effective way to mitigate flood risks but only result in risk redistribu-
tion. The construction of dikes at one place raises the water level at other places. This 
conflict of interests between the populations and communities in upper and lower 
reaches is a commonly described problem in flood-related literature. A further space 
dimension of flood events is the impact of climate change which takes place at a global 
level in an ecological context (Pohl, 2003: 202).  
Similarly, according to the German Committee for Disaster Reduction (DKKV), flood 
risk management includes two major components: flood prevention and emergency 
management which are embedded in the cycle of disaster management (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Cycle of disaster management 
 
Source: DKKV, 2003: 19 
 
 
In this model, fields of actions are clearly defined in different phases. In the phase of 
emergency management, actions focus on flood fighting, humanitarian and reconstruc-
tion aid as well as recovery aiming at building up stronger social resilience (DKKV, 
2003: 19). Compared to the prevention phase, consensus and “objectivity” are more 
easily achieved in this phase (Pohl, 2003: 205). 
In the prevention phase there are seven fields of action:  
  Spatial precaution aims at minimising construction within flood plains; 
  Construction precaution regulates ways of construction with construction codes 
to adapt new buildings to flood events; 
  Risk precaution aims at financial risk mitigation through insurance; 
  Behaviour precaution prepares the population for dangerous situations through 
education; 
  Information precaution targets early warning and information for the population; 
  Natural water retaining capacity shall be increased by reforestation of mixed 
forest and recovery of retention areas and wet land; 
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  Technical flood protection measure such as dams, dikes and gated retention 
basins shall minimise the flood potential (DKKV, 2003: 19).  
The four components of preventive flood protection summarized by the Independent 
Commission of the Saxon State Government are also included in the DKKV framework 
(Unabhängige Kommission der Sächsischen Staatsregierung, 2002: 23). 
The complexity and challenges of the fields of action in the preventive phase can be 
illustrated with the list of the actors and organisations involved (see box 1 and 2).  
 
Box 1: List of actors in flood risk management 
 
 
 
Box 2: List of organisations in flood risk management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pohl, 2003: 205 
 
All involved actors and organisations represent different interests due to their different 
technical and political backgrounds. Decisions are made according to their understand-
ing of risk from their specific perspectives. Hence, risk judgement is biased through 
  Individuals and private households 
  Firms 
  Executive administration at different spatial and factual levels 
  Political unions (citizens’s groups, environmental activists, local unions of 
political parties) 
  Media 
  NGOs 
  Disaster economy 
  Scientific community and consultants 
  Technical planning and spatial planning organisations 
  Legislative organs 
  (Political) executives 
 
  Emergency management agency 
  Health agency 
  Navigation 
  Water protection 
  Sewage 
  Civil engineering 
  Hydraulic engineering 
  Agriculture 
  Tourism, local recreation, green space 
  Nature conservation, environmental issues  
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factors such as data availability and particularly represented interests (Pohl, 2003: 205). 
However, flood prevention and emergency management as an integrated management 
approach are tasks which can only be accomplished by close cooperation and coordi-
nation as well as communication between all actors. Lack of any of these components 
leads to problems in flood risk management (DKKV, 2003: 127). Yet, contesting under-
standings of flood risk often leads to challenges in risk communication. Therefore, it is 
essential both to understand discrepancies in flood risk perception between different 
actors and stakeholders and to identify gaps in risk communication. The following 
empirical study aims to reveal risk perception and communication which lead to differ-
ent actions of flood management and coping strategies to mitigate flood risk.   
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C SITES OF FIELD WORK 
The city of Wuhan in China and the city of Cologne in Germany are chosen to be field 
sites for the empirical investigation. The field site selection was largely determined by 
the nature of a comparative study apart from the pragmatic consideration. The first 
criterion is to find two comparable sites which are both flooded frequently. Due to the 
consideration of utilising the geographical convenience of the researcher, the city of 
Cologne in Germany was first chosen to be a field research site which has been 
confronted with flooding problems in the past decades as the following chapter will 
further elaborate on. Since Wuhan in China is one of the most frequently flooded cities 
along the Yangtze River and it has similar economic importance as the city of Cologne 
as the following chapter will show, Wuhan was chosen as an example for flood man-
agement in China. In this chapter a brief introduction to the location, population and 
economy as well as historical flood events will provide an overview of the main features 
of the field work sites.  
1. LOCATION, POPULATION AND ECONOMY 
1.1. Wuhan, China 
The city of Wuhan, Hubei province, lies upon the Yangtze River and its tributary, the 
Han River, in the People’s Republic of China. The Yangtze River, with its total length of 
over 6,300 kilometres, is the longest river in the People’s Republic of China. The 
Yangtze catchment area covers 1.8 million square kilometres and has a yearly dis-
charge of 960 billion cubic metres. It originates in Tanggula Mountain and runs through 
11 provinces, regions and cities before it empties into the East China Sea (see map 1). 
There are 437 tributaries whose catchment areas cover more than 1,000 square-
kilometres apart from a considerable number of tributaries which cover less than 1,000 
square-kilometres. The Han River is the longest tributary with a total length of 1,577 
kilometres and a discharge average of 1,500 m³/s (Xu et al., 2003: 1).  
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Map 1: Position of the Changjiang River Basin in China 
 
Source: Shi and Wang, 2003: 107 
 
Wuhan is located in the middle reach of the Yangtze River (see map 2). The geo-
graphical position of Wuhan is at 29° 58´-31°22´ latitude and 113°41´-115°05 longi-
tudes. Due to this position sub-tropical monsoon dominates the climate. Yearly rainfall 
is 1205 mm. Rainfall between June and August amounts to 40% of the total value. 
Wuhan lies in the Jianghan plain. The Yangtze and Han rivers run through the city and 
divide the city into three districts: Hankou, Wuchang and Hanyang. The Han empties 
into the Yangtze River in the city of Wuhan. The length of the Yangtze River which lies 
within the city of Wuhan is 73.4 kilometres and that of the Han River is 62 kilometres. 
(Xu, 2003: 380).  
The city area is 22 to 28 metres above sea level with most areas in the city 24 metres 
above the sea level. Worth noting is that these areas are 3 to 8 metres lower than the 
highest water level of the rivers.  
The metropolitan area covers ca. 8,467 square kilometres and is divided into 13 admin-
istrative districts. Nine of these districts belong to the core area of the metropolitan area 
of Wuhan. Two of them are suburban areas and another two are rural counties (see 
chart 1). As the provincial capital, Wuhan is the political, economic and cultural centre 
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of Hubei province as well as the intersection of water, air and land transportations 
(Wuhanshi Tongjiju, 2006).  
 
Chart 1: Administrative concept of the city of Wuhan 
Greater Wuhan
Rural counties
(2 counties)
City area
(11 districts)
Huangpi Xinzhou
City center
(9 districts)
Jiangnan, Jianghan,
Qiankou,Hanyang,
Wuchang, Qi ngshan,
Hongshan, Dongxihu,
Hannan
Suburbs
(2 districts)
Caidian, Ji ang xia
 
Source: Wang, 2002: 20 
 
According to statistics of 2006, Wuhan has a total population of 8.75 millions and the 
population density is 964 persons per km². Of the total population, 8.19 millions inhabi-
tants have official registrations. Among these, 2.99 millions belong to the urban popula-
tion and 5.19 millions belong to the rural population (Wuhanshi Tongjiju, 2006). 
Wuhan is one of the most important economic zones in the Yangtze River Basin (see 
map 2). The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the city of Wuhan is 259 billion Yuan in 
2006 and per capita GDP is about 3,790 USD. Net annual income of the urban inhabi-
tants is 12,369 Yuan (ca. 1,237 Euros) and of the rural inhabitants is 4,748 Yuan (ca. 
475 Euros) (Wuhanshi Tongjiju, 2006).  
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Map 2: Gross domestic product of the Changjiang river basin (2000) 
 
Source: Shi and Wang, 2003: 108 
1.2. Cologne, Germany 
The city of Cologne is situated in Germany upon the river Rhine which connects the 
Alps and the North See. The Rhine emanates in Grisons in Switzerland through the 
confluence of two source rivers: the Vorderrhein and the Hinterrhein. It is 1,320 km 
long and covers a catchments area of 185,000 km². It runs through nine countries and 
has seven tributaries (see map 3). The average yearly rainfall in the catchments is 900 
mm and thus, the Rhine catchment area is one of the regions with the highest precipi-
tation in Europe (IKSR, 2005).  
The Rhine is divided into six river sections: the Alp Rhine from the confluence of the 
source rivers at Reichenau (Switzerland) to Lake Constance, the High Rhine from the 
outlet of Lake Untersee to Basel, the Upper Rhine from Basel to Bingen, the Middle 
Rhine from Bingen to Cologne, the Lower Rhine from Cologne to Lobith and the Rhine 
delta from Lobith to North Sea/Wadden Sea (IKSR, 2005). 
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Map 3: Rhine catchments 
 
Source: IKSR, 2007 
 
The city of Cologne is located in the Middle Rhine area. The geographical position of 
Cologne is at 50°56’33.2607 latitude and 06°57’32.3136 longitude. The length of the 
river bank on the west side of the Rhine is 40 kilometres and the river bank on the east 
side is 27.3 kilometres. The highest spot in Cologne is located at 118 metres and the 
lowest at 37.5 metres above sea level. The zero point for the measurement of the 
water level in Cologne is 34.98 metres above sea level (Stadt Köln, 2006a: 9).  
The climate in Cologne is mild and humid. Yearly rainfall is 803 mm (between 1961 and 
1990) according to the statistics of the Deutscher Wetterdienst (Deutscher Wetterdienst, 
1996-2007). 
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Cologne has a city area of 405.15 km² and is divided into 9 administrative districts (see 
map 4) (Stadt Köln, 2006a: 11). Cologne has a total population of 1,024,346 according 
to the statistics of 2005. The population density is 2,434.1 people per km². The GDP in 
2004 was 39,243 billion Euros (The Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Cologne, 
2007: 7, Stadt Köln, 2006a: 11).  
Map 4: Structure of the city area of Cologne 
 
Source: Stadt Köln, 2006a: 11 
 
District borders 
Districts 
The River Rhine 
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2. HISTORICAL FLOOD EVENTS 
2.1. Wuhan, China 
From the year 1188 onwards flood events in Wuhan have been recorded in written 
documents. Altogether Wuhan was flooded more than 50 times in the last 800 years. 
The most severe flood disasters occurred in 1870, 1931, 1935 and 1954. The highest 
water level recorded in 1931 was 28.28 metres and the three city areas Hankou, 
Wuchang, and Hanyang were flooded for almost 100 days with the lowest locations 
being 6 metres under water. More than 70% of the population were affected and the 
death toll reached 32,600. In 1935, the highest water level recorded was 27.58 metres; 
the city area of Hanyang was flooded for up to 90 days. An area of 35.5 square kilome-
tres was inundated and 115,000 people were affected. In 1954, the highest water level 
reached 29.73 metres and the dike in Hanyang breached. Most of the factories had to 
interrupt their productions due to the dike breach (Xu, 2003: 380-383). 
Between 1865 and 2003 the water level has exceeded 27.30 metres 13 times accord-
ing to the measurement in Wuhanguan2 water station. Flood events of such magnitude 
occurred 8 times between 1980 and 2003. The magnitudes of the flood events in 1996, 
1998 and 1999 are comparable to the most severe flood event in 1954. The following 
table shows the flood events during which the water level was higher than 27.30 
metres3: 
Table 2: Statistics of the water levels above 27.30 metres measured in Wuhanguan water 
station between 1865 and 2003 
 
Year Water level Year Water level 
1954 29.73 1980 27.76 
1998 29.43 2002 27.76 
1999 28.89 1935 27.58 
1996 28.66 1968 27.39 
1931 28.28 1988 27.39 
1983 28.11 1870 27.36 
1995 27.79   
Source: Wuhan Shuiwuju, 2004 
                                               
2 A measure station whose measurement is taken as standard for flood protection planning.  
3 The water level of 27.30 metres is defined as “warning level” for flood protection in Wuhan. More details 
will be elaborated in Chapter E.1.1.a. 
C SITES OF FIELD WORK 2 HISTORICAL FLOOD EVENTS 
 
 
 39 
2.2. Cologne, Germany 
According to the “Flood protection concept of Cologne”, Cologne is the most affected 
city by floods in Europe. The first registration of flooding can be traced back to 920. 
The severest flood was recorded in 1784 when the water level in Cologne reached 
13.55 metres, the highest water level documented since 1342, caused by ice conges-
tion. The last flood event due to ice congestion occurred in 1963, since then this type of 
flood has not reoccurred in Cologne (Der Oberstadtdirektor, 1996: 10). The following 
table provides an overview of those flood events where the water level exceeded nine 
metres (the zero point for the measurement of the water level in Cologne is 34.98 
metres above the sea level) and these events have been documented since 1816: 
 
Table 3: Water levels above nine metres since 1816 
 
Year Water level Year Water level 
1845 10.34 m 1948 (21. Jan) 9.24 m 
1850 10.28 m 1955 9.80 m 
1876 9.74 m 1958 9.31 m 
1882 10.52 m 1970 9.87 m 
1920 10.58 m 1980 9.31 m 
1924 9.80 m 1983 (April) 9.84 m 
1926 10.69 m 1983 (May) 9.96 m 
1930 9.15 m 1984 9.11 m 
1944 9.08 m 1988 9.95 m 
1945 9.01 m 1993 10.63 m 
1946 9.32 m 1995 10.69 m 
1948 (02. Jan.) 10.41 m   
Source: Stadt Köln, 1996: 10 
 
Among the eleven flood events during which the water level was above 9.50 metres in 
the last 100 years, five of them occurred in the last 12 years. One can observe that in 
the period from 1950 seven flood events with water levels rising above nine metres 
occurred in the last 15 years, whereas only three such flood events occurred in the 30 
years before 1950. This shows that the frequency of flood events has been increasing 
over the last decades (Stadt Köln, 1996: 10).  
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3. ENGINEERED MEASURES 
3.1. Wuhan, China 
The fact that both the Yangtze and Han River run through the city of Wuhan, means a 
great challenge for the Municipality of Wuhan to cope with flood events. The Chinese 
water authorities intend to meet this challenge by applying engineered measures which 
are believed to be essential to guarantee the functionality of the city in case of a flood 
event (Xu et al., 2003: 382). 
Among these, the most important measure in Wuhan is dike construction. The first dike 
was built as early as in Beisong-Dynasty (1111-1118). By 1949, there were altogether 
108 kilometers of dike with a protection level of 28.28 meters. After the great flood in 
1954, the protection level was raised to 29.73 meters which equaled the highest water 
level reached during this flood event. During 1972-1973, 1.50 meters were added to 
the protection level of 29.73 meters to ensure more safety, and in 1982 this standard 
was again added another half meter. This protection level is to protect the city of 
Wuhan against flood events with a 20-30 years’ recurrence probability. There were 
altogether 286 kilometers of dikes in the city of Wuhan by the year 1992. These are 
built at different protection levels for differentiated protection objects such as the 
protection of critical infrastructure and chemical industries. However, detailed criteria 
for different protection purposes are not available in the researched literature. By 1992 
the length of the dike with the highest protection level was 178 kilometers within the city 
of Wuhan. The three districts Wuchang, Hankou and Hanyang which are divided by 
Yangtze River and Han River are enclosed by dikes and flood walls (see map 5) (Xu et 
al., 2003: 382). 
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According to the synopsis of the flood control plan of the city of Wuhan, there are 
nowadays altogether more than 800 kilometres of dikes in Wuhan, considered to be the 
only guarantee for the safety of the city in case of a flood event (Municipality of the City 
of Wuhan, 2004: 1).  
However, despite the increase of the length and the continuous improvement of the 
dike quality and standard, the city would not be able to withstand a flood event with a 
water level exceeding the flood protection level of flood events with 20-30 years of 
recurrence probability without additional measures (Xu et al., 2003: 382, Wang et al., 
2002b: 53). 
According to the “Report on the Plan for the Integrated Management of Yangtze River” 
which was set up as early as 1959 (Xu et al., 2003: 381), Wuhan with its population of 
ca. 8.75 millions falls into the category of cities which have to be protected against 
flood events with more than 200 years of recurrence probability (see table 4) (Cheng 
and Shang, 2005: 70). To reach this level, the plan dictated that in addition to the 
retention areas in the Jingjiang and Chenglingji areas, a retention volume of 6.8 billion 
cubic meters had to be created nearby Wuhan. Thus, the retention areas of Xilianghu, 
Dongxihu, Wuhu, Zhangduhu, Baizhanghu und Dujiatai were built up between 1954 
and 1973. The retention area of Dujiatai alone can detain 11 billion cubic meters of 
water (Xu et al., 2003: 381).  
Table 4: Statistics of the cities which have reached national standard for flood protection 
Non-
agricultural 
population  
National standard  
(According to 
recurrence 
probability) 
Number of 
cities with 
flood 
protection 
task 
Number of 
cities 
which 
have 
reached 
the 
national 
standard 
Percent of 
the cities 
which 
have 
reached 
the 
national 
standard 
Number of 
cities 
which 
have not 
reached 
the 
national 
standard 
Percent of 
the cities 
which have 
not 
reached 
the national 
standard 
Mega city 
(> 2 million) 
> 200   13 3 23.1% 10 76.9% 
Very big cities 
(1 - 2 million) 
Population > 1.5 
million: > 200; 
Population < 1.5 
million: 100-200 
25 5 20.0% 20 80.0% 
Big cities 
(500,000 - 
1 million) 
100 - 200 53 10 18.9% 43 81.1% 
Medium sized 
cities 
(200,000-
500,000) 
50 - 100 207 64 30.9% 143 69.1% 
Small cities 
(< 200,000) 
20 - 50 322 154 47.8% 168 52.2% 
Total  620 236 38.1% 384 61.9% 
Source: Cheng and Shang, 2005: 70 
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In 1973 the Reservoir Danjiangkou was built at the upper reach of Han River with a 
volume of 7.8 billion of cubic meters (Xu et al., 2003: 381). In addition to this there are 
now other 273 reservoirs with different volumes. The total water detaining volume of 
the reservoirs now sums up to 925 millions cubic meters (Municipality of the City of 
Wuhan, 2004: 1). Apart from these water detaining measures, a pumping system was 
built up to increase the drainage volume. There are 50 pumping stations with a total 
pumping volume of 714.68 cubic meters per second. The completion of Three Gorges 
Project is expected to significantly increase the flood protection standard in Wuhan (Xu 
et al., 2003: 382). 
3.2. Cologne, Germany 
Due to the low elevation of the city of Cologne, an area of 3.000 hectares would be 
flooded once the water level of the Rhine reaches 7 m. Therefore, to prevent inunda-
tion, technical flood protection measures have been put in place. A computer-
supported system of 120 water gauging stations, 500 distributing regulators and 54 
pump stations with a total pumping volume of 110,000 cubic meters guarantees that 
sewage is fed into a sewage plant up to a water level of 10.70 m (Der Oberstadtdirektor, 
1996). 
In addition to the pumping system there are 16 km of dikes, 8 km of high embankments 
and 11 km of protection walls which are built along the 67 km river bank inside the 
Cologne city limits. For some of the districts such as Zündorf and Altstadt mobile flood 
protection elements will be installed on existing flood walls. This special technical 
measure is meant not only to protect the area from inundation, but also to prevent the 
city’s landscape in flood free periods from being impaired (Der Oberstadtdirektor, 1996: 
96). 
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D METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
1. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.1. Qualitative social research method 
In order to operationalise the research plan described above, appropriate social sci-
ence methodologies, particularly qualitative techniques will be applied. The pluralisa-
tion of ways of lives in contemporary society demands social scientists to investigate 
their research topics in diverse social contexts and perspectives. Due to the novelty of 
these social contexts and perspectives they have to adjust their classical deductive 
methods. Social science engages itself with new social areas which are not known to 
us in the first place. By doing so, one cannot aim at testing existing theory, but generat-
ing new theories. Blumers states that the starting point of a social scientist for a re-
search is always the lack of knowledge about the field to be investigated (Flick, 2002: 
12-13).  
However, standard quantitative social research seems unable to fully embrace this 
challenge. Bonß and Hartmann elaborated their observation on the “Entzauberung” of 
science: science can no longer claim to offer the ultimate truth. Complex research 
results are often neither accessible nor widely applicable in political and social life, as 
one would desire them to be. In order to keep up with standard quantitative research, 
qualitative research questions and research results are often far removed from the 
reality (Flick, 2002). In addition, no matter how strict a method control is practiced, 
research and research results cannot avoid being influenced by the researchers’ social 
and cultural background. The ideal of objectiveness in science is dishonoured. Under 
such circumstances it can no longer be claimed that science is always based on a true 
objective theorem. Subjective and situational statements are the remaining terrain 
which can be reached by qualitative methods. Nevertheless the research results must 
be supported by logical and cogent arguments. Qualitative research can serve the 
purpose to generate this type of findings (Flick, 2002). 
As a consequence, qualitative social research focuses on using appropriate methods 
and theories which are based on the research objects. It not only analyses different 
perspectives, but also takes the researcher’s reflection about his or her research into 
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account and moreover this reflection is seen as part and parcel of generated knowl-
edge (Flick, 2002). It is the research object as much as the researcher that determines 
a research method. As the research object cannot be fractioned into single variables, 
qualitative methods investigate the object in its daily situation and in a holistic manner 
(Flick, 2002). Objectives of qualitative social research are not only to test existing 
theories, but also to discover new theories with empirical validity (Flick, 2002). 
This research investigates risk perception and communication in different cultural 
settings, which are situational and embedded in time and space. A positivistic approach 
is not adequate for cultural studies, as cultural studies are constructivist both in their 
production of contexts and in their analysis of power relations (Winter, 2003: 212-213). 
Deploying cultural theory coming from an interpretive rather than a positivistic tradition 
for this research, a qualitative method seems to be feasible, especially because many 
cultural empirical studies applying positivistic quantitative methods have not yielded the 
expected result (Tansey, 2004: 29). 
1.2. Research subjects 
To investigate the risk perception and communication of various stakeholders and 
actors a broad range of interviewees have been chosen. The interviewees cover 
government officials of different agencies such as the flood protection agency, envi-
ronmental agency and Fire Brigade etc., representatives of NGOs such as conserva-
tionists’ union, farmers’ union and citizens’ groups as well as the military.  
In China interviewees at different management levels for flood protection were invited 
to attend the discussion with the researcher, since flood protection in China is arranged 
in a hierarchical way and all management levels from the central to the local govern-
ment are involved in flood protection decisions. This includes the national, river basin 
and local levels.  
In Germany the interviews focused on the regional and local levels, since the main 
responsibility of flood protection and management rests with the local and regional 
agencies.  
1.3. Range of methods applied and the field work 
The qualitative research methods applied in this research include semi-structural 
interviewing, informal interviewing, participant observation and general field observa-
tion. 
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Semi-structural expert interviewing is frequently practiced due to its flexible form which 
allows the interviewer to conduct the interview in a relatively informal atmosphere and 
therefore leaves room for new leads. The written guidelines which determine the 
interview structure still provide a comparable framework. This method is especially 
applicable to research which involves high-level bureaucrats and elite members of a 
community who have time constraints (Bernard, 2006: 212, Kelle and Kluge, 1999: 63). 
Since the research subjects in this study all belong to this category, semi-structural 
interviewing seemed to be the most appropriate method to generate data. 
The interviews were mostly conducted at the work places of the interviewees, espe-
cially the interviews with government officials. Some of the discussions took place in a 
more informal way during a working lunch or dinner. Meetings with interviewees in 
Germany were sometimes also arranged in a cafeteria. By doing so, the atmosphere 
was more relaxed and the interviewees were more at ease to talk about sensitive 
topics. 
Due to the specific cultural background in China meetings were often continued during 
lunch time. This allowed the researcher to have the chance to conduct more informal 
data collection. The information collected on such occasions was documented in form 
of a field diary, since taking notes was not appropriate under such circumstances.  
Both in China and Germany the planned one-to-one interviews were often adapted to 
focus group discussions, since interview partners were sometimes joined by their 
colleagues spontaneously. The field experience shows that this type of discussion 
contributed to data collection on the one hand, since more information could be gener-
ated and the statements of the interviewees were controlled by each other to provide 
the researcher a more objective picture of the information, which is also described by 
Flick (Flick, 2002); on the other hand, group discussion may hinder some interviewees 
to speak freely. 
The method of participant observation was only applied in Germany, since it is an 
uncommon practice for the Chinese agencies to accept researchers as observers 
within their offices. 
The participant observation took place in two forms: working in the Flood Protection 
Centre (HSZ) as an intern in December 2005 and participation in the internal meetings 
of the local, regional and international actors. During the period of the internship, the 
researcher was integrated into the team of HSZ and took part in their daily work and 
meetings within and outside of HSZ with other agencies and actors. The researcher 
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could gain an insight into the work of HSZ and the interaction between the agencies 
and other actors such as interest groups or private enterprises.  
During the field work data collection was carried out in 2 or more phases. The data 
collected in the first phase was at least partly interpreted, so that the researcher could 
determine which type of data should be further collected to fill in existing gaps (Flick, 
2002). 
The field work in China was divided into 2 phases. The first field phase lasted from the 
end of August until the middle of October 2005. In this field phase a bottom-up strategy 
was applied, since the researcher mainly interviewed local river basin and flood man-
agers in Wuhan. After analysing the data collected during the first field trip a second 
field phase was carried out between November and December 2006. The objective of 
the second field phase was to generate the data which should fill in the “gaps” of the 
data collected during the first field work. Further interviews were conducted with inter-
viewees at the river basin and at national level as well as with a NGO. 
The field work in Cologne was conducted during the period of 2005 and 2007 due to 
the geographical vicinity of the researcher to the city of Cologne; therefore there was 
no clear cut field work phase like in China. 
2. FIELD WORK EXPERIENCES 
It is worth noting that the researcher had very different experiences during the field 
work conducted in Wuhan, China and Cologne, Germany. These differences lie in the 
access to the field and the attitude of the interview partners towards the research and 
the researcher as well as the ways how they respond to questions. 
2.1. In Germany 
The access to the field in Germany was effortless. After the researcher identified the 
interview partners who might provide interesting information, these partners were 
contacted via e-mails or phone calls. Almost all the persons being contacted offered a 
meeting to the researcher. Those who did not consider themselves to be the “right 
person to speak to” recommended other interview partners. At the beginning of each 
interview, the researcher asked the interview partner if they had any objections to 
recording the discussion. All interview partners consented to it and the researcher had 
the impression that they felt comfortable with the fact that the interviews were recorded. 
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The interview partners in Germany showed great openness and interest to the re-
search topic and the researcher. They were willing to provide all relevant information. 
In addition, they often voluntarily offered information materials such as brochures, 
papers, internal documents of their agencies and other literature. This attitude led to a 
smooth communication between the researcher and the interview partners. The inter-
view atmosphere was informal and relaxed. The interview partners were not hesitant to 
express their objection to the current practice in their or other agencies as well as the 
entire flood management in Germany. 
2.2. In China 
Compared to the experience in Cologne, Germany, the access to the field in Wuhan, 
China proved to be a great challenge. Before the first phase of the field work, the 
researcher sent introductory letters to potential interview partners elucidating the 
research interests and research objectives. These letters were written both in Chinese 
and English, an official letter head of the United Nations University was attached. 
However, none of these letters were replied to.  
After the first failure of the official contact, the researcher decided to use personal 
contacts to establish access to the field, as it seemed to be more promising in a Chi-
nese cultural context to the knowledge of the researcher as a Chinese national. The 
researcher chose a more informal way to establish the access to the flood manage-
ment agency of the municipal government of the city of Wuhan by making use of her 
own social network. Drawing on an acquaintance’s personal contacts to the head of 
one of the divisions in the Agency of Foreign Affairs in the municipal government of 
Wuhan proved most promising. The procedure involved confidence-building measures 
in accordance with the Chinese conventions, such as personally inviting the contact 
person, who is living in Germany, for dinner. Subsequently, the researcher obtained the 
name and address of the person working in the Agency for Foreign Affairs in Wuhan. 
The contact person in Germany suggested to the researcher not to send any official 
letter to the Agency for Foreign Affairs asking for assistance until he in turn would have 
settled the situation with his friend in a face to face situation during a trip to China. 
Finally, the contact to the Agency for Foreign Affairs was established through a number 
of personal contacts and the researcher received an official letter from the respective 
agency inviting her to conduct her research in Wuhan. The researcher was now offi-
cially assisted by the Division for Foreign Experts of the Agency for Foreign Affairs 
instead of the division which the researcher had originally contacted. The reason for 
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this was that the latter division was only “in charge of Europe”. Since the researcher 
was conducting her research for the United Nations University, she counted as a 
“foreign expert”, although she informed the agency that she is a Chinese national4.  
As the researcher arrived in the field, it became apparent that an additional research 
permission from the mayor of Wuhan was needed. Luckily, she was supported by an 
invitee to the United Nations University-organised Urban Training Programme (UTP), 
Mr D. This participant was the deputy head of the Division for Special Tasks of the 
municipal government of Wuhan and therefore had close collaboration with the mayor’s 
office. Thus, the researcher was able to obtain the research permission shortly after 
and the field work could finally begin.  
During the first phase of the field work (August - October 2005) the Agency for Foreign 
Affairs was supportive in organising meetings requested by the researcher. Introduc-
tory letters were produced by the agency introducing and allowing the researcher to 
establish further contacts with the interview partners. Once a meeting had been ar-
ranged by the Agency for Foreign Affairs, the researcher could enter the office building 
of the interview partners with an introductory letter of the Agency for Foreign Affairs 
and her own ID card. After the scrutiny of the suspicious guards, the researcher could 
finally speak to her interview partners.  
Doubtlessly, the establishment of the access to the field in China for the first field work 
phase was challenging, however, unexpectedly, the second field phase required even 
more persistence and communication skills.  
As the researcher contacted the Agency for Foreign Affairs in Wuhan asking for assis-
tance in the second field work phase, the head of the Division for Foreign Experts, Ms. 
W. replied through her assistant Ms. Z. that her agency “was not going to be involved in 
this research” anymore without providing any reasons. However, later in the field the 
researcher found out (again!) through her personal contact with Ms. Z. about the 
reason for the unwillingness to assist. Mr D., who then had attended the UTP taking 
place in Germany, had returned to Wuhan and informed Ms. W. that the research 
conducted in Wuhan by the researcher might “have negative impact on the image of 
the city of Wuhan”. Thus, the access to the field through the Agency for Foreign Affairs 
was no longer an option. 
Under such circumstances, the researcher had to establish contacts to further interview 
partners without the above agency. As a consequence, the research could not be 
                                               
4 The Division for European Affairs and the Division for Foereign Experts are independent sections within 
the Agency for Foreign Affairs. 
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conducted officially due to the missing research permission and the introductory letters 
of the agency. Subsequently, the researcher had to mobilise her social network in 
China including those contacts she established during the first field work phase to gain 
access to more interviewees. Often the researcher, sticking to the culturally expected 
way of establishing contacts, had to invite several people to dinner in a row in order to 
reach the end of the chain, the desired interview partner. The advantage of this prac-
tice was that the discussions were no longer official and the atmosphere of the discus-
sion was more at ease. 
However, the difficulty in gaining access to the field resulted in constraints in sampling. 
The desired interview partners were sometimes not accessible despite of all the efforts 
of the researcher. Another constraint was the attitude of the interviewees. They were 
cautious in responding to the questions of the researcher and often perceived the 
questions to be a threat in spite of the efforts of the researcher to formulate the ques-
tions as “harmless” as possible. In order to put the interview partners more at ease, the 
researcher had to forbear from recording most of the interviews. 
The reasons for this could be seen in the following: firstly, the interviewees were not 
familiar with social research practices and therefore were not used to being interviewed 
by a researcher; secondly, the interviewees could not estimate the consequences of 
their answers and predict which impact the research results could possibly have on 
them; thirdly, Chinese are unwilling to express criticism which could harm the harmony 
of the society, and they are especially unwilling to do so in front of a wairen, an “exter-
nal person”. A Chinese saying reveals this unwillingness: “The scandals of the family 
shall never go beyond the family”. The researcher was considered to be an external 
person irrespective of the fact that she is a Chinese national. As long as she does not 
belong to a Chinese Danwei, working unit, it is assumed that she represents the 
interests of the “others”. More importantly, she is beyond the control mechanism within 
a Danwei whose main function is social control (Weggel, 1994: 52). In such a case, 
cautiousness in providing information became necessary for the interviewees. 
The different field work experiences in China and Germany demonstrate different 
behavioural patterns of the interview partners. These patterns are clearly embedded in 
their social relations and societal rules. Chinese are shaped by the Confucianism 
consensus tradition whereas the Germans are shaped by Kantian conflict tradition 
(Finger, 2007: 45). That is why the Chinese actors interviewed seldom criticized or 
blamed anyone, and the German actors seemed to talk about failures and mistakes or 
D METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 3 DATA 
 
 
 51 
conflicts between actors more openly. The field work experiences as part of the data 
will be further analysed in the framework of the cultural theory in Chapter G. 
3. DATA  
3.1.  Data and data transcription  
In this research different types of data collections were carried out: qualitative semi-
structured interviews which were partially recorded during the field work, a field work 
diary and notes taken during the participant observation in Cologne. In addition the 
researcher had the opportunity to get an insight into the internal documents of respec-
tive risk management agencies and take notes as data. Also, further documents such 
as reports on meetings with other actors and agencies were collected as part of the 
object of analysis.  
Especially the field work diary produced during the field work in China is an important 
data resource due to the fact that information exchange also took place in a situation in 
which recording and note taking were not possible. This type of data generation is 
described as informal interviewing in social research methodology (Bernard, 2006: 211).  
The qualitative interviews for this research were conducted in the respective native 
language of the interview partners in China and Germany. For further interpretation 
these interviews were transcribed. In order to keep the information as accurate as 
possible, the interviews were transcribed into the same language in which the inter-
views were conducted. The data was only translated into English when a citation was 
necessary.  
Data transcription was undertaken with a combination of different transcription methods 
to serve the purpose of the interpretation and in the meantime to avoid unnecessary 
time consumption. Therefore, a literary transcription which intends to stay as close as 
possible to the spoken language of the interview partner with all distinguishing marks 
such as “hmms” and “ehs” was not applied here. Instead, only the data with a direct 
relevance to the research question was transcribed into normal written German or 
Chinese. In addition to this, special reactions of interview partners are noted and 
commented in the transcription, for example, a particularly long pause has been 
marked when the interview partner began elaborating on a certain relevant topic or 
special emphasis of words or sentences. This combination of transcription techniques 
is considered to be the appropriate method for most of the works in the discipline of 
geography (Pfaffenbach, 2006: 164-165).   
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Due to possible consequences for the interviewees a list of interviews and names of 
interview partners is not included. This applies for all data, collected both in China and 
Germany. 
3.2. Data analysis  
Transcribed interviews serve as the basis of the data interpretation, whereas the field 
work diary and field notes provide contextual information.  
As a preparation for the data analysis category systems were constructed. There are 
two possibilities for the creation of a category system: to attach a certain phenomenon 
to a class of phenomena which are known (subsumption); or to construct a new cate-
gory to describe or explain an empirical phenomenon (abduction) (Kelle and Kluge, 
1999: 58). Thus coding can be undertaken in two different forms as well: one can 
prepare a category system and build a code accordingly; so called abductive coding 
generates a new category based on collected data (Kelle and Kluge, 1999: 59). 
Even if one develops codes without having a category system, it does not necessarily 
mean that coding takes place in an abductive manner. This type of coding can be 
based on the researcher’s theoretical knowledge generated before. 
A category system is developed according to the researcher’s existing theoretical 
knowledge and research questions. Theoretical knowledge includes general theoretical 
concepts which are not empirically tested but have heuristic function, background 
knowledge for a specific research situation and empirically verified social theories 
(Kelle and Kluge, 1999: 59). 
Guidelines for interviews play an important role in category and code development, 
since some of the categories are already settled during the process of drafting guide-
lines. Interview partners are addressed with questions according to previous drafted 
guidelines so that an interpretation accordingly seems to be a logical consequence. 
Nevertheless more categories and codes emerge due to new information which is not 
anticipated by researcher before the field work (Kelle and Kluge, 1999: 65). 
In this research code building is carried out in following steps: 
1. A category system is developed according to guidelines of the semi-structured 
interviews undertaken.  
2. By going through the interviews, unexpected new information comes up and is 
coded in new codes or categories as complementary to existing categories. 
According to the developed coding system the data was structured and categorised for 
the data presentation and interpretation. 
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4. THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER 
Despite of all methodical examinations, as a researcher one can never be free of his or 
her social and cultural background. The research question, hypothesis as well as the 
interpretation of data are influenced by this background and by personal or institutional 
research interests (Flick, 2002).  
However, subjectivity of a researcher is not seen as a disturbing variable which impairs 
research results; rather, it is part of the research process. In natural science, the 
standard methods are sufficient for analysis, but these methods cannot always be 
applied for social science, for human beings are the research subject. It is inevitable 
that the researchers incorporate their own “personal potential” into the research, to 
detect more than a standard method would enable them to do so (Seiffert, 2003: 257). 
In such a case it is essential to reflect upon the researcher’s personal behaviour, 
observation, impression, irritation, influences and feelings etc. in the research process. 
This type of reflection is considered to be part of data collected, which is also incorpo-
rated into data interpretation (Flick, 2002). 
The long experience of having lived and worked in both research target countries 
China and Germany enabled the researcher to have a deeper insight into the social 
and cultural contexts of the field sites and guaranteed smooth interaction between the 
researcher and the interviewees. The interpretation of the data has often been based 
on these experiences and knowledge about the respective societal and cultural con-
ventions. But yet, the researcher as a human being is inevitably value-laden and 
therefore biased. Being aware of this fact, the researcher constantly reflected her 
interpretation and endeavoured to put her interpretation into perspectives.  
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E RESEARCH RESULTS  
“Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that 
is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as 
true.” – Michel Foucault (Gorden, 1980: 131) 
  
In chapter B different fields of action in flood risk management and potential problem 
dimensions in taking these actions have been discussed. In the following chapter the 
problems which have surfaced during the field work in Wuhan and Cologne will be 
elaborated on. These problems show how different actors perceive flood risk in differ-
ent ways and how they construe their own realities and truths. In turn their risk percep-
tion leads to different ways of flood risk communication and flood risk mitigation strate-
gies.  
Flood risk perception is a “construct” which one can not observe directly. It is therefore 
essential to translate this unobservable construct into observable parameters so that 
this construct can be described in operational language. To look at perception in a 
more operational manner, one needs to create an operational language to describe this 
phenomenon (Seiffert, 2003: 203-207). The observable parameters used here to 
elucidate differences and commonalities in flood risk perception among different 
stakeholders in flood risk management agencies between Wuhan, China and Cologne, 
Germany are the problem dimensions in flood risk management which reflect com-
monalities and differences in perception and communication. These problem dimen-
sions will be discussed under the following aspects:  
o organization of flood risk management in terms of institutional arrangement of 
flood protection and flood protection measures which are being practiced;  
o the role of spatial planning in flood risk management and the principles accord-
ing to which it is being shaped;  
o distribution of risk in the process of planning and decision making as well as 
representation and enforcement of different interests and reconciliation of con-
flicts;  
o differences of perceptions of different stakeholders; 
o constraints and advantages of flood protection strategies as perceived by man-
agement agencies which will also shed some light on their risk perception;  
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o different notions of human-nature relationship which impact on flood risk per-
ception  
Using these categories in flood risk management the following chapter will endeavour 
to describe flood risk perception of Chinese and German actors and elucidate the 
differences and commonalities as well as why these differences emerge. 
Flood risk communication and perception are two interdependent elements in risk 
management. However, for the purpose of analysis flood risk communication will be 
elaborated in a separated sub-chapter. The analysis of risk communication includes the 
aspects of inter-agency communication and cooperation, information and risk aware-
ness as well as questioning of authority. 
1. FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
1.1. Institutional arrangement of flood protection 
1.1.a. Wuhan, China 
The institutional arrangement of flood protection in the city of Wuhan is an integral part 
of the national flood protection system in China and is closely linked to the other 
administrative levels of management due to its hierarchical structure. Therefore, an 
overview of the flood protection system in China is essential to understand how flood 
risk in Wuhan is managed. 
The flood protection system in China is based on China Water Law, China Flood 
Control Law, China flood protection regulation, China river management regulation, 
Reservoir and dike safety regulation, Guidelines for the safety construction within 
retention areas, Plan for extreme flood events on important rivers as well as other 
respective policies and guidelines regulating national economic and social develop-
ment (Cheng et al., 2004: 29, Wang, 1999). The State Council is the top decision-
making organ in cases of critical flood situations. The Chinese government assumes 
the whole responsibility and sets up flood control headquarters at various levels as the 
flood control executive body (Interview 2005/2006).  
There are four flood management levels:  
The first level is the central government whose executive body is the national agency 
State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters (SFCDRH). SFCDRH is located 
within and supported by the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR); however, it reports to 
the State Council. A Vice Premier takes the role of the General Commander of 
SFCDRH while the Minister of Water Resources serves as the standing deputy head. 
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Other leadership members including leaders from related ministries and stakeholders 
at national level are also represented within the SFCDRH (see chart 2).  
Chart 2: Organisation for flood control and disaster relief in China 
Central government
Flood Control
Disaster Relief
State Development Planning Commission
Ministry of Civil Affairs
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Construction
Ministry of Land and Resources
Ministry of Water Resources
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Health
China Meteorological Bureau
Armed Force
Other Ministries
Central government
Source: Wang, 1999: 37 
 
The executive office of SFCDRH supports routine operations and is responsible for the 
formulation of flood control standards and criteria as well as a national approval of flood 
control options regarding flood management options during a flood. 
The second level is Yangtze River basin management level. The executive body is the 
Yangtze Flood Control Headquarter (YFCH) which is located within the Changjiang 
Water Resources Commission (CWRC). CWRC is one of the seven river basin com-
missions created by the Ministry of Water Resources to implement water resource 
management policies at river basin level. YFCH is a leading decision making body of 
the Yangtze flood control in which the Hubei Governor serves as the Head, the CWRC 
Commissioner as the standing deputy head, and the vice governors of the remaining 
five provinces in the middle and lower basin as deputy heads.  
According to the empirical data collected during the field work (Interviews, 2005/2006) 
this structure of leadership is an expression of an informal strategic consideration: 
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since most of the retention areas are located in Hubei province, the governor of the 
province as the head of the YFCH can largely elevate the decision-making efficiency. 
This arrangement is a result of some pragmatic considerations: The Governor of Hubei 
province, having the most retention areas and the biggest retention volume in the 
Yangtze middle and lower reaches (see table 5) is put into a strong position to simplify 
the decision-making process significantly in cases of severe flood events in which 
retention areas have to be used to guarantee the safety of important objects at risk. 
This arrangement also avoids potentially conflicting situations among different decision 
makers.   
Table 5: Retention areas of Yangtze River catchments 
Retention areas of Yangtze River catchments 
Nr. Retention 
area 
River Province Total area 
(km²) 
Agricultural 
area 
(km²) 
Population 
(x10,000) 
Retention volume 
(x100,000,000 m³) 
1 Jingjiang 
Fenhong Qu 
Yangtze Hubei 921.30 340.00 46.42 54.00 
2 Wanshi 
Kuoda Qu 
Yangtze Hubei 96.00 58.00 6.20 2.00 
3 Renmin 
Dayuan 
Yangtze Hubei 255.00 184.00 19.24 11.88 
4 Huxi Beixu 
Qu 
Yangtze Hubei 86.00 50.67 5.40 3.80 
5 Dongtinghu 
Xuhong 
Yuan 
Yangtze Hunan 2834.04 1490.34 146.41 65.68 
6 Honghu 
Fenhong Qu 
Yangtze Hubei 2782.80 868.67 96.90 189.40 
7 Xiliang Hu Yangtze Hubei 1032.00 564.67 56.50 42.30 
8 Dongxi Hu Han Hubei 444.00 236.67 18.00 20.00 
9 Wu Hu Yangtze Hubei 289.00 122.67 10.20 18.00 
10 Zhangdu Hu Yangtze Hubei 309.00 236.00 28.20 10.00 
11 Baitan Hu Yangtze Hubei 204.00 174.00 30.30 8.80 
12 Dujiatai Yangtze 
Han 
Hubei 614.00 226.00 10.40 22.90 
13 Poyang Hu Yangtze Jiangxi 508.80 187.34 15.40 26.20 
14 Huayang He Yangtze Anhui, 
Hubei 
1460.00 746.67 79.00 62.00 
Total 11835.94 5485.67 568.57 636.96 
Source: Li, 1999: 284 
The advantage of this informal institutional arrangement can only be gained under 
certain cultural conditions. First, self-sacrifice has always been one of the important 
E RESEARCH RESULTS 1 FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
 58 
virtues held high in Chinese culture whereas sacrificing the others to protect one’s own 
interests is much criticized. The decision which retention areas are to be sacrificed to 
serve the “greater goal and interests” is therefore also a moral game. The other gover-
nors must not be given the opportunity to blame for a moral judgement that the inter-
ests of the other provinces were jeopardized. The Governor of Hubei province shall 
rather be honoured for his “self-sacrifice”. And “self-sacrifice” has a deeper root which 
is embedded in the Chinese culture. If self-sacrifice means to sacrifice oneself, how, 
then can a governor of a province be more self-sacrificing than by sacrificing flooding 
retention areas in his own province rather than the adjacent provinces? This behaviour 
does not come as a surprise if one looks at the concept of a state in Chinese culture. It 
is reflected even in the Chinese language. The term “nation state” in Chinese language 
means literally “state family”. A state is more perceived as a family and the governmen-
tal officials are even today called “parental officials” in many official occasions and 
especially in daily language. If a governor plays a parental role to guarantee the fam-
ily’s prosperity and to protect the interest of a bigger unit e.g. the interests of a region 
or even the interests of the whole country, then the act of sacrifice is more than justified 
– it becomes a moral obligation. Thus, this strategy can only be functional in a specific 
cultural context. The social value of self-sacrifice and the concept of governing in such 
a cultural framework lead to social expectations which justify and encourage this kind 
of behaviour. 
The executive office of the YFCH, set up at the CWRC, acts as the technical adviser of 
the YFCH by preparing flood control plans before the event and flood management 
options during a flood such as operation of major detention basins and provision of 
flood forecasts. Flood management orders are issued by the YFCH instead of the 
CWRC. 
State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters oversee and direct YFCH’s 
operations during major flood emergencies. 
The third level to manage flood risk is the provincial level. The Hubei Provincial Flood 
Control and Drought Relief Headquarters (PFCDRH) are located within the Provincial 
Bureau of Water Resources and chaired by the provincial governor. They are in charge 
of the transmission of field data to the YFCH and/or to the SFCDRH as required. They 
implement orders from the YFCH or the SFCDRH to use detention basins and organize 
and coordinate emergency civil protection operations and evacuation efforts for af-
fected areas through provincial governmental departments. They are also in charge of 
all flood forecasting and river management work within their own provincial areas, 
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particularly for the Yangtze tributaries within the provincial area, and they give orders to 
the city/county and provide guidance for flood management operations. A major flood 
management role of the provinces, however, is the implementation of decisions from 
the YFCH and the SFCDRH, particularly breaching the dikes, when ordered, to flood 
detention basins located in different provinces. Unlike the detention basins in Western 
countries, including Germany, where they can only have flood-compatible uses and 
thus they are usually free of inhabitants or major infrastructures, the situation in China 
is different: while the state is making efforts to relocate people from high hazard deten-
tion basins, many are still densely populated and contain major infrastructure. This is 
as a result of China’s huge predominantly rural population. Detention areas will only be 
used to store excess water for major floods but people will still live in them during minor 
floods (Interviews 2005/2006).  
Therefore, potential cost to the provinces and the local people of flooding these basin 
areas can be high - in terms of human as well as in terms of monetary losses. This is 
even amplified when considering that compensation laws and flood insurance are still 
embryonic in China and only the very basic needs are met in the event of major flood 
damage. For this reason, a decision to flood a critical basin is made only as a last 
resort and to prevent more catastrophic damage elsewhere. In this regard, the 
SFCDRH and the YFCH together with the CWRC play a key role as “neutral” parties in 
deciding which of the detention basins located in the various provinces should be 
flooded to achieve the maximum hydraulic impact for damage reduction purposes both 
locally and downstream.  
The informal institutional arrangement mentioned above also contributes to the efficient 
implementation of the operations with regard to the retention area, since the Governor 
of Hubei province serves as the head of the YFCH as well as the head of the Hubei 
Provincial Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters. He at the same time takes 
over the same role of a decision-maker and of an executive operator.   
The fourth level of flood risk management is the city/county level which works on a 
local scale. Wuhan Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters are established 
within the Municipality Water Bureau which is the main executive body for the imple-
mentation of structural and non-structural measures for flood protection in Wuhan as 
well as the organization of flood fighting at the local level. The mayor of the city of 
Wuhan functions as the head of the Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters 
whereas the head of the Bureau of Water Resources in the Municipality Government of 
Wuhan acts as the deputy head. The headquarters consist of members of respective 
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governmental departments at municipal level, army force stationed in Wuhan and the 
head of the civil armed force (Municipality of the City of Wuhan, 2004: 2).  
Chart 3 gives an overview of the organisational features of flood risk management in 
China and how the management at Wuhan local level is interlinked to higher manage-
ment levels: 
Chart 3: Organisational features of flood management in China 
 
 
 
Source: Wang, 2005 
 
The organization of flood management in China is highly hierarchical. Flood control 
headquarters/offices at various levels are all commanded by government heads (vice 
premier, governors, mayors) with water resources departmental heads as executive 
deputy commanders; the government leadership has the authority to mobilize all 
necessary resources.  
Line departments (army, finance, civil affairs, supplies, communications, transportation, 
energy, health etc.), which have designated representatives in the flood control head-
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quarters/offices, shall take action once order is received from the headquarters accord-
ing to the division of responsibility. 
At the local level, flood risk management is organized in the same hierarchical style as 
in the higher management levels. Municipality, district and street/community all set up 
their own flood control headquarters and leadership is taken over by the heads of the 
communist party and of the administration. Other governmental departments and units 
such as urban construction, petrol, electric power, railway, transportation and naviga-
tion etc., which are assigned to take over flood management tasks, also set up their 
own flood control headquarters (Municipality of the City of Wuhan, 2004: 2).               
According to an internal document of the Municipality Government of Wuhan the 
following arrangement is made at the operational level of flood management of Wuhan 
Municipality: 
The Hubei Provincial Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters have scheduled 
the timeframe from the 1th of May to the 15th of October to be a flood protection phase 
in Wuhan. Referring to different water levels measured in Wuhanguan, three flood 
protection phases are defined in Wuhan, according to the document No. E XUN BAN 
(1999) 46 of the Hubei Provincial Flood Control Office. The first phase is the cautious 
phase with a water level of up to 25 meters; the second phase is warning phase with a 
water level of up to 27.30 meters and the third phase is guarantee phase with a water 
level reaching as high as 29.73 meters or even above. Different actions are taken in 
accordance with the respective phases. These actions mainly include controlling the 
safety of dikes and other infrastructures inside of the river embankments, handling of 
flood protection materials and pumping. When water levels reach warning thresholds, 
the deputy heads of flood control headquarters at different levels are required to be 
present at the headquarters to supervise the flood protection measures. An emergency 
management team which is responsible for the safety of dikes is set up. When the 
water level reaches 28.28 meters, both head and deputy head of the flood control 
headquarters are required to be personally present at headquarters. When the water 
level reaches 29 meters, flood protection enters the emergency state. Flood manage-
ment is carried out in a martial order style. When the water level reaches 29.73 meters 
(guarantee level), the municipality headquarters declare a state of emergency in the 
entire city. Safety of dikes will be ensured by 24 hours of intensive controlling. Critical 
stretches of dikes and dams as well as any constructions on it are guarded day and 
night by leaders, technical staff, civil force, police and armed force. The army stationed 
in Wuhan will join forces with an emergency rescue team which is again organised in a 
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hierarchical manner and responsible for dike safety (Municipality of the City of Wuhan, 
2004: 8-11). 
According to China Flood Protection Law, once Flood Control Headquarters have 
announced a state of emergency, all departments involved at all levels must submit to 
the need of flood protection. Emergency cases can be handled with exceptional regula-
tions to shorten the decision-making process. This approach leads to the fact that 
many cases such as illegal construction within the embankments which raised the 
water level could be cleared up during severe flood events, whereas it becomes a 
challenge for the administration to solve these problems in flood-free periods (Inter-
views, 2005/2006). This problem is further described under the topic “Decision-making, 
conflict of interests and reconciliation” (see chapter E.1.3.). When extreme flood events 
occur, all human and material resources shall be mobilized to protect dikes with all 
means (Municipality of the City of Wuhan, 2004: 11). 
1.1.b. Cologne, Germany 
In contrast to the clear hierarchical flood risk management structure in China, Germany 
adheres to a decentralized flood risk management structure. Promoted by financial 
problems a political change took place in flood related policies which includes deregu-
lation, decentralization and privatisation (Entstaatlichung) and the emphasis on self-
responsibility (Pohl, 2002: 35). 
The organisational feature in Germany can be described in three different categories: 
preventive flood risk management (vorbeugender Hochwasserschutz), flood manage-
ment and emergency management (Gefahrenabwehr und Katastrophenschutz) (Stadt 
Köln, 1996). The engineered flood protection, which is part and parcel of flood risk 
management, has been described in chapter C.3.2.  
According to the Basic Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany flood 
protection is the responsibility of each federal state. Due to the German federal system 
(föderalistisches System), each federal state is treated as an independent state which 
can issue its own laws and regulations. Not only on a federal, but also on a state level, 
flood protection takes place through spatial planning instruments (Raumordnung) and 
policy guidance. But the implementation of flood risk management as well as crisis 
management belongs to the tasks of the respective local community. Therefore, in this 
study focus is on the organizational features at the level of the Municipality of Cologne. 
It can be observed that flood management is carried out by the Flood Protection Centre 
(HSZ) due to the charismatic personality of the director. One interviewee proved this 
observation: “In our experience the state does nothing. The local flood management 
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takes the lead, since the Flood Protection Centre has a leader with a strong personal-
ity” (Interview 28, 21 August, 2006). 
Depending on the water level and the forecasts of the water level different agencies 
take the leadership. The reason for the division of competence is that the agency in 
charge of crisis management is not familiar with the daily tasks of other agencies which 
are involved in flood risk management (Neuhoff, 1994). 
The HSZ in Cologne is part of the Municipal Agency for Drainage. In 2001 the Munici-
pal Agency for Drainage was transformed to a community owned enterprise according 
to public law. The question was raised as to how to replace HSZ. Considering that 
flood protection is a sovereign task of the state, HSZ was distributed to the Municipal 
Agency for Construction. This arrangement should help better integrate flood preven-
tion measures into urban planning, though this purpose does not yet seem to be 
fulfilled for various reasons (see chapter E.1.3). 
HSZ is in charge of carrying out appropriate measures before the water level in Co-
logne reaches or is expected to reach 10.70 metres. Currently further construction of 
technical flood protection is being carried out. It aims at raising the protection level from 
10.70 m to 11.30 m. Once the planned constructional measures for flood protection are 
completed in the future, the competence of flood protection stays with the HSZ until a 
water level of 11.30 m is reached and further water level rise is forecasted.  
For high frequency and small magnitude flood events the consequences are well 
known and plans have been made accordingly. Collected experience through the last 
decades in coping with flood events also contributes to efficient organization. Danger-
ous situations, which have to be handled with emergency response, rarely ever happen. 
With a water level lower than 10.70 m the HSZ is in the position to take full responsibil-
ity for carrying out the necessary measures to minimize potential damage (Neuhoff, 
1994). According to the Flood Direction of the City of Cologne (Hochwasservorschrift) 
the tasks of the HSZ include: 
  “Informing all municipal agencies about the current situation and develop-
ment of water levels in Cologne as well as flooded and potentially affected 
areas; 
  Informing and warning citizens through the media; 
  Disseminating information amongst the general public and consulting service 
for citizens; 
  Coordinating measures to be undertaken as defined in the Flood Direction 
for the City of Cologne (Hochwasservorschrift) as well as other special 
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measures of flood protection; specific technical flood protection measures 
shall be defined and undertaken by the respective technical departments; 
  Coordination of organizations and institutions involved in flood protection; 
  Informing and the supervision of the media” (Stadt Köln, 1996: 166). 
A crisis management group (Krisenstab) is to be set up inside the HSZ office, as soon 
as the water level reaches 7.50 meters with further rises being expected. According to 
the recommendation of the HSZ the directors’ board of the Municipal Agency of Co-
logne for Drainage shall create and is in charge of the crisis management group (Stadt 
Köln, 2006b: 4). Members of the crisis management group include the Fire Brigade, 
Street and Traffic Technical Department, Department for Bridge and Tram Construction, 
Public Security (öffentliche Ordnung), Technical Aid Organization, German Association 
for Rescue, Police, Department for Drainage and the Federal Army (see chart 4). 
Chart 4: Organisation chart of the crisis management group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Stadt Köln, 2006b: 6 
 
Once the water level in Cologne has reached 11.30 m, the Lord Mayor of Cologne 
decides whether the Operational Leadership and Crisis Management Group (Ein-
satzleitung und Krisenstab) should be set up inside the Municipal Fire Brigade and 
Agency for Fire Protection, Rescue Service and Civil Protection. This leadership and 
management group would then assume the supervision of the HSZ. Practically this 
means that not only responsibility is shifted from the HSZ to the Fire Brigade, but also a 
physical relocation of the Crisis Management Group from the HSZ to the office building 
of Fire Brigade takes place. This also applies for emergency cases should some areas 
of the city be flooded due to dike breach (Stadt Köln, 2005).  
With rising water levels planning becomes more and more complex. There is a lack of 
experience in managing extreme flood events. Thus, emphasis of flood management 
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rather lies on averting dangerous situations. In such cases the responsibility is shifted 
from a management approach of the HSZ to civil protection approach of the Municipal 
Fire Brigade and Agency for Fire Protection, Rescue Service and Civil Protection.  
Such a case is defined as “high impact event” (Großschadensereignis) and its man-
agement regulation is embedded in The Law for Fire Protection and Assistance (Ge-
setz über den Feuerschutz und die Hilfeleistung, FSHG). According to FSHG (article 1 
paragraph 3) an event is considered a “high impact event”, if a large number of peo-
ple’s lives and health or considerable amounts of assets are endangered and if coping 
with the event requires support of an operational leadership due to great need of 
extensive coordination. (Stadt Köln, 2005: 4).   
1.1.c. Synopsis  
The organizational features in China are designed for flood fighting and emergency 
management, where in Germany the emphasis of risk management lies on preventive 
measures. In China the organization of flood risk management is hierarchical and flood 
risk management is seen as a task of the state in which all individuals are obliged to 
participate in flood fighting (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuxiling No. 88, 1997). In 
Germany the organization is decentralized. Individuals are obliged to take their own 
preventive measures to protect their private property (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2005). In 
China there is an informal practice to shorten the decision-making process as de-
scribed above in the case of the Governor of Hubei province as the head of Yangtze 
Flood Control Headquarter. In Germany, however, the cultural context does not en-
courage this kind of informal practice. 
The leadership of command in China is assumed by the government and the Agency 
for Flood Management is understood as an operational unit and technical consultant. In 
Germany the institutional arrangement allows flood risk management to take over large 
scope of decision making and to be intensively involved in decision making process 
due to the subsidiary principal.  
This hierarchical institutional arrangement of flood protection in China proved to be 
efficient in terms of emergency management during the flood event, but due to its 
strong focus on protection by engineered measures and on flood fighting it also reveals 
its structural weakness in reconciling conflicts between stakeholders, and consequently 
causes tension and problems among stakeholders. These problematic issues will be 
discussed in detail in chapter E.1.3. 
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1.2. Spatial planning and land use 
1.2.a. Wuhan, China 
The guidelines of the land use plan with regard to flood management are defined in 
Article 23 of the Land Use Law of the People’s Republic of China as the following: 
“Within the administrative competence of river, lake and reservoir management as well 
as protected area and retention area, land use must be in line with the development 
plan for the integrated management of river, lake and reservoir; it must meet the 
requirements of water flow in river and water detaining function in lake and retention 
area” (Zhonghu Renmin Gongheguo Zhuxiling No. 28, 2004).  
However, flood protection through spatial planning in China is focused on structural 
flood protection measures. This focus is also prevalent in the Urban Spatial Plan of the 
city of Wuhan and in the way how different actors in flood risk management understand 
the meaning and function of a spatial plan.  
According to Wang (Wang, 2002: 37-38), the urban plan approved by the People’s 
Municipal Government of Wuhan in 1999 covers a plan period from 1996 to 2020. This 
plan emphasizes the further economic development of Wuhan and aims to build up a 
good educational system and an extensive public service network. At the same time 
the plan claims to take ecological aspects into consideration while endeavouring to 
achieve a “reasonable distribution of functions in the city” within the service network. 
The main focus of the plan is, however, the economic development especially of the 
tertiary sector which is concentrated within the third city ring. This area will play a very 
important role in Wuhan’s economic development; it lies within the city’s “flood protec-
tion circle” protected by dikes. 
According to the above plan, population growth and land use within the inner city are 
strictly controlled. But a significant increase both in population and land use for con-
struction is inevitable (see table 6). Under these circumstances the emphasis of the 
plan with regard to flood protection clearly lies on the structural measures. The plan 
highlights the improvement of dike quality and further construction of the dike system. 
The dikes within the city area shall be elevated by two meters in addition to the water 
level of the 1954 flood (29.73 m) and serve to be a “guarantee dike” (the last mile). The 
dikes within the administration of the city of Wuhan but outside the third ring area shall 
be elevated by 1.5 meters to the same record water level of 1954. In addition to the 
dike protection the existing five retention areas Xilianghu, Dujiatai, Wuha, Zhangduhu 
and Dongxihu shall remain as retention areas until the Three Gorges Project will have 
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been completed in 2009. Then the function of these retention areas will be revised 
(Wang, 2002: 38). 
Table 6: Population development and land use in Wuhan 
 
Year 
Permanent 
inhabitants 
(millions) 
Actual inhabi-
tants 
(millions) 
Building area 
(km²) 
Building area 
per inhabitant 
(m² p.p.) 
1996 3.55 3.79 364.0 69.6 
2000 3.65 3.95 281.2 71.2 
2005 3.90 4.26 311.0 73.0 
2010 4.15 4.58 343.3 74.9 
2015 4.35 4.88 390.4 80.0 
2020 4.50 5.05 427.5 84.7 
 
Source: Wang, 2002: 38 
These spatial planning guidelines for structural measures are also reflected in the 
interviews with statements spatial planners gave at city, river basin and national man-
agement levels. The interviewed municipal spatial planner understands flood protection 
through spatial planning in Wuhan to be categorized in different protection areas mainly 
according to potential economic losses, population density and respective protection 
measures which are characterised by different dike categories. Planning safety meas-
ures such as a safety platform in retention areas is another important component of 
planning practice (Interview 10, 26 September, 2005). Other actors at the river basin 
level understand spatial planning to be the allocation of flood water: “We have 40 
retention areas in the Changjiang flood plain. If flood water comes and cannot be 
detained inside the river … and if we are having 50 billion cubic meters of water which 
exceeded the potential volume of the river, we can then use the retention areas. For 
instance, the Honghu retention area can detain 16 billion cubic meters of water, the 
Jingjiang retention area can detain 0.4 billion cubic meters, plus with the extended 
retention areas in Jingjiang we can have 7.6 billion cubic meters volume altogether 
and … if an extreme flood event occurs, the allocation of water is the task of spatial 
planning” (Interview 25, 19 December, 2006).  
Similarly, the interviewee at the national level sees spatial planning as one of the most 
important instruments in flood risk management, although his technical focus became 
quite evident during the interview: “We have been using this instrument since the 
1950s. It is a unified and standardized arrangement of the entire flood protection 
system. It regulates flood protection, hydropower, shipping, irrigation etc. within a river 
basin spatial plan. Based on this plan we develop the flood protection plan regulating 
the development of reservoirs, dikes and retention areas. In addition, we also have 
some non-structural measures such as telecommunication, hydrologic forecast. This is 
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the foundation of our work” (Interview 19, 08 December, 2006). However, a policy 
change can also be observed: “…Especially after the Great Flood in 1998, we have put 
[more] emphasis on flood management. The new flood management concept is under-
stood as a people-centred approach which highlights the harmonious relationship 
between man and nature. Consequently we control the population and economic 
development in high risk regions; at the mean time we [also] manage water in rivers as 
resources under the condition that flood protection is ensured. This is a new concept 
which we started to practice” (Interview 19, 08 December, 2006).  
The new concept is a policy shift “from emphasis on structural engineering solutions in 
shuili (water management) enterprise to a broader resource-defined concept of ‘re-
source’ water management (ziyuanshuili) in support of water sustainability” (Boxer, 
2001: 1). Although this policy shift has been introduced in 1999, its implementation still 
remains a Herculean task. Taking into consideration China’s water engineering history 
of two millennia and a well-established Marxist theoretical and ideological framework 
that is grounded in instrumental rationalism, the challenge of understanding and realis-
ing this new concept is immense.  
Before the Great Flood in 1998 in the Changjiang River basin, urban flood protection in 
terms of urban planning had not been practiced. Only after the introduction of the China 
Flood Law, flood protection has been taken into consideration in the urban planning 
process. Even the China Flood Law does not fully forbid land use practice within the 
retention areas, but recommends to limit the land use as much as possible (Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Zhuxiling No. 88, 1997).  
The strong emphasis on economic development and consequent dependence on 
structural flood protection measures as well as the belief in this technical approach 
leads to problems in management of the retention areas and vulnerability of the city. 
As the interviewee described, there are problems in the retention area of Dongxihu 
located close to the city of Wuhan (see map 6). Dongxihu is a focal point of conflicts. 
The local government wants to minimize the scale of the retention area in order to 
avoid the limitations for economic development, which would be the inevitable conse-
quence of the the regulations set up by the central government. This is backed up by 
the Urban Planning Department of Wuhan. The planning department argues that this 
particular retention area has never been put into practice and the flood protection plan 
is made in a conservative manner. In addition, the department supports “more intensive 
land use to achieve a higher efficiency of the respective land” (Interview, 2005/2006). 
This issue is even further exacerbated by the administrative structure of the manage-
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Source: Chengshi Guihuaju, 2003 
ment of the retention area: Construction projects are obliged to apply for permission to 
the local planning office. If there is a conflict between land use and economic develop-
ment, the local planning office does not consult directly with the municipal government, 
but with the local district government and subsequently makes decisions in line with the 
local district government’s interests. The district planning office is not directly under the 
municipal government but under the district government, therefore even the lord mayor 
cannot exercise pressure.  
The implementation of the land use regulation for retention area is also hampered by 
“management failure”. In the past construction projects often started before the permis-
sion was actually granted. Once projects have been completed, it is extremely difficult 
for the government to revoke them, as the potential economic losses would be so high 
that the local government would be neither willing, nor able to bear them: “Once a 
construction project has become reality, even the Municipal Government has to give in” 
(Interview 10, 22 September, 2005). 
Map 6: Flood protection in Wuhan 
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Only in very special cases a compromise is possible. In this context many interviewees 
mentioned the case of illegal construction sites in Hanyang, one of the inner city 
districts located within the river bank, which would have significantly hindered the 
safety of flood protection, as it took away a large volume of water retention area. In that 
case the intervention of Prime Minister Zhu Rongji eventually caused this illegal con-
struction to be removed. But if “illegal projects” within retention areas are not in purely 
private ownership, it would be very difficult to regulate them (Interview, 2005).  
Since the land use plan with regard to flood prevention is not strictly institutionalised, 
the implementation is especially hampered in flood free periods. There are two main 
reasons for it: firstly, the urban plan has a clear emphasis on economic development; 
secondly, the institutional arrangement of flood risk management focuses on flood 
fighting and emergency management. Consequently, the flood management unit has 
more power to carry out the necessary measures during a flood event than to take 
preventive measures. However, during “flood free” times the authority of the unit does 
not embody administrative competence which enables the Flood Protection Agency to 
ask for support from the police. Therefore, the implementation is hindered during “flood 
free” times. For instance, a sand factory was built up along the Yangtze River inside 
the embankment. This factory would have impaired the water flow during flood events. 
The Flood Protection Agency of Wuhan ordered the owner to remove the factory, as it 
was an illegal construction. However, the owner of the factory simply ignored this order, 
and due to the lack of any enforcement mechanisms on the side of the Flood Protec-
tion Agency, they were unable to invoke assistance from the police department. The 
municipal government is the last remedy which can solve such issues, since the 
municipal government has the power to mobilise the police. Through the support of the 
police such a case can be solved without going through legal procedures. This, in 
return, leads to a large work load for the Municipal Government, which is the highest 
authority at local level (Interview 1, 30 August, 2005). The above example also shows 
the structural weakness in the institutional arrangement of flood risk management.  
1.2.b. Cologne, Germany 
Spatial Regulative Report of the Federal Government of Germany (BBR, 2000) states 
that flood risk has not yet been sufficiently taken into consideration during the devel-
opment of settlement and infrastructure. Anthropogenic activities which contribute to 
increased economic losses shall not be ignored in recent and future planning proc-
esses. Apparently, structural measures such as river training, construction of dams as 
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well as dikes increase water level. New settlements which are built in areas protected 
through dikes experience increased economic damage during flood events due to lack 
of retention areas. The development of new settlements and change of land use 
pattern, turning green areas into agricultural land are also responsible for increased 
losses during flood events (BBR, 2000: 163). 
The report clearly conveys the message that the structural river training programmes 
as well as other technical flood protection measures have increased the flood risk. 
Especially the negative effect of engineered measures and the anthropogenic impact 
on economic losses is highlighted. This marks a turning point in flood management 
policy in Germany. This guideline has been institutionalized as a legal regulation for 
spatial planning (Bezirksregierung Köln, 2006).  
Accordingly, in 2000 the Minister Conference on Spatial Planning made preventive 
flood management recommendations in land use management. The emphasis on the 
safeguarding and recovery of natural flood plains and risk prevention in areas behind 
the dikes which could potentially be flooded reflects a nature-orientated approach in 
flood risk management. The concept is geared towards an approach to live with floods 
rather than to fight floods. The Minister Conference for Spatial Planning also recom-
mends natural or nature-orientated preservation measures for development as well as 
renaturation of the areas along the river bank. The recommendations are in line with 
the EU Water Framework Directive (The European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 2000). The legal regulations and the recommendations are mainly 
implemented through spatial planning (Raumordnung), that is the Spatial Plan of the 
Federal States (Landesplanung) and the Regional Spatial Plan (Regionalplanung) 
(Bezirksregierung Köln, 2006: 46). 
The Regional Spatial Plan is drafted by the Agency for Spatial Planning of the regional 
government of Cologne according to the Flood Law (Hochwassergesetz), Water 
Resources Act and the European Water Framework Directives and authorized by the 
Regional Council (Regionalrat) which consists of representatives of local politicians. 
The proportion of different political parties among the members in the Regional Council 
is determined by the results of the respective local elections. Due to the strong pres-
ence of local politicians who lobby in the interest of local communities, the Regional 
Council often makes decisions in favour of local needs. This ensures on the one hand 
that the interests of local communities are paid attention to while on the other hand it 
sometimes hampers the implementation of flood prevention measures through spatial 
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planning due to the conflicting economic and ecological considerations. Conflicts and 
solutions during the planning procedure will be discussed in chapter E1.3. 
The city of Cologne as the centre of the Greater Cologne Region must align its urban 
planning in regard to flood risk management, which in turn must be in line with the 
regional spatial plan of Greater Cologne Region (Regionalplan Köln). At the local level 
of the Municipal Government of Cologne the Urban Land Use Planning (Bauleitplanung) 
consists of a Zoning Plan (Flächennutzungsplan) and a Development Plan (Be-
bauungsplan). The Zoning Plan is the underlying basis to the more detailed Develop-
ment Plan. 
Flood prevention through spatial planning means, that no construction shall be under-
taken in areas which will potentially be flooded. For any construction in such areas, the 
Zoning Plan has to be changed which requires permission from the Regional Govern-
ment of Cologne. If the construction project is in conflict with the flood prevention 
measures of the Regional Plan, the permission for the respective construction will not 
be issued. In such a case the local community can insist on its project plan and a 
consensus-finding process will start. During this process a dialogue between different 
stakeholders such as environmental organizations, organizations of nature conserva-
tion and representatives from the regional government who are responsible for flood 
prevention would enfold endeavouring to find a solution which is acceptable for all 
stakeholders. However, if this effort fails, a decision has to be taken by the Regional 
Council.  
In the interviews the statements of different stakeholders of public administration 
involved in the planning process reflect their differing risk perception. Local communi-
ties often try to win more construction area despite of an existing flood risk, for the sake 
of their economic development and an improvement of the labour market. Also transna-
tional enterprises located in flood plains are reluctant to be marked as located in a 
potential flooded area on the map of the Regional Spatial Plan, for they are worried 
about their image, and their spatial development potential – and the implications this 
might have on their flood insurance. This consequently obscures their risk perception in 
a certain way that they seem to be more willing to take risks.  
Local politicians have strong interests in short-term economic prosperity due to the 
election system. They presume that the potential voters who would benefit from a 
stronger labour market would also vote for their lobbyists.  
Interestingly one can observe different attitudes among politicians and representatives 
of public administration. Whereas politicians are more interested in pushing forward 
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and maintaining economic development, the representatives of the administration show 
more interest in flood prevention. One interviewee states that “politicians are often 
enthusiastic about their construction plan which shall create more employment oppor-
tunities but ignore flood risk, representatives of administration think in a longer time 
frame. But administration is just an executive institution and hardly has any influence 
on the politicians’ decisions. If politicians are determined to realise a plan, the admini-
stration has to follow. It was reported by interviewees that representatives of admini-
stration remain silent during a dialogue between the planning agency and politicians 
with their administration representatives, if they have different opinions than their 
politicians” (Interview 33, 25 January, 2007). The priority of economy, ecology or 
sustainability is a major source of conflict, which is also a driving factor for how these 
actors perceive flood risk.  
1.2.c. Synopsis 
Spatial planning in China understands risk management mainly as structural measures 
and allocation of flood water volumes. The Urban Planning in the city of Wuhan there-
fore puts its main emphasis on structural measures in flood risk management. Despite 
of the introduction of the new water management concept of “resource” water man-
agement which has evolved from and added to the structural engineering paradigm, 
the imprint of socialist historical legacy and Confucian cultural tradition is still strongly 
reflected in spatial planning ideologies. The ambitious “new concept of resource water 
management” which seeks “boldly to reshape deep-seated assumptions about the 
universal efficacy of engineering solutions for water supply, control, and quality prob-
lems” (Boxer, 2001: 335) still faces numerous challenges especially at the local level.  
In Germany a change in flood management policy took place after a series of flood 
events in the last two decades and this change is reflected in the spatial planning 
guidelines. The spatial plan in Germany emphasizes the counterproductive effect of 
engineered measures and highlights the anthropogenic influence on flood risk through 
settlement establishment in flood plains. The change of this flood risk concept has also 
been translated into legal regulations which endeavour to achieve the goal of a more 
proactive than reactive flood management; however, even the new regulation contains 
some compromises due to clashing interests between economic and sustainable 
development considerations according to its critics. Nevertheless, spatial planning 
seems to be an effective instrument in flood risk management in Germany. 
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1.3. Decision-making, conflict of interests and reconciliation 
Decision-making is a risky undertaking. Every decision is intrinsically tied to cost and 
benefit. In our post modern society, while wealth distribution has remained the origin of 
conflicts and injustice, risk distribution amplifies social injustice even more. The con-
flicts of distribution of wealth and the distribution of risk are superimposed (Beck, 1986: 
25). Who shall reap the benefits and who has to carry the cost? Decisions in flood 
management such as determination of flooding retention areas need to take those 
cost-benefit considerations into account. Or, more precisely, it has to decide whose 
interests are taken into consideration and whose interests are sacrificed. How are 
these decisions justified and how are the victims compensated to keep the social 
balance? Who is involved in the decision-making process? What conflicts are caused 
by decision-making and how are these conflicts reconciled? In this chapter these 
questions are to be answered by looking at the risk distribution through decision-
making, principle of decision making, involvement of stakeholders and the overall 
decision-making process. It is worth to note that dike construction on the one hand 
protects people and their property; on the other hand it enables flood risk distribution 
and has become an important instrument to do so. 
1.3.a. Wuhan, China 
In China there is a clear hierarchical decision-making structure which is illustrated in 
the institutional arrangement described in chapter E.1.1. The heads of administration 
such as the Prime Minister at national level, the governor at provincial level, and the 
lord mayor at the local level carry the whole responsibility for flood protection. Since 
flood protection in China mainly focuses on flood fighting, the most critical decision-
making process seems to take place during a flood event. However, the decision-
making dilemma during a flood event is preassigned by decision-making principals 
practiced within Chinese cultural context.  
The major principle of flood protection according to the respective laws and regulations 
can be summarized as follows: an overall plan must be made for flood protection; 
parallel to this unified overall plan, other interests are also taken into consideration; 
prevention and integrated management are set up to be the main goal; the interests of 
all are superior to the interests of a limited number of people (Cheng and Shang, 2005: 
54). The hierarchy of interests is also often formulated as “state interests are superior 
to community interests that are superior to individual interests”. This principal lays the 
foundation for the decision-making approach of water management in China. It has 
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ensured the efficiency of a decision-making process on the one hand; on the other 
hand, however, it has caused some tensions among different stakeholders as revealed 
in the statements of the interviewees.   
The interviewees describe the following conflicts caused by decision-making in a top-
down manner: 
The central-local conflicts 
The decisions of the upper level administration often do not take into consideration the 
local needs and local conditions, which creates a mismatch in decision-making and 
implementation.  
A local official states: “If you listen to the talks of the Ministry (of Water Resources), you 
will think that it is all so up-to-date with Western standards. But once you go to the local 
level, it doesn’t work at all. What the upper level talks about is what should be done, 
but the local level simply can not implement it” (Interview 16, 6 December, 2006). 
However, the representative of the central government contends: “…Risk prevention 
has to start with risk awareness. In addition to this, we need matching policies and 
administrative systems. But the local governors and officials often don’t understand it. If 
you ask a county governor, according to which criteria he wants to set up his new 
district, he would say, first, at locations with the biggest economic potential; second, at 
locations which are suitable for development” (Interview 17, 7 December, 2006). 
Yet, at local level the perception reveals different perspectives: “In fact, the Ministry (of 
Water Resources) just talks the big empty words... it is high up there and does not 
have any idea about the local conditions. It gives random orders and makes all those 
glorious speeches, but when it comes to the local level, there is no way to implement it” 
(Interview 23, 17 December, 2006).  
This is not just the perception of the risk managers at the local levels, as also the upper 
levels including the river basin and national levels realise this difficulty. The problems 
caused by this decision-making approach demonstrate the conflict of interests of 
different stakeholders. “Local protectionism” (see next page) is a typical conflict re-
ported by interviewees. 
The Chinese central government has introduced a new management concept which 
emphasizes disaster reduction as an integral part of development strategy. However, 
governmental officials including those at national level all regard economic develop-
ment as the most important indicator for their political achievement. “Development” is 
equated with economic development. Especially local politicians and officials are facing 
this challenge:  
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“Local parental officials are not like us whose task is only to take care of disaster 
reduction; they have to shoulder the entire responsibility of their region. Besides, they 
are under pressure to prove their political achievement. If the figure of my GDP is not 
high enough, then I, as a mayor, would be considered to be ‘no good for nothing’. … It 
doesn’t make any sense to create an environment with mountains covered with forests 
and clear water everywhere, while people go starving” (Interview 17, 7 December, 
2006).  
China Daily, the most important official Chinese newspaper in English language which 
is a counterpart of the People’s Daily, the “voice of the communism party”, also con-
firmed this perception: 
“Local environmental watchdogs exist to oversee implementation of environmental 
policies and standards. But local officials want an ever-increasing gross domestic 
product to decorate career records” (China Daily, 2007: 10).  
Economy and ecology are considered to be conflicting interests who can hardly be 
reconciled. This leads to a controversial debate as to whether higher priority should be 
given to the economic development or the environmental governance. At local level 
due to the population pressure and the political goal to reach the GDP requirements, 
“local protectionism” especially in retention areas has been a common practice, which 
basically means to first meet the need for economic development even at the expense 
of proper flood protection measures.  
Local protectionism is directly reflected in non-state initiated dike building in officially 
defined retention areas: 
Due to frequent flood events, soil quality in retention areas is particularly high. Farmers 
try to achieve ever higher yields off this fruitful land and thus have begun to construct 
dikes on their own initiatives. These dikes built by farmers or collective efforts of a 
village or community are called “secondary dike (Zidi)” or “people’s dike (Minyuan)”. 
These dikes usually protect a village as a unit (Interview Huang). Over time, the pro-
tected areas have developed, both, in terms of population and infrastructure. Especially 
during the period of the “Great Leap Forward Movement” (1958-1960) dikes were 
rapidly increased to allow agricultural production in the wetland areas. The construction 
of dikes in Dongxihu (East and West Lakes) District, one of the five retentions areas to 
protect the city of Wuhan, began 1958 during the “Great Leap Forward Movement”. 
Altogether 94 kilometres of dikes were built up and the construction and renovation of 
the existing dikes “changed the original geography and formed an independent lake 
system. Many small lakes and river arms disappeared through many years of construc-
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tion and management. The West Lake completely vanished” (Dongxihu Government, 
2007). Since the 1980s along with population growth in retention areas, the value of 
infrastructure has also increased. Dujiatai for instance, one of the five major retention 
areas which greatly contributed to the safety of Wuhan during flood events, now has a 
population of 256,200 people according to the statistics of 2004 and annual GDP 
amounts to approximately 2.1 billion Yuan. The potential flood damage in retention 
areas has been rising and subsequently these areas have become the focus and 
symbol of conflicts (Lu, 1998: 389-390).  
Due to the historical development and the legacy of the “Great Leap Forward”, as well 
as the local economic interests, these dikes inside the retention areas have not only 
been tolerated in an informal way, but were even supported by the local governments. 
An interviewee explains:  
“It is not that these ‘secondary dikes’ cannot be controlled. The upper governmental 
levels are fully aware of this fact. But after the economy in these protected areas has 
been largely developed, one is not willing to control it. During flood season, when the 
pressure of the lower reach increases, only then people are forced to breach the dikes 
to ease the pressure of the lower reach. Besides, industrial areas within the retention 
areas have to be protected. People inside can be evacuated to high-lying land. The 
problem is that although the state has respective regulations for retention areas, it is 
local officials who are supposed to implement these regulations. For the latter the 
economic loss is clearly the driver for decision making. In fact, local officials advocate 
that the state should strengthen engineering protection” (Interview 5, 7 September, 
2005).  
In this statement one point stands out: There is a conflict between the regulations of 
the central government and the local implementation due to different interests. The 
state has overall interests to reduce flood risk by gaining more space for retention, 
while on the other hand the local government intends to protect its economic interests 
which are seen as the main indicator of achievement. This way of measuring one’s 
success in governance and management is driven by the requirement of the central 
government which relies on economic growth to stabilise its position and strengthen the 
Chinese Communist Party’s credibility (Yang, 2005: 66). Current discussions show that 
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the central government is considering the introduction of “Green G.D.P.”5 which is to 
take into consideration the environmental impact due to the rapid growth of economy in 
China over the last two decades (Yang, 2005: 66). Nevertheless, economic growth at 
local level remains an important goal for local officials who, as “parental officials”, have 
to protect people’s livelihood and at the same time, serve the central government. The 
Chinese local governments, like Wisner et al. also observed, have powerful incentives 
to build in inappropriate places and “to defy or avoid central government planning 
guidelines for land use” (Wisner et al., 2004: 210). Flood prevention through non-
structural measures is not seen as a part of development strategy by local government.  
Some of the interviewees refer to this mismatch between central government’s policy 
and local implementation as a problem of the “system”. The system is understood as to 
be incompatible with the current social and economic situation. In fact, the discussion 
as how to reform the political system to face the new ecological and political challenge 
has been going on in China for the last decades. However, no tangible political reform 
can be observed. 
Conflict between “bigger and smaller interests” 
Despite of the outstanding water engineering and water management history in China 
(Needham et al., 1971), during flood events the situation in retention areas often leads 
to calamitous decisions. Officially these secondary dikes are often built without permis-
sion. But after they have been constructed, they are tolerated as “historical legacy” and 
subject to ad hoc rules. In Wuhan according to the Flood Protection Headquarter, these 
“secondary dikes” are only under protection before the water level reaches 27 meters. 
Above 27 meters, decisions about the protection will still be warranted based on a case 
to case basis according to rainfall forecast etc. “Since these areas are supposed to be 
river bed anyway, people living there or having their agricultural production have to live 
with the possibility to be flooded. They have their harvest, if flood is not severe; other-
wise they have to give up their harvest. The main thing is to ensure the safety of 
people” (Interview 1, 30 August, 2005). The security concept as understood by Munici-
pal Flood Protection Headquarters does not, however, include the security of livelihood. 
Livelihood in such a case depends on compensation by the government according to 
the compensation regulation for retention areas. Since this compensation system is still 
                                               
5 “Green G.D.P.” was an effort to create an environmental yardstick for evaluating the performance of every 
official in China. It recalculated gross domestic product, or G.D.P., to reflect the cost of pollution. The 
project was initiated in 2004 as President Hu Jintao’s most ambitious attempt to change the culture of fast-
growth. However, the project was stripped of official influence in 2007.  
KAHN, J., YARDLEY, J. (2007) As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html>, 15 October 2008 
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not yet well developed, flooding a retention area is the last decision to be taken. And in 
case of flooding, the local government and the population are facing a great challenge 
as how to recover given the insufficient compensation provided by government. 
The top-down decision-making approach is perceived to be an “effective and efficient” 
instrument in flood risk management. It is counted as one of the greatest advantages of 
the “socialist system”: 
“The best thing about our socialist system is our system of responsibility with the head 
of the administration as leadership. No other country can keep up with us in this regard, 
whether it is the USA or other countries. I have been to more than 30 countries to 
exchange experience with them. I found out that the best one is our system. … Each 
level takes its responsibility for the level below it. By issuing orders, we avoid see-saw 
and bargaining. It is an order! If you resist the order, you’ll be punished; if you don’t 
obey it, you’ll lose your position right there, irrespective if you are a governor of a 
county or the head of a village. The Governor of the county Sanzhoulianyuan6 didn’t 
want to flood his retention area, because it was too painful for him. So he was dis-
missed right there! The Deputy Governor took over his position. If there would be 
anyone else who resists the order, he will also be dismissed and punished. So nobody 
dares to do it again, because no one wants to be dismissed. Why should he want to do 
that? To me, the biggest advantage in flood protection in China is the system” (Inter-
view 25, 19 December, 2006).  
The conflict of interests can also be small scale, for example, when the water level has 
reached a certain level it is forbidden to use pumps within low-lying areas, especially in 
retention areas, for the capacity of the river within the embankment has reached its 
maximum. In order not to increase water levels by pumping water back into the river, 
many areas have to live with certain a degree of flooding. This has caused some 
tension between local communities and the flood protection agency (Interview 7/9, 8 
September/22 September, 2005). 
But more vehement conflicts have to be faced when it comes to flooding settlements 
within a retention area. To understand this particular constellation one needs some 
background knowledge about retention areas in China. “In case of extreme flood, in 
order to ensure the safety of important cities and economically well developed regions, 
so that total damage can be reduced, lakes and low-lying land are often used to detain 
                                               
6  One of the largest protected retention area by dike in the county Jianli, Hubei Province. 
LIU, W. (1998) NOPQR  (Beizhuang de Qishou) (The Sad and Glorious abandonment). IN LIU, W. (Ed.) 
!STC (Shiji Hongshui) (Flood of the Centrury). Lijiang, UVWXY  (Lijiang Chubanshe).  
E RESEARCH RESULTS 1 FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
 80 
water. This is to protect the interests of all by sacrificing the interests of some” (Wang, 
1999: 282-283). Historically these retention areas are lakes and low-lying land con-
nected with rivers and therefore natural wetland. After the foundation of the People’s 
Republic of China, these areas are diked to enable better control and efficiency of use. 
Most of the retention areas are controlled by floodgates and considerably contributed to 
the flood protection in China. However, development of settlement and economy has 
become the greatest impediment for the functionality of retention areas.  
For instance, the retention area Mengwa upon the Huai River, which was flooded on 
the 10th of July 2007 has an exceptional population density of 724 per/km² (Wang, 
1999). The Chinese government has realized this problem and thereupon “Some 
Recommendations on Strengthening the Development and Management of Retention 
Areas” was issued in 2006. The recommendations are drafted by Ministry of Water 
Resources, National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Finance 
“sufficiently incorporating the critics and recommendations of local government, rele-
vant departments and experts” (Office of the State Council, 2006).  
According to this document the Ministry of Water Resources elaborates the current 
situation: there are altogether 97 retention areas which are listed for compensation in 
case of use. These retention areas cover 30.6 thousand square kilometres with a 
population of 15.95 million. Between 1954 and 2004 the most important retention areas 
have altogether been put into use 458 times and thus retained 1,230 billions cubic 
meters of water. These retention areas make it possible to implement the Chinese 
flood prevention strategy which intends to protect the important objects by sacrificing 
less important objects and to protect the whole by sacrificing the parts. Flooding is 
effectively controlled and the safety of important areas is ensured. This has made a 
great contribution to the flood prevention and disaster reduction according to the 
Chinese government (www.GOV.cn, 2006). 
However, with the economic and societal development as well as population growth, 
many retention areas have been constantly developed and used, consequently the 
capacity of retention largely decreased. Today the management of the retention areas 
severely lags behind its economic development. Safety measures and structural 
measures to regulate floods are far from sufficient. At the same time, a large population 
is living inside the retention areas. The living standard of these people is relatively low 
on average. The mechanism of compensation and releasing is not completed. Once 
the retention areas are flooded, there will not only be great loss but also negative 
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impacts on social stability. Retention areas have become an eminent weak point in 
flood control mechanism which urgently has to be improved (www.GOV.cn, 2006). 
The guidelines of the central government of water resource management point out that 
a people-centred and scientific development ideology is essential. To “leave flood 
space and at the same time take appropriate risk” is a management concept which is to 
be set up. Flood control is to be transferred to flood management. 
In the period of the 11th five-year-plan (2006-2010), management of retention areas is 
one of the most important tasks of flood control. It aims to increase the flood protection 
level to guarantee the safety of the population as well as to facilitate the development 
of the people in these areas into a modestly affluent society (Xiaokang ShehuiZ[Y
\). 
According to the preliminary statistics, recent safety measures in retention areas can 
only guarantee the security of 3.3 million people which covers only about 20% of the 
total population (www.GOV.cn, 2006). 
The case of the retention area Sanzhou Lianyuan during the Great Flood of 1998 
illustrates the challenge of retention areas and varying perceptions of different stake-
holders concerning this issue as well as controversies of the top-down decision ap-
proach. The Great Flood of 1998 was a flood event which affected 29 provinces, 
autonomous regions and cities in China and the death toll according to the official 
report exceeded 4,150 (Wang, 1999: 31). Hubei province was one of the most affected 
provinces by this flood event. The most difficult decision-making that needed to be 
made during this event concerned the use of the Jingjiang retention area. Given the 
population of ca. 8 million people living behind the Jingjiang dike, the use of the reten-
tion area of 5.4 billion cubic meters would have made many of these people homeless 
and the economic loss would have been immeasurably high (Interview 6, 7 September, 
2005). One interviewee described the dilemma of this decision: 
“The Prime Minister Wen Jiabao7 could not sleep the entire night. He was walking up 
and down on the dike and he said, if he decides not to use the Jingjiang Retention Area, 
he might well be a culprit of the history for thousands of years. Because if the retention 
area is not used, the dike may breach and cause the death of tens of thousands of 
people” (Interview 4, 6 September, 2005).  
From this statement one can observe, how decisions like these are made by an indi-
vidual in power, who consequently takes over responsibility.  
                                               
7 Wen, Chinese Prime Minister, was then Chinese Vice Prime Minister who was the head of the SFCDRH 
in 1998 and the highest decision-maker for the emergency management during the Great Flood. 
E RESEARCH RESULTS 1 FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
 82 
In the end the central government decided not to use the Jingjiang Retention Area and 
made every effort to protect the dike. The consequence was that many smaller reten-
tion areas either suffered dike breach or had to be abandoned (Interview 9, 22 Sep-
tember, 2005). Sanzhou Lianyuan was one of these abandoned retention areas, 
therefore, this case will be used to elaborate on decision making in conflict situation. 
A journalist of the China Youth Daily, one of the most important official newspapers in 
China documented this controversial event (Liu, 1998): 
Due to the lasting high water level in Jingjiang, the Hubei Provincial Flood Control and 
Drought Relief Headquarters “felt impelled” to abandon the protection of Sanzhou 
Lianyuan, the biggest retention area protected by dike in Jianli county. It covered 
altogether 186.13 km² and had a population of 60,000 people. The retention volume 
was ca. 1 billion cubic meters. Since the first flood wave passing Jianli County at the 
beginning of July 1998, the county government decided to take Sanzhou Lianyuan as 
one of the most important areas to be protected together with 6 other areas. On the 5th 
of August three of these protected areas had to be abandoned, however, the water 
level kept rising. “To protect Jingjiang dike, the main dike along the Yangtze and the 
safety of Dongting Lake and the city of Wuhan, Sanzhou Lianyuan which had not 
been flooded for 18 years had to be inevitably abandoned to ease the pressure”. Direct 
loss of this retention area was about 5 billion Yuan (about 500 million Euros). On 8th of 
August 2 pm the flood protection headquarters of the Jianli County received the order 
from the Hubei Provincial Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters to flood 
Sanzhou Lianyuan. The Governor of the County, Mr. Zhao, asked Mr. Liu, the party 
secretary of the Municipality of Jingzhou8, if the evacuation could be extended to the 
next morning, because there was only one road for evacuating local workers and 
people. It would be very difficult to complete the evacuation for flooding the retention 
area. But Mr. Liu said, the order must be obeyed and the evacuation had to be com-
pleted on time. The flooding time could not be postponed. After the evacuation was 
completed by 10 pm, the flood protection headquarters were surrounded by thousands 
of local farmers. They damaged some boats parking in front of the headquarters to 
show their anger that their homes were going to be flooded. About 400 farmers gath-
ered on the dike where the breach was about to be made and only returned home the 
next morning. One farmer said: “We can protect the dike; we even gathered more than 
2,000 sand sacks at our own cost.” 
                                               
8 Jianli County belongs to the administration area of the municipal government of Jingzhou. 
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The county government decided to carry out the dike breach to flood the Sanzhou 
Lianyuan at 12 am on the 9th of August. But this had to be postponed to 2 pm due to 
the clash between the farmers and the police. Farmers did not want their land, crops 
and possessions to be flooded and they even knelt on their knees to plead not to flood 
their homes “with great sadness”, reported the journalist from the China Youth Daily.  
More than 70 farmers gathered on the dike holding spades and sticks to stop the police 
from breaching the dike. The police felt impelled to use fire weapons with rubber bullets 
to warn the farmers. Two farmers were injured which caused even more furious conflict, 
for the other farmers did not know that the bullets were made of rubber. Other farmers 
who had tried to harvest their rice which was not yet ripe in the field saw a bleeding 
farmer carried by four policemen. In the following, the situation between the same 
policemen, who had been fighting the floods together with the farmers for more than 40 
days, and the local population turned into a furious conflict. A 70-year-old woman even 
tried to stop the policemen by throwing herself on the dike. 
A journalist asked one of the farmers: “when the county government and the village 
committee informed you about the evacuation, you agreed, didn’t you?” 
The farmer said: “We know that we have to sacrifice our ‘small home to protect the 
bigger home’, but when it comes to breaching the dike, we just cannot take it! Inside 
the dike are our homes! It is not because we cannot protect the dike anymore, but we 
have to breach it to flood ourselves, who of us can just do this?” 
Farmers cursed the Deputy Governor of the county and the deputy chief of the police 
who were commanding the breaching. The conflict continued until a journalist cried: 
“For the interests of all, you shall sacrifice your own small homes. We are going to 
report your great sacrifice to all the Chinese people. The people will remember your 
sacrifice.” 
Finally the dike was breached at 3:05 pm. But as the farmers saw the water flowing into 
the protected area towards their homes, they were outraged again and rushed to the 
breach. Some of the farmers asked the policemen: “You come from Hunan province, 
don’t you? Why don’t you go to the other side of the river9 and dig your holes there?” 
The farmers were so upset that they were about to take Mr. Zhang, the head of the 
village Tuomu hostage. Mr. Zhang said: “I don’t want to breach the dike. But as a 
communist party member, I have to obey the order. I don’t mind people attacking me 
and cursing me. We all know that the dike breach is for the interests of greater number 
                                               
9 On the other side of the Yangtze River in Sanzhou stretch lies a city of Hunan Province. 
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of people. Seeing the farmers cry I also feel their pain. They have been protecting the 
dike for more than 40 days. I feel terrible about it.” 
When the Deputy Governor of the County Jianli was asked to comment, he just shook 
his head and said in a sad voice: “I don’t have anything to say”. The Governor of the 
County Jianli wrote a report to the disciplinary committee, the party secretary and the 
lord mayor of the Municipality of Jingzhou: 
“I have been supportive in the process of carrying out the order of flooding the Sanzhou 
Lianyuan. But honestly, I have to say, I don’t completely agree with this decision. I feel 
sorry for those people who lost their belongings they built up for decades all at once. 
And I feel sorry to give up the effort in protecting the dike we made in more than 40 
days. Although we have made all our effort, still we could not carry out the order of the 
Hubei Provincial Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters on time for different 
reasons. Being the head of the Flood Protection Headquarters of the county, I take the 
full responsibility. Some of the comrades reported me to the leaders in the municipal 
and provincial governments saying that I intentionally postponed the time of the dike 
breach, I don’t want to make any comments on that.” 
A news report on the flooding of the Sanzhou Rentention Area on the China Youth 
Daily on the 11th of August is the only report on this event. In respond to it, the Jianli 
County government disseminated 100 copies of this report and sent a letter to the 
China Youth Daily to express their gratitude for the realistic description of the event and 
telling the truth to the people (Liu, 1998).  
In the case of Jianli County a top-down decision-making approach which intends to 
ensure the interests of the majority (state and big cities) by sacrificing the interests of a 
minority (local community) shows its efficiency and strength in emergency manage-
ment in protecting “more important areas” such as the city of Wuhan, but at the same 
time it reveals vehement conflicts between higher decision makers and local govern-
ments as well as the local population. The decision could be enforced, but the price is 
high not only in economic terms. Social injustice caused by this decision will signifi-
cantly impact local people’s trust towards the government. As it is already stated by the 
speaker of the Ministry of Water Resources, flooding inhabited retention area has 
“negative influence on social stability”. Also, one interviewee expressed his concern 
about the controversy of this decision-making principal:  
“Despite of the efficiency to protect bigger interests, we must recognize that the sacri-
fice of some of the regions or people could be immense. Sometimes it has indeed 
devastating consequences for affected people” (Interview 18, 7 December, 2006) 
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However, this decision-making approach is perceived by local and river basin water 
management officials to be one of the “biggest advantages of the socialist system”, for 
this decision-making approach is deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture.  
The advantage and intention of such an arrangement is to keep “a holistic perspective 
(Daju Guannian) in decision-making” (Interview 2005/2006). “Holistic” means the 
“priority of the greater interest” according to interviewees in Wuhan and at the national 
level. The word “ju” (] ) originally means a military unit (Editorial department of the 
Shangwu Yingshuguan, 1984: 0903). This terminology stems from Chinese chess 
game. It is a strategic thinking for sacrificing less important figures such as “soldiers” 
(which is an equivalent of “pawn” in European chess) to save more powerful and thus 
important figures such as “horses” to achieve the final goal of winning the game in the 
end. “Holistic thinking” (daju) is a popular vocabulary among interviewees in China. Hu 
argues the main difference between Chinese culture and Western culture is that the 
Chinese culture emphasizes a holistic approach whereas the Western culture cares 
more about “details”. Daju, a holistic perspective, is the focus of attention in Chinese 
culture. He names the following example on different expressions on time: Chinese 
always states the year in writing before stating smaller units such as month and date, 
on the contrary, the Westerners write smaller units in front of greater units such as 
month and year (Hu et al., 2005: 20).  
This concept of “holistic perspective” is coupled with the concept of “ren” (^), “benevo-
lence”, the core of Confucian ethics and morality. It means interpersonal relations 
which are organized in a strict hierarchical manner. The persons at higher hierarchical 
level should be merciful in treating persons under their governance, in return, persons 
who are at lower level of the hierarchy are expected to obey whatever they are required 
to do: “it is the feeling of compassion and its consequent expression in ‘humaneness’ 
which must be cultivated by the ruler if he wishes to become a true king to whom all the 
people in the world will turn” (Allan, 1997: 115). This principal applies for family rela-
tions and the basis of Chinese society is family. Hu and Herrmann-Pillath observe that 
most of the Chinese enterprises are family business (Hu et al., 2005, Hermann-Pillath, 
2000: 59). The importance of family and its internal relationship is also reflected in the 
differentiated and detailed ways of addressing family members. For example, the 
English word “aunt” has many different expressions in Chinese according to how the 
person is related to the others. The notion of family is transferred to the concept of a 
country. According to the Confucian understanding of the hierarchy the emperor is the 
son of heaven and his officials are the parents of the people. “Self-cultivation, founda-
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tion of a family, governance of a country and peace of the earth (_`% ab % cde )” 
are the order of a person’s development. Foundation of a family is seen to be a prac-
tice of governance of a country. In other words, a country is to be governed according 
to the same principles of managing a family. 
Whereas family and country are given a paramount significance, individuals are far less 
important. The interests of the individual are included in the interests of a group. Hu 
names another example: the word “I” in English is written in capital letter, but in Chi-
nese “I” has to be written in a very modest way to stress the importance of the group 
and the country and at the same time minimize the meaning of an individual. It was a 
common way to address oneself with words such as “the humble person”, “good-for-
nothing”. Because of the central role of the family in Chinese society, interpersonal 
relationship around the family can be extended to people coming from the same town 
or village (Hu et al., 2005: 21-22). 
Due to these traditional values which are still valid today, the top-down decision-making 
approach giving “bigger interests” higher priority than “smaller interests” is based on 
and justified through these values. Social expectation requires individuals to sacrifice 
their own interests and in return, this social expectation is strengthened through such 
events: “Values and meaning are not existing fixed terms, for which we just need to find 
a form of expression; rather, social meaning of a culture is construed through spectacu-
lar performances” (Böhme, 2006). The case of Sanzhou Lianyuan is one of these 
spectacular performances. This is reflected in the title of the report: “The Sad and 
Glorious Abandonment”. The words “sad” and “glorious” express exactly the moral of 
this story. Sacrifice is sad for the people affected because they lose their homes and 
even their livelihood; at the same time it is glorious, because this sacrifice is one of the 
social values held high by Chinese society. Thus, a tragedy is conferred the meaning of 
heroism. Social justice in Chinese society in the sense of a Western democratic society 
is not ensured by focusing on the individual’s interests, but rather by moral obligation. 
“If one is in difficulty, all are expected to help him out”. This is the principle according to 
which sacrifice is compensated and justified. The society which benefits from individual 
sacrifice is in return expected to contribute to the recovery of affected people. Xian-
gruyimo (fg> h ), a Chinese idiom meaning “mutual help in difficult situations” 
(literarily meaning “ventilate each other with his saliva”) expresses this spirit. However, 
this idiom stems from the classical Taoist philosophy and had a very different connota-
tion in its original meaning. Zhuangzi wrote: “once the water of the fountain dries up, 
the fish in the water are exposed to land. To ventilate each other the fish offer each 
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other’s saliva. Yet, it was better if the fish would be residing in rivers and lakes forget-
ting each other…” (Chen, 1983: 178). However, the meaning of this idiom today evokes 
positive associations due to the change and adoption of different values. In contrast to 
the ideal of loosely organized Taoist society in which each individual takes care of 
himself and has no obligations towards the other societal members, the change of 
meaning of this idiom reflects a strong advocate of the evolution of values from more 
individual based society structure to a hierarchical society with high social coerciveness. 
The social coerciveness of a hierarchical society and expectation of social obligation 
and solidarity, in return, it supports and justifies the way of life of hierarchies. Disaster 
is meant to happen to some people, but the social solidarity principle encourages and 
obliges the people who benefit from the sacrifices of others who offer their help. This 
shall weld the society together.  
This notion of cultural reproduction depends on a specific human concept. Unlike the 
belief of the Western free market thinking that every human being is self-seeking, the 
Confucian concept of human beings believes that “man is born good” (Weggel, 1997). 
Only based on this belief the Chinese value system can be functional.  
Conflict between different departments 
Due to different duties of different departments they all have their own working focus. 
An interviewee gives an example: The Flood Management Agency in charge of the 
reservoir only cares about whether the dam breaches or not and if it has enough water 
to produce hydropower, but it does not care about the people’s need for irrigation water 
or if they would be flooded. This is justified by the priority of the higher interests of all. 
They argue, if the dam breached, the loss would be much bigger for more people 
involved. It is common for the management to focus on the protection of the dams and 
dikes. But the agency for disaster mitigating activities puts people in the centre of their 
management strategy. They have to face the questions people raise such as “why 
should we be flooded? If you didn’t use our region as retention area to protect your 
dikes and dams, we wouldn’t be flooded” (Interview 18, 7 December, 2006)  
The Water Management Unit often focuses on “water” as a technical term. The man-
agement’s working objective is to keep water within the embankment. In the mean time 
the objective of the Disaster Relief Department is to ensure the safety of people and 
people’s livelihood during and after the disaster event. Officials often see the clear 
scope of work as an advantage for defining responsibilities, but they sometimes over-
look the interdependence of many of the tasks in flood management. There is an 
obvious lack of interaction and communication between different agencies which 
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impedes integrated water management. For instance, in Wuhan urban planning and 
flood protection and prevention are implemented by different agencies. These agencies 
are not interested in the other agency’s “business”, thus, each agency only takes its 
own objectives into consideration. Each agency takes care of its own working focus 
without taking into consideration the tasks and interests of the other agency, thus 
conflicts emerge (Interview 2005/2006).  
The difference in working focus is also reflected in statistics generated by different 
agencies. For instance, the Agency for Water Management only registers casualties 
due to flooding. But if there is a wind storm, there are not only casualties due to the 
flooding, but also casualties due to the wind storm. Thus, the Agency for Disaster 
Relief registers all casualties during an event. Consequently, there are often different 
statistics between the Agency for Water Management and the Agency for Disaster 
Relief. The only way to find out whose statistics are closer to the real casualty rate is to 
ask lower administration levels such as the provincial and community level to double 
check the statistics (Interview 18, 7 December, 2006). 
“We all speak different languages and lobby different interests. No one is willing to take 
on the other agency’s perspective” (Interview 18, 7 December, 2006). Although there 
are consultation meetings between agencies, the situation has not been changed. 
Coordination and conflict reconciliation highly depend on higher officials’ involvement. 
Conflict reconciliation  
Conflict reconciliation takes place in a hierarchical style. As the case of Jianli County 
shows, conflict is solved by way of moral obligation, order and police force. Once the 
social coerciveness fails to oblige people to take the action as expected by authorities, 
a hierarchical order is put in place to enforce the implementation. If this order is ques-
tioned, punishment is one of the final steps taken, for instance, the Governor of the 
County Jianli was dismissed due to his hesitation in dike breaching. When local people 
resist the orders of the provincial flood protection headquarters, police force is initiated. 
There is no discussion or consensus finding process in an emergency case.  
Even in daily water management situation the hierarchical structure is regarded as one 
of the biggest advantages of the socialist system in China by the water managers: 
“One should not bargain with the government. This is not like in Western countries. 
Once an order is issued, it will be implemented under any conditions” (Interview 1, 30 
August, 2005). Consensus finding is seen as bargaining and is considered to be selfish 
and therefore a negative trait of a human being. According to Chinese values one is not 
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entitled to striving for one’s right. Since altruism is expected from each individual, the 
act of striving for one’s right is not encouraged.  
Similarly, reconciliation of conflicts among different governmental agencies largely 
depends on the “mediation of the leaders”: “if there is conflict, we all go to the leaders. 
They are supposed to tell us what to do. The Prime Minister mediates between the 
ministries and the ministries can mediate between local officials. The key to conflicts is 
the mediating power of the leader. Without this mediation, governance would be very 
difficult in China. If the leader is determined to do something, then success is guaran-
teed, otherwise nothing can be achieved” (Interview 18, 7 December, 2006).  
Also the conflicts between stakeholders in different river stretches are “mediated” by 
“united management”: “If the river crosses boundaries of provinces, the river basin 
administration is in charge of reconciliation of the conflicts. Local conflicts within a 
province will be solved by higher governmental levels. Thus, conflicts can be avoided 
within one provincial administration unit. Besides, we have the unified Flood Protection 
Law. From top to bottom, local governments are subordinate to the central government. 
There are local regulations; these have to be in line with the state’s regulations. If they 
are conflicting with each other, the state’s regulation overrules the local regulations. 
Some of the foreign countries always criticize China in the name of democracy; in fact, 
these countries are very envious of China. In China, a big project can be easily realized 
if the central government advocates it. This is unthinkable in foreign countries” (Inter-
view 19, 8 December, 2006). 
However, it can be observed that the strength of hierarchy has been weakened: “Be-
fore, we just disseminated the documents with red letter head10 with our recommenda-
tions, but today, this is not functioning anymore” (Interview 17, 7 December, 2006). In 
addition to this challenge to the central government’s authority, stakeholders try to 
postpone the execution of the flooding of their retention areas by using “excuses”. The 
most frequent excuse is that they need more time to evacuate people. 
“Changing local politicians’ mentality” is recommended to be the solution to central and 
local conflicts. “The greatest challenge we are facing is to change the way of thinking of 
local politicians. If local politicians are not interested in disaster reduction, there is no 
way to improve their disaster management” (Interview 17, 7 December, 2006). Suzhi 
(ij ), “quality”, which refers to a person’s professional qualification as well as his 
overall moral and value standard, is perceived to be a key word for the improvement of 
                                               
10 Red letter head has only been used by government when important official recommendations and orders 
are issued. 
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local politics and implementation of policies of the central government. This perception 
is not only valid for officials at national level, even at local level many water managers 
see the insufficient “quality” of the cadres as a big obstacle for the “correct understand-
ing” of the central government’s policy and consequently impair its implementation. The 
implementation difficulty of the major shift “from flood control to flood management” in 
water management is considered to be caused by the lack of “quality” of local manag-
ers rather than the mismatch of policy and local conditions. The quality of a person’s 
character, especially the moral standard, is seen to be essential for “correct” implemen-
tation of China’s water policy. It is the local level and the executive individuals who are 
to be blamed for difficulties in implementation. Thus, the local level officials are the 
main actors which have to change or improve their behaviour by raising their qualifica-
tion and moral standards. Suzhi, the “quality” of an actor is to be blamed instead of the 
latent weakness of the system itself. There is no wonder that suzhi has become a 
national blame for almost every failure of the society. “Raising the quality of the cadres 
and citizens” has been one of the major societal goals for many years in China.  
“Scientific evidence” as an important decision-making criterion  
Beck states, the current discussion in the Western world on environmental destruction 
is only or at least dominantly based on natural science paradigm. It is largely miscon-
ceived that the “impoverishment formula” also has a social, cultural and political mean-
ing. Beck calls it the “technocratic and naturalistic” (technokratisch und naturalistisch) 
approach. But this approach is blind to power and distribution structures, bureaucracy, 
currently valid norms and rationalities (Beck, 1986: 33). This description of the techno-
cratic approach in Western world coincides with the statement of Chinese water man-
agement officials. Decision-making based on “scientific evidence” is a strong feature of 
decision-making in Wuhan and among other management levels: 
“Which retention area is to be used depends mainly on the safe retention capacity. First 
of all, the retention has to be efficient; secondly, we choose places which have the 
smallest potential for human and livelihood losses, (…); thirdly, we take into considera-
tion the existing engineered construction. For instance, we raise the question of 
whether the retention area is gated or not. Once the plan has been made, the leaders 
have to give their go” (Interview 4, 6 September, 2005). 
From this statement one can observe that a decision is determined by two dimensions: 
political dimension which is simplified as the proof of higher officials and the “scientific 
dimension” which is considered to be an objective and value-free undertaking. The 
criteria in this statement are clear: retention capacity, casualty and economic loss and 
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the existing engineered measures. These criteria can all be translated into figures or 
technical terms.  
Rayner summarized the way how hierarchical culture deals with risk as to formalize it 
like all the other themes (Rayner, 1992). This behaviour pattern is very eminent among 
the interviewees in water management. When asked about what can be done to reduce 
flood risk in Wuhan, flood managers often have very similar response as follows: 
“Flood risk reduction is just to relocate flood water in different retention areas; decide 
which reservoir will be used for what purposes; to implement the emergency plans for 
flood management; consultation to the higher leaders; to collect information of danger-
ous situations and respond to it…” (Interview 19, 8 December, 2006). 
Science seems to be entirely neutral to assess risks and therefore free from any blame. 
At the same time science becomes also a strong instrument to justify the government’s 
behaviour in assessing, managing risk and their decision-making. If science is a moral-
free, objective device, then it is science which is to be blamed in case of failure. Fur-
thermore, science can also be an instrument to stabilize authority, because experts 
always know better and it is the expert who has access to science and the justification 
to act accordingly. If science would be questioned as it is constantly done in Western 
societies, then discourse had to be allowed and authority would be challenged. There-
fore discourse is not encouraged in order to strengthen authority.  
Similar to the Chinese risk managers, the proponents of the 104th US Congress’ 
regulations on risk management advocate extensive risk assessments because the 
regulations have to be based on ‘sound science’. Slovic criticized that this language 
reflects the ‘traditional narrow view of risk and risk assessment based ‘only on the best 
reasonable available scientific data and scientific understanding’. He argues technical 
analysis is essential for better information, more consistency and accountability for risk 
decision. However, addressing risk conflicts with more science is more likely to enlarge 
the conflict (Slovic, 2000: 410-411).  
While many Western scholars strongly advocate the approach of “taking the natural-
ness out of natural disaster”, Chinese water authorities still emphasize the “natural-
ness” of a natural disaster and therefore support their risk management strategy using 
“pure” scientific paradigm: “Flooding is inevitable, because it rains when it rains, no one 
can stop it. It is a natural phenomenon” (Interview 25, 19 December, 2006). 
Since conflict reconciliation in China is reduced to be mediation of higher officials and 
agencies as well as administrated in form of an order, conflicts are often hidden. But 
not talking about conflicts does not eliminate conflicts. Once conflicts have to be solved 
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by police force, social stability is heavily impaired. Science based on instrumental 
rationality can be used as an argument to support the top-down approach. However, 
blind spots due to this approach can lead to further problems. 
Risk distribution in decision-making 
Based on the principle of interest priority, risk distribution is clearly defined according to 
criteria of population density and economic status. This leads to externalisation of flood 
risk in urban areas which rank high in terms of population and economic considerations. 
Flood risk in the city of Wuhan is assigned to the retention areas located close to the 
city and retention areas in upper and lower reaches of Yangtze River. The city is 
protected by dikes. Dikes, as a result of development of technology, are not only used 
for protection, but also as an instrument to channel risks. This inevitably leads to 
conflicts of interests. As revealed from the statements of the interviewees and the 
example of the retention area Jianli County which was flooded to protect “more impor-
tant objects such as the city of Wuhan”, conflicts emerge despite of moral obligation of 
affected communities and people. Nevertheless this approach is perceived to be the 
most rational way to distribute risk and whose acceptance of stakeholders is not 
questioned: “The safety of the city of Wuhan should certainly be guaranteed by all 
means. The other areas can take more risks. Flooding one or two counties in rural 
areas is not a big deal. We have to take a certain risk and we can calculate risks and 
see which region can take which risk” (Interview 6/7 September, 2005) 
Douglas states: “If some degree of risk is inevitable, suppressing it in one place often 
merely moves it to another. Shifting risks may be more dangerous than tolerating them, 
both because those who face new risks may be unaccustomed to them and because 
those who no longer face old ones may become more vulnerable when conditions 
change” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 197). In the city of Wuhan one can observe 
that the confidence in dike and retention areas as safety measures against flood risk is 
quite strong amongst local flood risk managers. A dike breach scenario within the city 
area is unimaginable for them. They do not take this into consideration in their agenda: 
“The dike will never breach. Even if it is about to breach, we have to protect it with all 
efforts even with our lives and do not allow it to happen. This dike has been stabilized 
after the Great Flood 1998. One can say it is unbreakable” (Interview 6, 7 September, 
2005). The overconfidence of dike protection leads to lack of preparedness of flood risk 
through dike breach. Externalizing risk distribution jeopardizes both the city of Wuhan 
where inhabitants and local managers completely rely on transporting risk to other 
areas and the retention areas which is not flooded on a regular basis, for people living 
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in these areas are often not aware of the risks they are facing. Especially in retention 
areas such as Dongxihu, which has never been put into use since its construction in 
1957 (China Water Resources News, 2007). “Local people living in retention areas are 
often not aware that they are living within a retention area which can be flooded in case 
of severe flood events to ensure the safety of more important protection objects” 
(Interview 4, 6 September, 2005). Thus, risk distribution has become an ever challeng-
ing undertaking. 
However, this externalizing risk distribution is again justified by cultural tradition. The 
interviewee of the Ministry of Water Resources argues: 
“In China it is not like Western countries that people risk to live in flood prone areas in 
order to make more money due to its cheap real estate prices. If they are flooded, they 
require financial aid paid by all tax payers. In China people have to live in retention 
areas, otherwise they can not make a living at all. This is like a family with two sons: if 
one son gets a better land protected by dikes, another son has to farm in high risk 
locations. Once flood occurs, the son with safer land is obliged to help the son living in 
a high risk area. The same applies for people in retention areas. Once a disaster 
occurs and their land has to be flooded, then they will get help from all over the country. 
This is our culture” (Interview 16, 6 December, 2006). 
The dilemma is that this principle functions well if everyone obeys this cultural rule. But 
in reality the interests of affected people are far from being protected through moral 
obligation. Without a legal mechanism, compensation solely based on and enforced by 
moral obligation is not ensured.  
Public Participation  
There are local managers who seem to be at a loss as to how to respond to public 
participation when confronted with this topic. This shows that public participation is 
indeed a new concept to many of the local flood managers. They are more used to the 
traditional way of coping with flood which focuses on engineered measures and dike 
protection during flooding events. 
Other water managers perceive public participation to be a new concept of decision-
making which is not completely in line with the traditional Chinese culture. The flood 
managers in Wuhan who are very sceptical about this approach argue:  
“We don’t have too much public participation in our country. This is due to our thousand 
year old culture. People are willing to be guided and led. The relationship between 
people and government is a relationship of leading and being led. People don’t want to 
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make their own decisions. They have been used to it since thousands of years” (Inter-
view 4, 6 September, 2005). 
Traditional culture here refers to the Confucian tradition which dictates the behavioural 
pattern for different hierarchies: lords rule over their subjects and the fathers rule over 
their sons (kkllmmnn ) (Song, 1985: 51). 
An emperor who has the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ (do tianming) should govern over 
people and the people should follow whatever the emperor requires from them. A 
Chinese saying states: “If the monarch wants his subjects to die, then they have to die; 
if a father wants his son to die, his son has no other choice than to follow his father’s 
will.” Luan (p), chaos, has always been the most fearful thing for the Chinese rulers. 
Lucian Pye, as cited in Cultural Theory (see chapter F), elaborates: “Following on ‘the 
intense Chinese fear of luan, chaos, disorder and confusion, they turn to ‘the classical 
Confucian assumption that all will be right with the world if everyone conscientiously 
performs his or her assigned role” (Thompson et al., 1990: 228) 
This feudalist behavioural model evolved, especially after the New Culture Movement 
in 1919 in China, when feudalist ideas were challenged by Western democratic 
thoughts. Democracy and modern science are seen to be the greatest challenge to 
traditional Chinese culture. However, compared to the rapid development in scientific 
research, democracy has largely lagged behind when it comes to influencing Chinese 
society. China’s feudalist societal form was long lasting and its hierarchical structure is 
deep-rooted. Decision making of an individual in a high position replaces rule of law 
and order. The hierarchical structure in China is well established. During the Qing-
Dynasty (1644-1911), for instance, there were nine different ranks amongst the officials 
and even regulations on official clothes, food, housing and transportation for different 
officials. Even today, ranks in Chinese society play an important role which maintains 
the functionality of a hierarchical societal structure. This is reflected in how people with 
different titles are addressed. Unlike in Western countries where only academic titles 
such as Dr. or Professor are the common titles with which the respective person is 
addressed, in China also people with different positions are addressed according to 
their ranking. For instance, if a person has the position as head of an agency, he is not 
called Mr. so and so, but called “head” plus his family name e.g. “Head Li” (Hu et al., 
2005: 32).  
Due to this well established strict hierarchical approach which is still valid today in 
China, water managers do not see any need to involve the general public into the 
decision-making process. 
E RESEARCH RESULTS 1 FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
 95 
Also the understanding of public participation differs: 
“The implementation of public participation is sometimes very difficult, for instance the 
collection of the flood protection fee. According to the Chinese Flood Protection Law, 
people living in flood prone areas should submit a flood protection fee. But in the lower 
reach of the Yangtze River, there is no problem with flooding, but more problems with 
drought. They do not see any point in financially supporting flood protection. Farmers 
do not need to pay a flood protection fee, but they have to provide their labour for free” 
(Interview 9, 22 September, 2005).  
“Public participation? Yes, we also practice public participation. During a flood event, 
whoever he is, as long as he has a job and belongs to an official unit, he has to partici-
pate in flood fighting. In Wuhan, during the Great Flood 1998, every company, every 
governmental agency has to send people to protect the dikes. This is compulsory for 
employees. We involved tens of thousands of people to protect the dikes.” (Interview 
25, 19 December, 2006). 
It is obvious that public participation is understood by flood managers from the per-
spective of hierarchies. Involving the public means that people are assigned with 
obligation and tasks instead of being entitled to express their opinion and protect their 
rights. This is a specific way of framing public participation within Chinese cultural 
context. It is a typical top-down decision-making approach. Public participation is 
understood in a way that the authorities tell people what they have to do and people 
should take it as an order and follow. 
Another reason for lack of public participation also has cultural roots. The individual is 
understood as part of a group. The concept of group in China is understood as a 
certain professional entity or a neighbourhood (Interview 20, 11 December, 2006). 
Since there is no private ownership in China, individuals are all bound to a collective. 
Public participation in China does not mean participation of individuals but their repre-
sentative who are always part of the government.  
But yet, demand for public participation has been growing. The leading Chinese envi-
ronmentalists have demanded for more public participation in environmental issues: 
“Social democracy requires that people must have the right to know … the environ-
mental crisis that is happening; socialist democracy requires that people must have the 
right to monitor environmental issues, especially the right to monitor the public projects 
which have an impact on the environment; socialist democracy requires that people 
must have the right to participate in environmental issues, especially in the making of 
strategies concerning environmental security … To develop environmental culture will 
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lay an important cultural foundation for the evolution of the socialist democratic system” 
(Yang, 2005: 60)  
Nevertheless the question remains as how long it will still take for this approach to 
penetrate flood management which has a strong technical background. 
Sustainability Aspects 
In decision-making processes the concept of sustainability in development strategy is 
not taken as an important criterion. The main arguments are: 
“Western countries have passed the period of rapid (economic) development; therefore 
they can afford to think about sustainable development such as how to use natural 
resources in a more rational way. But China’s main task is still to feed billions of people, 
we have to use land in an intensive way, this is why the retention areas are still partially 
densely populated” (Interview 21, 11 December, 2006). 
“Talking about sustainable development is still much too early for China. We cannot 
even ensure the interests of this generation, let alone the next generation. … It is 
inevitable to repeat the mistakes of the developed countries. If people’s livelihood is 
endangered, there will be social chaos. This is very detrimental to societal stability” 
(Interview 16, 6 December, 2006). 
“China’s greatest contribution is to feed 1.3 billion people. Irrespective of how the 
others talk about CO2 emissions, ecological change or environmental pollution, no one 
can deny this contribution to the world. No other country is capable of it, not the Euro-
peans, not the Americans. It would be a real disaster on this planet if our 1.3 billion 
people would go starving or become asylum seekers” (Interview 17, 7 December, 
2006). 
“We must develop economy first so that we have enough money to pay attention to the 
environment later on” (Interview11, 27 September, 2005). 
Several messages in these statements are worth notifying:  
Sustainable flood mitigation is only possible after economic development has reached 
a certain standard. To ensure the economic development, retention areas have to be 
utilised for agriculture and industry. Different stakeholders and actors show great 
willingness to pay the price with environment and unsustainable practice in water 
management: 
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“Even in the retention area Dujiatai11 it is impossible to give up agricultural activities. In 
New Zealand the land close to the volcano which erupted recently has been given up. 
If this would have happened in Wuhan, we would have bought the land immediately to 
plant trees. We can not give up production within the retention areas and let it be idle. 
The purpose of flood protection and retention is to ensure production and development. 
Like human beings, one would not stop eating only because one could choke on his 
food. As long as water doesn’t come, we must keep farming, otherwise it would be a 
waste of nature” (Interview 12, 27 September, 2005). 
Furthermore, economic development compromising sustainability is seen to be the only 
option to ensure social stability which includes “feeding” the people. Sustainable flood 
management is even regarded as a risk for societal stability, for the people living in 
retention areas would lose their livelihood. 
In regard to sustainable development issues almost all interviewees have more or less 
a defensive attitude. This is probably due to Western media coverage which has been 
criticizing China for its environmental problems. In respond to it, interviewees always 
try to put this critique in perspective by actively relating their statements to “the West-
ern countries” and highlighting the different conditions in China. Among these condi-
tions population size seems to be the most frequently mentioned and emphasized 
variable. 
Population is perceived to be the greatest challenge in flood risk management. Due to 
the population size and density of the city of Wuhan, flood risk has to be distributed to 
the less populated rural areas. But even the retention areas which are situated in rural 
areas are populated. Population growth and consequently economic development in 
retention areas have been long lasting since the 1950’s. The continuous construction of 
“secondary dikes” created a landscape assembling scales within retention areas. Due 
to the population growth, more and more dikes have been erected expanding protected 
areas for agricultural land use. In the last two decades urbanisation and industrial 
development have been taking place rapidly which has made engineering flood protec-
tion even more essential. Therefore total population and population density on flood 
plains in China is seen as the main reason for the unshakable importance of engineer-
ing measures: 
                                               
11  Dujiatai is the retention area which has been flooded 20 times since its construction in 1954 
RESEARCH GROUP OF RENTENTION AREAS (2006) q3r`stuTvwxyzP{|  (Guanyu 
Dujiatai Fenxuhongqu Guanli Wenti de Taolun) (Discussion on Management Problems in Dujiatai Retan-
tion Areas). HAN RIVER MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
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“…We do not have any other choice due to our huge population. We have too many 
people and too little land. We can not allow water to flow rampantly like the Americans 
or Europeans. They have a lot of land but not many people, so they can leave water 
flow rampantly. If we would do the same thing, we have to flood all our cities such as 
Yichang, Shashi, Wuhan, Nanjing and Shanghai. This is unthinkable” (Interview 25, 19 
December, 2006). 
Flood management seems to be caught in a vicious circle: The larger the population 
becomes, the more economic activities are generated. Consequently the higher the 
respective area is ranked as protected objects due to its potential human and economic 
losses. Flood management authorities see no other option than strengthening engi-
neering measures. Sustainable flood management seems to be an unrealistic require-
ment under these local conditions.  
The policy shift “from emphasis on structural engineering solutions in shuili (water 
management) enterprise to a broader resource-defined concept of ‘resource’ water 
management (ziyuanshuili)” took place in 1999 (Boxer, 2001). Early in 2003 the State 
Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters and the Ministry of Water Resources of 
China explicitly pointed out that a shift “from flood control to flood management” should 
be implemented in China in regard to flood management (Cheng, 2006: 75).   
Despite of this new approach in water management which has been advocated at 
national level, change in decision-making has hardly taken place at local levels. Inter-
viewees have strong scepticism towards the implementation of this new policy. They 
believe that there will not be a great change in flood management strategy in the near 
future. Engineering measures will stay the dominant component of flood management. 
Structural measures are far from being “saturated” in comparison to Western countries. 
Local flood managers doubt if this policy shift would find enough acceptance and 
understanding among local flood managers. 
1.3.b. Cologne, Germany 
The central and the local 
In Germany the counter flow principle (Gegenstromprinzip) in flood management 
decision-making processes greatly contributes to easing the tension between stake-
holders. This aspect is well reflected in spatial planning which is one of the most 
important flood preventive measures in Cologne.  
There are different levels of planning processes and authorites including the European 
Union, the federal level, the federal state level and the community level. EU as the 
highest level of legislation does not give any concrete instructions. This is called 
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subsidiary principle12 according to which each country is responsible for itself to take 
concrete measures in flood protection. At the national level and the federal state level 
the laws on spatial planning provide guidelines for drafting the regional plan in each 
respective region. The regional plan obliges communities to follow its guidelines once 
the plan is approved by the regional council. In the mean time, the communities are 
involved throughout the entire planning process. For the regions Cologne, Bonn/Rhein-
Sieg and the river basin Erft alone as many as 211 stakeholders were involved in the 
planning process for flood protection aspects of the regional plan which was approved 
in 2006 (Bezirksregierung Köln, 2006). These stakeholders include communities’ 
representatives such as mayors, relevant technical departments, NGOs, energy enter-
prises, chemical industries, fishery branch, and conservation agencies. “All actors and 
stakeholders who are somehow affected spatially are involved” (Interview 33, 25 
January, 2007). And according the administration law every stakeholder can apply to 
participate in the planning process. Depending on the relevance of the stakeholder the 
regional council decides if the applicant would be taken into consideration (Interview 33, 
25 January, 2007). This principle applies also at the community level. The community 
has to involve its citizens into the process of creating the zoning plan and development 
plan.  
Extensive public participation in the planning process largely eases tension between 
stakeholders, especially between different administrative and political levels. It is based 
on democratic principles and provides all stakeholders from upper administrative and 
political level such as national and federal state level, to the lowest administration and 
political level such as the community level as well as each individual to voice their 
opinion. The interests of individual citizens and community autonomy (Kommunale 
Selbstverwaltung) are taken seriously and justice is the focus of this approach. Due to 
the regional council which consists of local politicians, the communities are given great 
power to lobby local interests. Although this approach cannot eliminate all conflicts, it 
                                               
12 According to the subsidiary principle a national task shall be implemented by the units at lower admini-
stration levels under the federal administration. The state shall only intervene, if communities or federal 
states are no longer in the position to cope with their difficulties. Accoridng to the Article 36 of the Euro-
pean Convention, mobilisation of the European Union is only allowed, if the tasks ahead require EU’s 
intervention and its member states authorise the EU to do so, for example, in the case of the conservation 
of fish population in the North Sea. This principle aims to avoid extreme European centralism and to 
strengthen a people-centred approach. 
 
BUNDESZENTRALE FÜR POLITISCHE BILDUNG (2005) Das Politiklexikon. 
<http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup_lemmata.html?guid=3H53IP>, 22 January 2009 
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endeavours to find consensus and common acceptance of the final decision among all 
stakeholders. 
However, the process is very time consuming and costly. There are official regulations 
on how long the plan draft has to be made accessible to the public and how much time 
stakeholders are given to express their concerns in a written form etc. Often such a 
process takes years to be completed, which is even becoming more longsome due to 
the complicated laws and regulations issued in the recent years.  
The most recent regional spatial plan of Cologne on flood protection aspect was 
approved by the regional council in 2006. The preventive flood protection spatial plan 
was initiated officially (Einleitungsbeschluss) in May 2004. In June, information materi-
als were sent to 211 stakeholders who were involved in the process. They were sup-
posed to submit their written comments and proposals within the following four months. 
But the deadline had to be extended to the 20th of December 2004 due to the heavy 
internal work load of different communities. Altogether 310 comments and proposals 
for changes were put forward. These comments and proposals were summarized and 
then sent to all stakeholders involved on the 15th August 2005 with compromising 
recommendations (Ausgleichsvorschläge) by the regional government along with the 
invitation to the public hearing. The public hearing took place on the 3rd, 4th and the 7th 
of November 2005. The objective of the public hearing was to find common denomina-
tors of the stakeholders. The results of the public hearing showed that stakeholders 
were able to achieve consensus among most of the proposals. 232 out of 310 propos-
als and comments have been accepted by all stakeholders. 78 of them could not be 
resolved. It was agreed on at the public hearing that the stakeholders and the respec-
tive regional spatial planning department should endeavour to reach consensus for the 
remaining differences. Finally the regional council had to decide as how to proceed 
about it. The decision of the regional council was issued on the 31st of March 2006 
(Bleeker et al., 2006).         
The decision-making process is a long and consensus based one. In the mean time the 
administration has been slimmed down. There is a lack of personnel in implementing 
this democratic approach. “Democracy has touched its limits” (Interview 33, 25 January, 
2007).  
The democratic election system seems to be a tricky factor which also has to be taken 
into consideration in practice. If the plan draft is submitted before the local elections, 
the local politicians who are also the regional council members are under pressure to 
give flood protection a greater priority. Considering the flood events in the last two 
E RESEARCH RESULTS 1 FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
 101 
decades, flood protection has gained more attention in the political agenda through 
media coverage. On the one hand spatial planning follows strict rules and administra-
tive regulations; on the other hand, there is still informal practice which requires the 
personnel’s sense for the window of opportunity and skill in enforcing their interests, 
since windows of opportunity is one of the keys to enforce flood protection measures. 
Some actors perceive the long decision-making process as a disadvantage of the 
democratic system. They describe these political and administrative bodies as “babble 
unions” (Laberverein) which take long time to reach a decision: 
“It gets very critical once a decision has to be made within a political body. There are 
endless discussions. And then there will always be one more board, one more appeal, 
one more legal process, one more judgment which extends the planning process again 
and again. And there are ever more people coming to express their opinions. This is 
something which makes things really difficult” (Interview 32, 26 October, 2006). 
Under these circumstances the centralistic system is perceived by some stakeholders 
to be more efficient and more adequate to flood management (Interview 32, 26 October, 
2006).  
Conflict of different interests  
The most significant conflicts of interests expressed by interviewees are the conflicts 
between different stakeholders at local level. These conflicts are reflected in the con-
sensus finding processes for technical flood protection measures such as dike con-
struction and retention areas.  
To protect the city of Cologne from flood events of 100 year reoccurrence, new dikes in 
the outskirt of the city have been planed (Stadt Köln, 1996). The plan of the construc-
tion of the new dikes and flood walls had to go through a plan-approval procedure 
(Planfeststellungsverfahren). Stakeholders such as the farmers union, conservationist 
organizations and citizens’ groups were heavily involved in this procedure through 
written documents expressing their opinions and public hearings. Also individual 
citizens could attend the public hearing and even used a law suit to enforce their 
objection against this project. It can be observed that the main conflicts are the interest 
of industries, conservationist, citizens groups and the farmers’ union as well as indi-
viduals.  
For instance, in the planning process for the new flood protection wall in Cologne the 
location of the flood protection wall has to be planed in such a manner that the existing 
big trees could remain. But in reality, these trees had to be cut down in the end be-
cause the construction damaged their roots. Otherwise these trees could cause a huge 
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damage, if they eventually fall due to their unstable roots. The decision to cut down the 
trees could only be made within a short process, because the construction had started 
and the damage to the trees has been made. The project manager concludes:  
“In fact, one could have decided from the very beginning that these trees have to be cut 
down. But this opinion would not find any supporters. It wouldn’t have worked out the 
other way. Now the damage to the trees has to be compensated. The compensation 
will be calculated. But that is all which has to be done to get the permission. It was in 
fact a short procedure. But if one had tried to cut the trees from the beginning, it would 
have been very difficult” (Interview 27, 18 August, 2006). 
The president of one of the citizens’ groups added: “With the animals it is the same 
story. I was at the public hearing. The Greens13 always shout, ‘the animals, the hedge-
hogs. These animals must have their exit’ [in the flood wall]…” (Interview 27, 18 August, 
2006). 
The long plan-approval procedure is seen by some stakeholders to be partially caused 
by the impediment of the conservationists who are perceived to have a strong voice in 
the decision-making process. 
Some of the interviewees state that some individuals also held up the process, be-
cause they initiated law suits for different reasons. Examples are related to the 
changed landscape due to the construction. Interviewees named cases like obstruction 
of the river view through the flood wall or some individuals wanting to keep their path to 
the river which will cause high costs in construction (Interview 27, 18 August, 2006).  
However, the Conservationists’ Union has quite a different perspective. The concern of 
the Conservationists’ Union is to gain as much “natural” retention areas as possible. 
These retention areas should not be gated so that the flora-fauna habitat can be 
maintained in a natural state which allows the healthy development of the biotope. 
They advocate that the flood protection wall should be built as close as possible to the 
settlements. This will avoid further construction of the existing settlement and in the 
mean time leaves more space for the river and flora-fauna. The conservationists also 
regard the physical separation of the retention area from the settlement through flood 
wall construction as a problem. They argue that the flora behind the flood wall may or 
may not be able to adapt to this change, for they are not flooded on a regular basis any 
more. The biotope will have a different development than before. Especially the mam-
                                               
13 The interviewee refers to “Die Grünen”, the German Green Party.  
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mals which live along the river side will not be able to escape in case of flooding events 
due to the construction of the flood wall. 
The interviewee of the Conservationists’ Union Cologne complained about how little 
their concern is taken into consideration during the planning of the technical flood 
protection: The plan “has changed its course” in the process. At the beginning, the 
water management intended to build up the flood protection wall as far as possible 
from the river, so that more retention area could be maintained. But “the pressure form 
the farmers and the inhabitants led to the result … that in the end the flood protection 
line lies very close to the River Rhine” (Interview 30, 21 September, 2006).  
The inhabitants are perceived to be very demanding. They do not want to have the 
flood wall “just in front of their windows” for instance, because they are afraid that the 
people taking walks along the Rhine on Sundays would “disturb their Sunday’s peace”, 
if the flood wall would be built up too close to their houses. Wealthy inhabitants are 
perceived to have more access to power which makes it easier for them to enforce 
their interests: 
“That is a rather posh district where influential people live. Some of them are in the City 
Council (of Cologne) or at least they have easy access to the Council, so [they can 
enforce their interests]...” (Interview 30, 21 September, 2006).  
The Farmers’ Union is also seen to have a very strong lobby and therefore enforces 
their interests easily. In the case of the relocation of the dike between Zündorf, Nieder-
kassel and Lülsdorf (see map 7), the Farmers’ Union in Cologne showed their strength 
in pushing their interests through. The conservationists support this plan, for they could 
regain an area for flora and fauna. However, this plan encountered strong opposition 
from the farmers. There were more than a dozen of farmers who initiated lawsuits 
against this relocation and they were supported by the agricultural chamber. The 
conservationists can not expect any support from the local politicians, because they 
rather take the farmers’ side in order not to lose their voters. The success of the plan 
would mean unemployment and this will have a considerable impact on local politics.  
The option of buying the land from the farmers fails, because the farmers would only 
sell their lands at a very high price which the community is not willing to pay or is not 
able to afford. Private property is protected by law. Without the voluntary compromise 
of the owners of the land, only a long-lasting and complicated legal process could 
dispossess the owners under specific conditions.  
In the end the plan had to be changed to meet the requirements of different stake-
holders.  
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Map 7: Planed retention area 
 
 
Source: Flood Protection Centre Cologne, 2005 
 
The interviewee of the Conservationists’ Union in Cologne perceives certain power-
lessness in enforcing their interests in terms of political support: 
“In regard to conflicts between the development of settlements and the protection of 
field hamsters, politicians find the question laughable. The conservation of the nature is 
rather unimportant” (Interview 30, 21 September, 2006). 
Comparing to the farmers’ unions the conservationists consider their lobby to be “weak”. 
“There is no comparison between the lobby of the farmers’ unions and the lobby of the 
conservationists. Our frustration is unimaginably high” (Interview 30, 21 September, 
2006). 
The reason why the farmers’ unions have such a strong lobby is understood to be the 
down-to-earth image of the farmers; in comparison to this, conservationists feel they 
are not taken seriously.  
Conservationists perceive the farmers in Cologne to be too “stubborn”: 
“All other people have to react to the changes flexibly in the course of their career, but 
the farmers are very narrow-minded, they either see their cows, then they want to have 
green land, or I (farmer) try to sell my sugar beets as expensive as possible. Or I 
(farmer) don’t know, maybe I (farmer) should grow barley or wheat, or corn as fodder. 
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But it won’t come into their minds that they also could earn their money with other jobs 
and they have to be flexible in life, this is not the case with the farmers” (Interview 30, 
21 September, 2006). 
Farmers see their existence endangered through the technical measures and retention 
areas. It is more than “being flexible” in life and it is about losses of tradition and life 
style. In addition to this they think they contribute to landscape conservation without 
generating extra costs for the community (Interview 29, 13 September, 2006).  
The conflicting interests of the farmers and other stakeholders concentrate on land use. 
The areas identified as retention areas are often agricultural land. Once the land is 
identified for retention, there are double losses to the farmers to whom the land be-
longs. First, they risk losing their harvest through the flood events. Second, their land 
use is constrained. The expansion potential of farming activities and construction are 
ruled out. In the early days farms were often situated close to the Rhine. These farms 
were particularly affected due to the construction constrains in retention areas.  
The constrain for construction consequently impacts the value of the real estate and 
banks where farmers take loans to finance their farming businesses, and also reduces 
their loans because of the value losses of the land.  
The Farmers’ Union argues that the identification of retention areas sometimes also 
leads to losses of agricultural land, because the conservationists use this chance to 
raise the value of the land for nature conservation. Agricultural lands are again reduced 
due to landscape planning and landscape development considerations. 
Through technical flood protection measures such as the construction of flood walls, 
there is a double reduction of agricultural land. Generally, engineering flood protection 
measures are constructed on areas which have not been used for other construction 
activities, therefore it is the agricultural land which is used for flood protection construc-
tions. These structural measures reduce farming land and in addition to it, the land is 
reduced again through the compensation for “altering nature” through these structural 
measures. According to the Landscape Conservation Law (Landschaftsgesetz) of 
North-Rhine Westphalia (2005), compensation (Ausgleichsmaßnahme) has to be made. 
The implementation of it largely affects the farmers, for compensation means to refor-
est some areas within agricultural land. Often the compensation for the altered nature 
is not practiced according to a one to one proportion based on the law, but rather one 
to 1.5 in practice. There is a lack of consensus on compensation calculations between 
conservationists and farmers. The lack of consensus on compensation for altering 
nature increased the tension between these stakeholders and consequently farmers 
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tend to “fight for every square metre of land”. This problem is encountered by another 
compensation procedure which shall reimburse a parcel of land to farmers. Usually the 
city of Cologne provides lands for the reimbursement from its own property. By doing 
so the farmers who own their own lands are not affected by such technical flood protec-
tion measures which are constructed on their lands in term of size of land.  
However, while private ownership is protected, the tenants in no way enjoy such a 
remedy. Especially, in some parts of Cologne 70% of the farmers are tenants. These 
tenants have much less entitlement to protect their rights in flood protection issues 
comparing to those of land owners. The tenants are affected again if the land owners 
decide to sell their lands to the city of Cologne for flood protection purposes. In fact the 
land owners often belong to a hereditary community and are interested in selling their 
lands in order to share the money, for they do not make enough profit from the rent that 
they receive. In such a case the tenants lose their land and are deprived of their liveli-
hood. The window of opportunity for flood protection is seen as a constraint to the 
development for farmers. Because the new retention areas are mostly identified directly 
after a flood event, local politicians are under pressure to take action to protect citizens. 
The argument that the collective interests should be given priority is so strong when the 
memory of the flood event is fresh that the decision is often made in favour of the 
interests of the community as such by limiting land use of the farmers (Interview 29, 13 
September, 2006).  
“It does not always make sense to start a law suit, because it is weighted between 
individual interests and community interests. If the individual will not lose his livelihood, 
it is not very likely that the decision will be in favour of the farmers” (Interview 29, 13 
September, 2006).  
In some cases farmers contend that they would have enough time to evacuate their 
horses from the retention area once a flood event occurs. Nevertheless, it is not al-
lowed to build barns within the retention area.  
At public hearing farmers often complain that flood protection which leads to the reduc-
tion of farming land and only contributes to the flood protection of other regions should 
not be their concern. The farmers say: 
“Which arguments does the Municipal Government of Cologne have to carry out flood 
protection measure using our land for other cities? They have nothing to do with us. 
The communities in the upper reaches of the Rhine should do more. In Sieg, in Flori-
enz, but not in front of my own door” (Interview 29, 13 September, 2006). 
This characteristic of farmers is described often as “small-minded”. 
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The tension between conservationists and farmers is strong. The political standing 
points and perspectives are different. However, there has been a change in recent 
years. Conservationists and farmers have found their common denominator. They 
defend their common interests against industrial and commercial land use. The con-
servationists also realize the value of the landscape maintenance through agricultural 
activities. There is a tendency that farmers and conservationists collaborate more and 
more (Interview 29, 13 September, 2006). 
However, farmers perceive their image to be conservative in the eyes of conservation-
ists and they have different understanding for nature conservation than the conserva-
tionists. Conservationists “only see the compensation in favour of nature conservation 
but ignore the livelihood of the farmers. The farmers are bounded to their location and 
they need their land to produce. If conservationists strive for ever bigger compensation 
for altering nature through construction and try to convert agricultural land into a rec-
reation area under conservation protection, the resistance of farmers can be very 
strong. They fear for losing their tradition and their life style as farmers: “the farm will 
decline and I can not pass it to the next generation” (Interview 29, 13 September, 2006). 
In relation to the Farmers’ Union the conflict of interests has a simple constellation: on 
the one hand inhabitants blame the city government for not carrying out enough flood 
protection measures in the past and allowing construction in flood prone areas. This 
has put the city government under pressure to undertake flood protection measures. 
On the other hand, farmers fear for their existence and resist any of these actions. 
Conservationists try to do something good to the nature but often overlook farmers’ 
livelihood and life style continuation.  
On the whole it can be well observed in the regional spatial planning process that  
industries try to keep as much land as possible for construction to serve their expan-
sion purposes; farmers fear for losses of their land and insist on their farming tradition; 
conservationists want to gain as much retention area as possible to achieve their 
ecological goal; Individuals have their own concerns and pursue their rights. Most 
interestingly however, governmental agencies do not necessarily support the interests 
of the government, but rather the interests of the respective agencies. Therefore, the 
environmental protection agencies strongly advocate sustainable development and 
their interest are in line with the environmental NGOs. 
Conflict between different agencies 
In general, the cooperation between the agencies in Cologne is perceived to be good. 
However, there seemed to be some conflicts between the local and national agency 
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such as the Federal Institute for Hydrology (BfG) and Flood Information Centre (Ho-
chwassermeldedienst).  
There seems to be a lack of communication between BfG and the Flood Information 
Centre and they see themselves as competitive agencies for flood forecast. One 
interviewee described the relationship between the local flood management and the 
other two agencies as a triangle relationship between a man and two women: 
“This is an interesting relationship. It is like a triangle relationship of a man with two 
women. The women do not know anything about each other. … The BfG supports the 
local flood management in Cologne, but this displeases the Flood Information Centre, 
because the Flood Information Centre uses different rainfall and run-off models to that 
of the BfG. We are using the same model as BfG which is developed for us by BfG. As 
a result we can produce much more precise forecasts than an agency which has to 
provide 30 different forecasts. Officially we have to be in line with the forecasts of the 
Flood Information Centre. However, until now we could always argue that we had to do 
the forecast much earlier than the colleagues in Flood Information Centre. I have to 
admit that they have improved their work today. But we should talk to each other and 
agree on the same forecast once the water has reached a certain level so that we have 
the same voice. This was not always the case, for instance in 2001 and 2003” (Inter-
view 26, 23 December, 2005).  
The reason for the lack of consensus is interpreted by the local flood management as 
the arrogance of the directorate of the Flood Information Centre. This “arrogance” leads 
to the belief that the Flood Information Centre can forecast the flood events in a very 
precise way which is technically impossible according to the opinion of the local man-
agement. The local management in Cologne highlights trust among the actors and 
stakeholders in flood management and therefore advocates for a flood forecast which 
is not as precise as the Flood Information Centre’s but lies in a safe range to maintain 
trust. Due to these different approaches a conflict emerged (Interview 26, 23 December, 
2005).  
This conflict reveals different considerations of different agencies. For the Flood Infor-
mation Centre it is important to forecast the flood events using all technical supports as 
precise as possible, but for the local management the local conditions including the 
trust of the general public and media are important aspects which guarantee the 
success of flood management. Trust is seen to be paramount in local flood manage-
ment. Based on these considerations different approaches are taken.  
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Among the local agencies conflicts are mainly caused by competition and question of 
authority. This issue will be analysed in the chapter E.2 “Flood risk communication”. 
Conflict reconciliation and representation of interests 
Different interests are represented and lobbied through public participation and law 
suits. In fact, communication between different stakeholders greatly contributes to 
conflict reconciliation. The role of communication is emphasized in conflict reconcilia-
tion and is seen to be the most important instrument to find consensus. This communi-
cation takes place in a horizontal direction and on a voluntary basis.   
Given the tension between the Flood Information Centre and the Federal Institute for 
Hydrology due to their competitive roles in flood forecasting, the local flood manage-
ment of Cologne took the initiative and arranged a meeting with the BfG and the Flood 
Information Centre to talk about the problems. This initiative reveals that discussion 
between actors is seen as an option to solve the problems. Higher authority is not 
involved before the agencies have tried to find their own solutions: 
“First of all we speak to each other among ourselves. We don’t want to go to the board 
of directors (with our problems). That would be the last step which could be taken. If it 
becomes necessary, we’ll have to do it” (Interview 26, 23 December, 2005). 
As can be learned from this example, one is not relying on higher authorities to recon-
cile conflicts but rather takes his own initiative. Individual initiative is encouraged in 
German culture and likewise, individuals are given the opportunity to play his role in 
society. 
Communication also takes place between agencies and NGOs as well as individual 
stakeholders. The Farmers’ Union perceives the city government to be very supportive 
towards the agricultural sector. The government on the other hand endeavours to find 
consensus with farmers.  
“It does not make any sense to do something against the will of each individual. It is 
more reasonable to consider everyone’s interests. Therefore, the willingness for nego-
tiation exists from the very beginning” (Interview 29, 13 September, 2006). The city 
government not only provides the farmers with the information they require, but also 
work with the farmers to find a solution to the problems. Both sides emphasize the 
importance of “harmonious relationship”, especially because the farmers are bounded 
to their locations and the experience with the city government will impact the next 
generations. They believe in mutual understanding and consensus. Whenever the 
farmers need information or wish a meeting, the city government or the department 
which is in charge of flood protection is always ready to talk with them. And often they 
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meet at the farmers’ to gain a picture of the location to better understand the farmers’ 
needs.  
Apart from the public hearings, the farmers can take part in and have their say; they 
can also use legal instruments to lobby their interests if they are not wholly taken into 
consideration. Since the legal process is time consuming and costly, usually they just 
initiate the legal process and then ask for suspension. By doing so, they can postpone 
the plan-approval procedure and put the counterparts under pressure. The construction 
project will be more costly if it has to be interrupted by legal processes. Therefore, the 
farmers gain more potential to negotiate with their counterparts in an extra judicial 
negotiation process. 
Risk distribution 
According to the current Water Resources Act (WHG) constructions in flood prone 
areas have to be compensated with retention volumes equal to the amount of water 
which is reduced through the construction. Construction can only be carried out if it 
does not have any negative impact for the people and communities located in upper 
and lower reaches (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2005). Field interviews show that the stake-
holders in Cologne are aware of the problem of risk distribution; especially the HSZ 
strongly advocates internalization of flood risk through creating retention volumes. The 
internalization of flood risk ensures justice and harmonious relationship amongst 
stakeholders in different river reaches. Also due to the consensus-based decision-
making process risk distribution has caused much less tension and conflicts. 
Public Participation  
Based on the field data public participation in Cologne is implemented mainly in infor-
mation dissemination and planning process. 
Actors perceived by the Flood Protection Centre in Cologne include individual citizens, 
firms, restaurants which need consultation for flood protection measures and informa-
tion on flood events and development as well as governmental agencies both at local, 
interregional and international levels. The HSZ emphasizes the importance of involve-
ment of the general public and other respective agencies in terms of information, 
cooperation and consultation. The information issue will be looked at in more details in 
chapter E.2 “Flood risk communication”. 
Regional planning which is an essential instrument for preventive flood protection 
measures also has an extensive programme to involve different stakeholders in order 
to voice their interests. Decision makers and stakeholders carry out a dialogue through 
written proposals and public hearings with mutual respect and are on an equal footing.  
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However, the problem caused by extensive stakeholder involvement is often an impor-
tant reason for complaints about the slow decision-making process. This seems to be a 
general issue within the democratic and federal political system.  
The case of the “Leybucht” in Ostfriesland the weekly newspaper Die Zeit reported on 
showed parallel to the problem mentioned above. The coastal protection construction 
was supposed to be strengthened after the inundation in 1962. However, the effort to 
take into consideration of the conflicting interests of conservationists, fishermen, 
tourism industry, farmers and the coastal protection agency resulted in a consensus 
finding process taking more than 40 years. The conservationists wanted to keep this 
bay as the last untouched bay along the North See coast and a space for the wild 
geese and avocets; fishermen wanted to keep a passage to the see; tourism industry 
would like to have a romantic harbour; the farmers needed a sewage system for inland 
whereas the coastal protectors were in need of a retention area and an increase in the 
dike height (Grefe, 2006: 29). 
Also the dike construction in Himmelgeist can not be carried out due to the law suit of 
one single resident. This is a clear reflection of the German democratic principle. 
Individual’s right is well protected (Everts, 2005). 
Field interviews show that in Cologne these stories are repeating themselves in the 
same way. 
Sustainability Aspects 
In general sustainable development is a well established concept within the interview-
ees, though all seem to be aware of its challenge in implementation: 
“If I mark the location as flood prone area in the Regional Spatial Plan, then this will 
certainly be a kind of limitation for the development and land use of a chemical factory 
which is located in this place. But that is the very reason why this place has to be 
marked as flood prone. One should not only see the economic development, one 
should also see the damage potential in a flood prone area. Once a flood event occurs, 
the damage will be even greater” (Interview 26, 23 December, 2005). 
This statement demonstrates the determination of the Flood Management Agency in 
Cologne to cope with flood problems with a consistent preventive approach. However, 
the interviewee also sees the difficulty in implementing this approach, as big industries 
have their own lobbyists in Industry and Trade Union as well as in administration due to 
their great economic influence. The only possibility is regarded to be the “personal 
steadiness” of the flood managers who persist their flood protection goal whatever 
resistance they face.  
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Nevertheless one can observe the change of the role of sustainability aspect. One 
interviewee explains: More emphasis is put into sustainable aspects today, for envi-
ronment has a high priority in decision-making nowadays. Also, one has to admit that 
the birth rate in Germany is low; therefore conflicts between economy and ecology are 
not as strong as in other countries with high birth rate. Due to the economic situation in 
the recent years many communities have heavy debt burden and therefore can not 
generate new investments. No new industrial or commercial areas are planned. Also 
the shrinking of population eased the pressure on ecological conservation, for there are 
less people who want to build homes. Under such circumstances conservationists have 
good chances to lobby their interests (Interview 33, 25 January, 2007).  
1.3.c. Synopsis 
Central and local 
China’s economic reforms have resulted in a growing disconnection between the 
central and local governments. The economic reforms require decentralization; conse-
quently the provincial and the sub-provincial units enjoy extensive autonomy. The 
intention of the central government often has been distorted by the time it penetrates 
the provinces (Yang, 2005: 61). This structural weakness in the political and adminis-
trative system can be well observed in regard to flood management especially during 
non-emergency periods. The mismatch between policy and local implementation 
resulted in “local protectionism” and construction of “secondary dikes”. As a conse-
quence, the development in retention areas has been uncontrolled and the potential 
losses due to the uncontrolled economic development have been increasing rapidly. 
The construction of “secondary dikes” is a historical legacy of the “Great Leap Forward” 
as well as a reaction to the requirement of the provincial and central government for 
economic growth. The Chinese saying describing the central local relationship explains 
this: “At the top they issue the policy, on the bottom we have our countermeasures”. 
This also explains why the policy shift of flood control to flood management faces a 
great challenge in its implementation. However, population pressure seems to be a 
strong argument why there exists the discrepancy between policy and implementation 
and why secondary dikes have been built to ease the pressure for housing and liveli-
hood. This is a common perception amongst interviewed flood managers. The settle-
ment and uncontrolled economic development within retention areas not only jeopard-
izes the people living in these areas and their livelihood, but also causes potential 
conflicts between stakeholders and therefore impairs social stability.  
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In Germany the subsidiary principle leaves the local communities to practice autono-
mous administration and therefore the community interests are well protected. The 
counter flow principle (Gegenstromprinzip) greatly contributes to the implementation of 
the policies and regulations through extensive involvement of different stakeholders. 
The resistance from the community is far less strong than in China, though communi-
ties also strive to gain more construction land to promote economic development. 
Certainly, it should not be ignored that the population development in Germany has a 
decreasing tendency. Also the lack of new investments due to the economic situation in 
the last years has eased the pressure on new construction land. Spatial planning as an 
important flood prevention instrument therefore has good conditions to regulate the 
land use in retention areas as well as construction in protected areas behind dikes.  
The issue of conflict of interests  
In Wuhan, China, the conflict between central and the local government is caused by 
principle of risk distribution: “State interests are superior to community interests that are 
superior to individual interests”. Due to this principle risk is distributed according the 
criteria of economic importance and population density. Thus flood risk is externalized 
mainly to rural areas and areas of less economic significance to protect big cities and 
the urban elites. However, these less important areas have been experiencing rapid 
economic and population growth after the economic liberalisation starting from the late 
1970s. Consequently this conflict is amplified by the mismatch between policy and its 
implementation at local level as well as the legacy of the “Great Leap Forward”. One 
can say that the conflicts between stakeholders both at administrative and individual 
levels are preassigned through the risk distribution principle.  
In Cologne, Germany, on the contrary, risk is distributed according to subsidiary and 
counter flow principles which entitle communities to represent and protect their inter-
ests. The interest of individuals especially those of land owners is largely protected by 
law and order.  
In Wuhan, conflicts are mainly between farmers and flood risk management which 
always represents the will of the government. But in Cologne there are different interest 
groups such as nature conservationists, farmers’ unions, citizens’ groups and the flood 
risk management which does not always represent the interest of the local government. 
Therefore, conflict emerges very often between different governmental agencies as 
well as between the political and the administrative levels. The Cologne flood protec-
tion agency, for instance, represents the interests of flood prevention and protection 
whereas urban planning takes economic promotion of the city more into consideration. 
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There is a check and balance in decision-making process to ensure that all interests 
are taken into consideration. 
In China, the administration and the party politics are identical, thus the decision of the 
flood risk management is always in line with the politicians. Also different agencies all 
speak with the “same voice”. When asked who else could be an interesting interview 
partner one interviewee told the researcher: “you don’t need to talk to the other agen-
cies, they won’t tell you anything different”. 
In Cologne the democratic system allows the conflict reconciliation to take place in a 
participatory manner involving all stakeholders. Even among the agencies horizontal 
communication is seen to be the key word to resolve conflicts within the administration. 
The tension between stakeholders is far less fierce in Cologne comparing in Wuhan. It 
is more a question of how the best option can be found and how different interests are 
best balanced.  
However, the efficiency of the top-down decision-making process and the risk distribu-
tion principle are perceived by risk management agencies in Wuhan to be a great 
advantage of the “socialist system” despite of the conflicts. The problems caused are 
often overlooked. In Cologne due to the extensive involvement of stakeholders the 
long-lasting decision-making process is a common complaint amongst interviewees. 
Some of the interviewees wish for a more efficient decision-making process and more 
hierarchical structures.  
Another feature of decision-making stands out: In Wuhan decision-making, both before 
and during flood events, is a political decision, because it involves flooding retention 
areas which are populated; in Cologne the decision as how retention areas are defined 
before flood events is a highly political process, but yet the decision-making during a 
flood event as which measures are to be taken is mainly technical. 
Despite of all differences flood risk managements in Wuhan and Cologne share some 
commonalities in conflict issues. In both cities there is competitive behaviour of differ-
ent agencies. The competitive behaviour results in problems in cooperation and infor-
mation sharing. 
Technocratic mentality 
While the Chinese risk managers in Wuhan highlight the objectivity of science for all 
decisions and show strong belief in technical solutions, the German interviewees in 
Cologne reveal far less trust in pure engineering measures, though this kind of mental-
ity is first observed by Western scholars such as Ulrich Beck. It seems that hierarchical 
culture tends to bureaucratise everything and the technocratic approach coincides with 
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this tendency, therefore, the Chinese instrumentalise objectivity of science to justify 
their decision-making behaviour. 
Public participation  
Little has been done to involve the general public and stakeholders into decision-
making processes in Wuhan. Stakeholders are not necessarily actors in decision-
making processes. There are mainly two reasons for this: First, the agencies have a 
very different understanding of public participation in comparison to the Western 
conception. It is often understood to be obliging the general public and different stake-
holders such as other governmental agencies to join the dike protection. Second, 
public participation as understood in Western democratic framework is perceived to be 
not in line with the traditional Chinese culture. 
On the contrary, in Cologne public participation is the indispensable element of the 
democratic system. Every decision should be based on agreed criteria between indi-
viduals and society. The German sociologist Renn states: “Public participation” has 
become a fashionable word in decision-making. It is not only a normative goal of 
democracy but also a requirement for rational decision-making under uncertainty (Renn, 
1998).  
The interviewees see it as a matter of course and an integral part of the decision-
making process. Though a pettifogging mentality is often criticised and seen to hamper 
the process. Nevertheless, consideration of public concerns and insights not only 
facilitates successful outcomes but also encourages consensus and trust (Irwin, 1995: 
68). 
Sustainability aspects 
It holds true that China has a big population which is a great challenge for the flood 
management especially in adopting preventive measures such as spatial planning. It is 
also true that China has not reached the development standard of Western countries. 
However, there is evidence that the unbalanced priority to economic development 
sacrificing sustainability is not solely due to the “development stage” as the interviewed 
Chinese officials refer to. Lieberthal observes that “it is fair to say that China now has a 
greater environmental crisis than any other country in the history of the human race at 
a comparable stage of economic development” (Yang, 2005: 53). 
However, China has been firm on its right to development. Former Premier Li Peng 
stated in his speech at the Rio Summit in 1992: “For many developing countries, their 
primary task is to develop the economy and eliminate poverty”. Jiang Zemin, then 
China’s president, named economic development and poverty eradication as “a basic 
E RESEARCH RESULTS 1 FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
 116
prerequisite for ensuring sustainable development”. China is lacking the political will to 
follow sustainable strategy “because economic growth is crucial to the legitimacy of the 
CPC’s14 rule after the collapse of communism as the ideological faith in China” (Yang, 
2005: 63). 
The empirical data proved these observations to be true. Most of the interviews insist 
on the argument that sustainable flood management is not realistic for China, because 
China still has to push its economic development forward before sustainability could be 
given priority. Population is perceived to be the greatest challenge to sustainable flood 
management. The main concern is to “feed” the people rather than to reach sustain-
ability.  
In Cologne, sustainability in flood management is understood as the nature-orientated 
development of the flood prone areas. Fauna and flora are given significant importance 
and its conservation is supported both by governmental environmental agencies as 
well as NGO conservationists. In Wuhan, however, these aspects are not yet taken into 
consideration. Chinese water management agencies advocate strongly the technical 
flood protection to ensure the economic development. Their mitigation strategy is in line 
with the political need for economic development. This is due to the hierarchical struc-
ture of the management and the intermingling of politics and management. Water 
management is not an independent entity from the political sphere, but rather an 
executive organ for it. Unlike in China the German water management is entitled to 
make its own decisions and due to this independence it also often lobbies its own flood 
protection interests in terms of retention areas or construction permissions. This ex-
plains why in Cologne people at administrative levels often have different opinions than 
local politicians (see chapter E.1.2). 
Western scholars, such as Ulrich Beck, question the benefit of modernity and try to 
look into the issue of the limit of rationality. Beck states, with the commence of and 
within the risk society, the linear rise of rationality has reached its limit. This is under-
                                               
14 CPC: The Communist Party of China. 
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stood as mechanisation, bureaucratization, economization and Verrechtlichung 15 , 
which eventually end up with jams in the sense of general infarction of modernization in 
all possible manifestations and societal areas (Glaser, 1997: 505). However, the 
Chinese still seem to stick to the idea of modernity which is to bring them prosperity 
and well being. 
The decision-making dilemma 
Observing the decision-making principal, the processes and the consequences a 
salient difference between the conceptions in Wuhan and Cologne can be identified. In 
Western culture there is a classic dilemma which has been debated over by philoso-
phers, thinkers as well as other intellectuals. This dilemma is summarized by André 
Comte-Sponville’s question: If you had to condemn one innocent (or torture a child, as 
Dostoevsky frames it) to save humankind, should you do it? Both Kant and Comte-
Sponville negate this option: “For if justice and righteousness perish, human life would 
no longer have any value in the world” (Kant, 1887: 196). Comte-sponville states: This 
is where utilitarianism reaches its limit. If justice were merely a contract of convenience, 
a maximization of the collective well-being of almost everyone, to sacrifice the few 
without their consent and even if they were perfectly innocent and defenceless. That, 
however, is just what justice forbids, or should forbid. Rawls, drawing on Kant, is quite 
right in this respect: justice is worth more than well-being or efficiency, and is better 
than either, and must not be sacrificed to them, even for the happiness of the greatest 
number (Comte-Sponville, 2000).  
The current debate on whether the federal state of Germany should be allowed to 
shoot down a hijacked air plane by terrorists in order to ensure the security of the 
country again showed the persistence of the Kantian philosophical tradition (Seils, 
2008). 
Confucianism which has left its deep imprint in Chinese culture advocates the contrary 
morality. For the sake of the happiness of majority it is taken for granted that interests 
                                               
15 This term shall express the meaning that action potentials in all societal areas within 
a modern society is defined and constrained by law, order, standardisation etc. Ver-
rechtlichung is part of bureaucratisation which goes along with social welfare and 
safety. One of the reasons for it is that more and more political decisions are not made 
at political level but rather made at legal level according to interpretation of law.    
BUNDESZENTRALE FÜR POLITISCHE BILDUNG (2007) Das Politiklexikon. 
<http://www.bpb.de/wissen/H75VXG,0,0,Begriffe_nachschlagen.html>, 09 October 
2007 
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of individuals should be sacrificed. Based on this fundamental difference of cultures, 
the decision-making principle, process and consequences in Wuhan and in Germany 
are also entirely different. 
1.4. Perception of general public by the risk management agencies 
1.4.a. Wuhan, China  
In Wuhan interviewees describe mainly two different reactions of the general public to 
flood management procedures. Before flood events the people are not always coopera-
tive in case of relocation or removal of constructions within the retention area between 
the river and the embankment. In some cases people refuse to move out of these 
areas and in other cases people intentionally construct houses within an area which is 
supposed to be used as retention area in order to get compensation which will largely 
exceed the value of the construction. Especially in rural areas in Wuhan this is reported 
by interviewees to be a common practice of farmers: “’Growing houses’ makes more 
money than growing crops” (Interview 1/5/8, 2005).  
This again, reveals problems which emerge in the process of law and policy implemen-
tation. People develop informal strategy to cope with their difficulties. 
However, during flood events the general public is actively involved in flood fighting. 
Interviewees see willingness and solicitousness of the people, because “the safety of 
the city is also their own safety” (Interview 1, 30 August, 2005). “People’s war” is the 
common expression to describe the participation of the general public in flood fighting 
both observed in Chinese media and field data.  
“People’s war” refers to the flood fighting scenario in the past flooding events in Wuhan 
as well as in all other regions in China. During the Great Flood of 1998, 6.7 million 
people participated in flood fighting along the Yangtze River in order to protect the 
dikes. It is a popular picture in Chinese media that an “ocean of people” is standing on 
the dike transporting sand bags. “The Great Wall of people” consisting of the general 
public and the army withstanding flood shall symbolise unbreakable strength. In fact, 
the term “people’s war” origins from the times of war. Especially during the Japanese 
invasion “people’s war” was a strategy of the CPC to mobilise the masses to fight 
against the Japanese army. It is obvious that flood fighting is perceived to bear an 
analogy to war.  
In Wuhan the dike is monitored by different amounts of people according to the rise of 
the water level. During the flood period all private and state enterprises and units of 
state agencies are involved in flood protection: 
E RESEARCH RESULTS 1 FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
 119
“Whatever they are working on, they have to leave it aside to participate in flood protec-
tion. Whether they are doing business or working for the government, during the flood 
period they have to participate in flood protection” (Interview 25, 19 December, 2006). 
The dike protection largely relies on the monitoring of the dike by the general public. 
Each firm and each agency is assigned with a stretch of dike to monitor. In flood free 
periods a professional dike inspector is in charge of a stretch of three to four kilometers 
of dike. Once the water has reached the cautious level, other people apart from the 
inspectors are involved. Five persons are assigned to monitor the dike at cautious level 
every kilometre; this will be increased to 20 persons at warning level and 50 people at 
the guarantee level which is the most critical water level expected. Time intervals of 
dike inspection along the respective stretchs are once in an hour at the lowest water 
level, once in half an hour at the middle level and 15 minutes at the highest level. Once 
the water level exceeds the highest expected level (29.73 metres), the dike has to be 
inspected constantly.  
The participation of the general public in flood fighting is enforced by order and moti-
vated by different activities. Mostly young staff members are chosen for dike inspection 
and protection, for they are physically strong and are considered to be more suitable 
for such a task. Participants are perceived to be understandable and willing, for “flood 
protection is about public safety and it is everyone’s duty”. To give a further incentive 
participants are awarded money and honoured as “heroes”. Food, visits and even 
entertainment programmes are organized to convey appreciation to the participants. 
Especially after 1998’s Great Flood, even participation in dike inspection itself was 
seen to be a form of entertainment. “People sit there watching the flood and are fasci-
nated” (Interview 25, 19 December, 2006). 
The participation of the general public in flood protection is highly moralized. The 
motivational activities are instruments to moralise and mobilize people’s participation. 
Heroism and “people’s war” have the clear message to see flood protection as a war 
against flood. Slogans such as “we swear to survive or perish with the dike” or “protect 
the dike with your lives!” engraved on the marble “Monument of Life and Death” along 
the Yangtze River stretch in the city of Wuhan manifests a strong military style of flood 
protection. Amongst the interviewees in Wuhan this belief that flood protection could be 
guaranteed by mass participation of dike protection is well pronounced. However, the 
concept of the “people’s war” or the strategy of the “ocean of people” has been chal-
lenged by some scholars who argue that this approach does not meet the requirements 
of societal and economic development any longer; the mobilization of a huge amount of 
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human resources inevitably impacts on the functionality of societal and economic 
activities (Wen et al., 2002: 42).  
1.4.b. Cologne, Germany  
Public perception of entitlement (Anspruchsdenken) 
In Cologne public perception of entitlement is strongly pronounced which causes 
complaints of agency personnel involved in flood management.  
“[…] the public perception of entitlement is very annoying. In Rodenkirchen, a quite rich 
district of the city of Cologne, the landlords just stand there and watch how the Fire 
Brigade lays sand bags. The voluntary Fire Brigade is also working there and they are 
not even paid for it. They, of course, are extremely unhappy about it. The landlords just 
make their comments and give their advice without doing anything themselves, this… it 
is a quite rich district and many wealthy people are living there” (Interview 28, 21 
August, 2006). 
The interviewee interprets this behaviour of the inhabitants as a result of helplessness 
in emergency cases and the feeling of entitlement. On the one hand, the city of Co-
logne is optimally protected and there is usually no need for the citizens to deal with 
unexpected events; on the other hand, people assert their claim to protection measures 
because they believe that is the very reason why they pay tax to the state. 
The perception of entitlement also manifests in the construction behaviour of the 
inhabitants. Real estate close to the Rhine is very attractive to the landlords. To enjoy 
the beautiful scenery of the Rhine they want to construct their houses as close as 
possible to the river. People who are better off are perceived to be more insistent in 
their claims. They put themselves at risk, while at the mean time they claim their rights 
to be protected by the state. Paradoxically some of the inhabitants also refuse engi-
neering flood protection which may impair the river view, whereas others want to have 
the flood wall or dike as high as possible to guarantee maximum safety. This heteroge-
neous and contradictory behaviour is observed by many interviewees.  
The perception of entitlement reveals a typical feature of an individualistic society. 
However, the Farmers’ Union perceive great understanding of farmers for flood protec-
tion. Although they do not need any further engineered flood protection measure and 
these measures will take their land away, they still are not against flood protection in 
general. Also because they are farmers and are bound to the location, therefore they 
want to keep a “harmonious relationship with their neighbourhood” (Interview 29, 13 
September, 2006). 
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1.4.c. Synopsis 
The German Farmers’ Unions in Cologne contend that they are being supportive to 
preventive flood protection, although the other actors blame them for being unwilling to 
offer their land for flood protection purposes. In Wuhan, the flood management agen-
cies report that the farmers often have informal practices to hinder flood protection 
measures.  
The significant difference between Wuhan and Cologne, however, is the perception of 
the flood management agencies on the attitudes of the general public. In Wuhan, the 
general public is perceived to be willing and solicitous for the participation in dike 
inspection and dike protection which are understood as the most important element of 
the flood protection. The general public participation is seen as indispensable for flood 
protection. It is highly moralised through heroism ideal and associated with the national 
heroes in the war against the Japanese invaders (1937-1945). On the contrary, the 
flood management agencies in Cologne perceive the general public to have a strong 
sense for entitlement and unwillingness to help during the flood events. Although this 
behaviour is addressed by many interviewees, it is not demoralised. One can observe 
that flood protection in China has a much wider political and moral dimension. 
1.5. Human-nature relationship 
1.5.a. Wuhan, China 
The field data in Wuhan revealed diverse notions of human-nature relationship among 
the interviewees. Almost all interviewees expressed their unified general understanding 
for human-nature relationship:  
“We must have a harmonious human-nature relationship. We emphasise the harmoni-
ous co-existence of people and river. We should leave the river a space to flow” (Inter-
view, 1/2/4/5/7/10/20/21/25, 2005/2006).  
However, the approaches differ as to how to regain and maintain the “harmonious” 
human-nature relationship. The following statements are some of the examples: 
“In everyday life we must protect our rivers by proper way of production. First, we must 
protect the environment around the river. We should stop land degradation and in-
crease soil maintenance; second, we must protect the river bed and third, if we con-
struct on rivers… we should not change the natural state of the rivers. But for the flood 
protection we can build some reservoirs or some hydropower stations. … But we 
should not damage the heath of the rivers too much” (Interview 19, 8 December, 2006). 
E RESEARCH RESULTS 1 FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
 122 
“Giving river more space means to improve the quality of the dikes to a certain level 
and create more retention areas. This is the most obvious reflection of the harmonious 
relationship of man and nature. It is very simple” (Interview 25, 19 December, 2006). 
These statements have a clear message: harmony of man and nature or water should 
be achieved by providing water more space to flow and by environmental protection. 
But yet harmony with nature does not rule out engineered measures, on the contrary, 
engineering measures are seen to be indispensable for maintaining the harmony. 
Some others emphasise the importance of science’s contribution to the harmony with 
nature: 
“We must look at the relationship between man and nature from scientific point of view. 
It must be harmonious. In relation to flood protection, harmony means flood protection 
with scientific methods. For example, if the water level is 25 metres, we should arrange 
three shifts on duty [for dike inspection]. After the flood protection capacity has been 
increased, we won’t need three shifts any more. Of course, we should not be too self-
confident” (Interview 3, 2 September, 2005). 
“Harmony is very important and science shall deepen the harmony between man and 
nature” (Interview 11, 27 September, 2005). 
This shows again the strong rationalistic belief of Chinese water managers. Science is 
a universal device and ultimate solution to every problem. It also shows the clear focus 
of flood fighting ideology. Scientific arrangement for flood protection is understood as 
dike inspection with different shifts.   
“We didn’t pay enough attention to the relationship between constructions and the 
environment. Now we should pay more attention to the natural scenery. Then every-
thing will look more natural” (Interview 8, 21 September, 2005).  
“We have not taken much into consideration the harmony of man and nature in terms 
of flood protection. The safety of Wuhan is ensured on the whole. After 1998, the state 
invested lots of money to build dikes. We have just experienced a big flood, so it won’t 
come again within the next decades. Therefore, the environmental problem is the focus 
now. ... From the planning perspective, relocating the people in the old city district is 
the most important thing to create the harmonious ecological environment between 
man and water” (Interview 10, 26 September, 2005). 
Apart from the misunderstanding of flood risk probability of one of the above interview-
ees, both of the interviewees interpret harmony with water or nature as an aesthetic 
and “natural” appearance of the city. One can observe that the new dikes and flood 
walls in Wuhan are constructed in such a way which is not only functional to serve the 
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purpose of the flood protection but also correspond to the specific Chinese understand-
ing of nature. The area between dike and river is turned into an artificial park to provide 
people with entertainment facilities such as fitness training equipments etc. (see picture 
1). Nature has two fold manifestations in Chinese culture. Nature can on the one hand 
be something “untouched”. In the mean time nature can also be an allegory of nature 
itself. A Chinese garden often has Bonsai or Taihu-stones which are not nature itself 
but shall have the function to create an allegory and symbolise nature. The co-
existence of these two concepts of nature often causes confusion as to what the 
Chinese concept of nature is. The researcher has found out that the interviewees in 
Wuhan do not seem to differentiate between these two concepts of nature. Conse-
quently, the understanding of harmony of man and nature may cause the same confu-
sion.  
Picture 1: Dike area in the city of Wuhan 
 
Source: Shen, 2005 
 
There is also a pragmatic way of thinking:  
“In the relationship between man and nature sometimes humans are the focus, some-
times nature is the focus. The considerations differ: If the conflict with nature is small, 
the Confucianism is more useful, because it dictates the relationship between human 
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beings and the relationship between people and the state. Taoism takes human-nature 
relationship more into consideration. Usually, we begin to rethink the relationship 
between human and nature once the conflict is more tangible and fierce” (Interview 21, 
11 December, 2005).  
Harmony with nature is not seen as a concept which requires consistency. The prag-
matic approach tends to adapt to change and avails itself of different schools of think-
ers such as Confucianism and Taoism.   
Sceptics think the concept of harmony of man and nature is not viable for the near 
future: 
“It is very difficult to realise the harmony of human and nature/water. This idea is good, 
but, first, it is not easy to change people’s mentality, second, we must first develop 
engineering water management. Only after a certain level of engineered measures has 
been reached, we can think about water resource management. The minister of the 
Water Resources thinks that we have reached that level, but I personally hold the 
opinion that we are far from that level. Even the minister of Water Resources does not 
intend to implement the transition now. Within the next 10 or 20 years this transition 
won’t take place. On top of it, this transition intends to use the flood as natural re-
sources such as irrigation or hydropower. To do so, one needs the engineered con-
struction to be the foundation for it” (Interview 4, 6 September, 2005). 
“Harmony with water or nature is a new slogan. But it is not realistic. … In the end, 
dikes are the balance point between man and river in the course of the fighting against 
each other” (Interview 4, 6 September, 2005). 
“Harmony between man and nature is too big a topic. To me the harmony between 
man and river is the safety of flood protection. … It is to reduce the flood risk as much 
as possible. We can not eliminate natural disasters, but as human beings we must use 
our capacity to reduce disasters. The harmony between man and water also means 
that we have to do everything to control it. If water comes, we try to control it by all 
means. Nature punishes human being; human being shall not wait for death. We shall 
fight with it” (Interview 5, 7 September, 2005). 
The sceptics have a distinguished affection for technical solutions in flood management 
and therefore a pronounced masculine approach to human-nature relationship. Altering 
nature for the benefit of man is taken for granted as a proper behaviour of human. 
Defying nature as a Maoist ideology during the Chinese Cultural Revolution has not 
completely vanished. Especially at the local level many interviewees cited Mao’s idea 
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of conquering nature and fighting flood with engineered measures: “Endless is the joy 
to defy nature”. 
In relation to “secondary dikes” (Zidi) an interviewee states: 
“In fact, the State should strengthen engineering protection. We should protect as 
much as we can and we are determined to exceed our limit to protect these areas, 
otherwise we’d have too much economic loss. For instance, there was a great eco-
nomic loss during the flood event in 1954. The main reason for it was the lack of 
engineering measures. The loss in 1998 was small, because we could rely on engi-
neering measures. Don’t you see that all the high officials in our history are officials 
who are successful in flood management!?” (Interview 5, 7 December, 2005) 
This again shows a strong belief in engineering measures. Traditional flood manage-
ment has not only forged the ideology of risk managers today but also become an 
integral part of Chinese civilization and culture. Even today, risk managers have kept 
the confidence in managing flood with engineering measures. They believe that the 
dikes, and reservoirs would guarantee them a bright political career like Yu (also Dayu, 
meaning the Great Yu), the famous King once had.  
Dayu is a household name in China and the myth about how he coped with flood 
disasters has left its imprint in China’s flood management approach. The official web-
site of the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources published a series of articles on 
Chinese Water management history to celebrate the World Water Day. One article 
states, “The Great Yu is the symbol of the spirit of the Chinese nation. The significance 
of Great Yu’s water management is a part and parcel of the long Chinese history and it 
is also the peak of our civilization” (Ministry of Water Resources, 2007). Dayu, the 
Great Yu, was the first successful flood manager in recorded history for water man-
agement, though this story should not be understood to be the equivalence of the 
biblical story of Noah’s flood. Rather it is comparable with the European myth of the 
creation of the world. In the time of Yao, the first Chinese ruler, the world was flooded. 
After a couple of failures in flood management Yao appointed Yu to cope with the flood 
problems. Yu dug channels to direct the water into rivers, so that the water finally 
flowed into the sea. The success of Yu made an agricultural society a reality, for the 
world becomes inhabitable for man. Thus it is the beginning of Chinese civilization like 
Mencius depicts:  
“The world was generated long ago; there is a time of order, and then a time of disor-
der. When it was the time of Yao, water flowed counter to its current and inundated the 
central states. Snakes and dragons lived in it. The people had nowhere to settle. Those 
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in the low lands built nests and those on high, made cave dwellings. The Documents 
say, ‘The deluge is a warning to me.’ By ‘deluge’, it means ‘water everywhere.’ (Yao) 
had Yu control it. Yu excavated the earth and channelled it to the sea. He drove away 
the snakes and dragons, banishing them to the grassy marshland. The water moved 
along courses on the earth; these were the Jiang (Yangtze), Huai, He (Yellow River), 
and Han. The dangers and obstacles receded. Only then did people obtain level land to 
live on” (Allan, 1997: 40). Yu’s achievement is seen as the foundation for the livelihood 
of the Chinese people. His method is to channel water to the sea following the “way of 
water”. Mencius elaborates the “way of water” as taking advantage of its natural ten-
dency to flow downward and yield to obstacles. Thus, Yu controlled water by following 
water’s natural inclination (Allan, 1997: 40). 
However, today this myth is conferred with different meanings: “The management 
approach of the Great Yu reveals a vivid picture of how our ancestors fought16 with 
flood. It also reflects the unyielding fighting spirit of our people in the course of 
conquering nature. His fearless spirit of fighting flood and his great achievement of 
water governance has been praised and handed down over generations. This spirit 
provides people with courage to fight flood disasters” (Ministry of Water Resources, 
2007). Apparently this is a very masculine way of framing Yu’s water control method. 
The words “fight” and “conquer” reveal an extremely strong tendency to claim an 
“enemy and I” relationship. Flood is seen as an enemy which has to be fought against. 
In fact, in modern Chinese language, the metaphor referring to flood as a monster is 
commonly used.  
The Great Yu is an important symbolic figure in Chinese culture. He symbolizes human 
power to change nature and marks a turning point of human nature interaction from 
pure passive adaptation to active cultivation of nature. Yang states: “Confucianism 
emphasises the regulation and ordering of the non-human environment for the food of 
human society and has been dominant in traditional Chinese culture. Its influence is 
determined by the fact that China ‘has long been at the mercy of natural disasters’. 
Efforts to temper the nature and model the landscape to make it suitable for human life 
date back to China’s legendary first ruler, Yu the Great (Dayu), more than four millen-
nia ago. Massive waterworks projects such as the Dujiangyan irrigation works built 
during the Qin dynasty of over two thousand years ago contribute to national pride” 
(Yang, 2005: 55). 
                                               
16 All bold letters in this citation were marked by the author of this thesis. 
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More importantly Yu is a model for later politicians for their water policy. As early as 
Spring-Autumn time (770-476 BC), Guanzhong states, good governance means the 
elimination of five disasters. Water disaster is the first one to be coped with. The 
radical17 of the Chinese character for “governance” (a ) is “water”. In fact the character 
has two original meanings: according to the Shuowen Jiezi (}~), the first Chi-
nese dictionary (100-121 A.C.), the character is the name of a river; the second mean-
ing is “water management” (Gu, 2003: 397). Then the character evolved and widened 
into today’s meaning “governance”. This is an indication for the paramount meaning of 
water management in political life. 
Coupled with the belief that man can shape nature and control nature as well as the 
meaning of flood management for a political career, the eagerness of engineered flood 
measures among the flood managers seems to be a logical consequence. Dike is not 
only a functional protection measure, but also has monumental symbolic meaning for 
the politicians: “The Great Wall running thousands of miles and built on water has been 
constructed based on the ‘concept of harmony between man and water”, it has become 
a monument in the heart of the people living along the river” (Guo, 2007). 
1.5.b. Cologne, Germany 
All interviewees in Cologne hold the opinion that human beings can not conquer nature. 
A given humbleness towards the power of nature can be observed among most of the 
interviewees. The anthropogenic activities such as construction and settlement in flood 
prone areas are seen as the main cause for losses during a disastrous flood event. 
Natural disaster is conferred a strong notion of man-made disaster. Therefore passive 
and preventive flood management strategy is advocated: 
“Nature does not belong to the human beings. We should treat nature in such a way 
that we can hand it over to the next generation as it was. … Nature is uncontrollable. It 
is surely much better to give in [in front of nature] which means that we should give the 
river more room. We should not try to constrain the river, otherwise nature will strike 
back. Rivers will find their original river bed anyhow. People see flooding as a natural 
catastrophe. In fact, it is not at all a natural catastrophe; rather, human beings have 
created the potential for it” (Interview 26, 23 December, 2005). 
According to this statement the naturalness is taken out of the natural catastrophe. 
Also the aspect of sustainability is a part of the concept of harmonious relationship with 
                                               
17 A radical is a semantic determinative of a Chinese character. 
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nature. But yet, this approach is not always popular among stakeholders. Many of them 
would benefit from engineered measures. It would facilitate the construction sector and 
provide more construction land for industries. The stimulated economic development 
through engineering flood protection measures is very likely hailed by local politicians. 
As a result engineered measures are easier accepted by many stakeholders than non-
structural measures.  
Other engineered water projects are perceived to be detrimental to the human-nature 
relationship. One interviewee contends that human beings have done big damage to 
nature and are not aware of it. Engineering measures such as the river training project 
in upper reach of the Rhine River increased the probability of flood events. In addition 
loss of retention area through dike construction once more facilitates the speed of the 
water flow as well as it heightens the water level. Human beings alter nature to gain 
more benefit and services of nature, but they are often blind to the consequences of 
their activities (Interview 26, 23 December, 2005).  
Loss of retention volume through dike construction has created more challenge to flood 
management, but there have been improvements. Instead of building dikes to protect 
industries and settlements inside the flood prone areas, some of the areas are relo-
cated and turned into retention areas again.  
The Natural Conservation Union advocates for stricter regulation and spatial planning 
for flood prevention to enhance harmony of man and nature. Farming activities should 
be completely forbidden, because pollution could be triggered by flood due to the 
utilization of fertilizer and pesticide.  
Interviewees observed changes in the attitudes of the stakeholders towards the hu-
man-nature relationship. Earlier it was common that people think human beings can 
control and conquer nature – an attitude which has its root in Christian culture. But 
through the environmental movement, especially after the Greens have become a 
political party and increased their influence, a change of thinking has taken place: 
“I think that we have understood [that dike construction is not the optimal solution]. At 
least it has penetrated the administration and agencies that we can not continue to 
construct dikes. On the contrary, we have to remove some of them” (Interview 28, 21 
August, 2006). 
One shall look for alternatives and try to be innovative. There is usually always an 
alternative if one looks for it as some of the interviewees believe.  
One interviewee expressed a more pessimistic view about achieving the harmony 
between man and nature. Human beings are too ignorant to realize that man and 
E RESEARCH RESULTS 1 FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
 129 
nature are interdependent. If one practices capitalism, then at least they should do it 
properly. They have to know, if a flood event of 200 years of reoccurrence comes, the 
industry lying in flood prone areas will suffer an interruption of production which causes 
great losses. For this “irrational” behaviour the limitation of the political level and the 
competitive relation of governmental agencies are to be blamed.  
Solidarity of the stakeholders of entire river basin is seen to be a foundation of harmony 
of man and nature. Externalization of flood risks is very much criticized by many inter-
viewees: 
“Dike construction is not the best solution, because we just shift the problem to the 
Netherlands” (Interview 28, 21 August, 2006).  
Human beings are blamed for their stupidity of not learning from the past experience, 
even if there has always been flooding along the river Rhine. Nevertheless people 
continue their construction activities. A radical spatial plan is seen to be necessary: 
“There are laws and regulations for spatial planning, but they are very slack and full of 
gaps. They are not forceful enough. I would say that so and so much space has to be 
left to the river on each side to allow the river to expand. If I am not willing to do so, 
then I have to be prepared that the river will take whatever it needs. Houses will be 
flooded” (Interview 32, 26 October, 2006). 
However, the interviewee of the Farmers’ Union puts forward a different view: 
“Human beings can shape nature in such a way so that nature serves human beings; 
this is a very popular view amongst farmers. … But of course there are farmers who 
run their farms according to ecological principles. And no one should be judged be-
cause of this. If you ask me, I would say, nature should serve human being, but one 
can only gain this service if one runs its farm with sustainability” (Interview 29, 13 
September, 2006). 
Overall, there is a consensus on a more sustainable and passive flood management to 
achieve a harmonious relationship between man and nature, although interviewees are 
also aware of the obstacles they are facing in implementing this approach.  
Interestingly, climate change is another common feature mentioned in the context of 
human-nature relationship. It is seen as yet another anthropogenic impact on nature. 
Interviewees believe it is also a result of the ignorance of human beings: “Human 
beings encroach upon nature without knowing what they are doing; this is a dangerous 
thing to do” (Interview 28, 21 August, 2006). 
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1.5.c. Synopsis 
In Wuhan the understanding of human-nature relationship especially concerning the 
question of how to achieve harmony between man and nature is very heterogenic 
whereas in Cologne a homogeneous interpretation is detected. In China most of the 
interviewees seem to agree that the relationship between man and nature should be 
harmonious, however, a strong belief in engineered measures is evident. Some even 
believe that engineered measure shall serve to be the foundation for enhancing the 
human-nature relationship. Science again is perceived to be an important device to 
achieve the harmony. In Cologne the consensus on a harmonious human-nature 
relationship is clear. Almost all interviewees including flood protection agencies ex-
pressed their critical view about engineered measures. A more passive and compro-
mising flood protection strategy which aims at prevention through spatial planning is 
strongly advocated. Apart from Farmers’ Union, giving the river more space is a popu-
lar approach amongst interviewees. Some of them support more radical regulations 
about construction in flood prone areas.  
In Wuhan some of the interviewees are sceptical about the passive flood protection 
strategy. They believe this can only be implemented after engineering measures have 
been saturated. Even those who seem to support a more preventive flood management 
such as the approach of giving the river more space see structural measures to be 
indispensable. Negative effects of engineered measures are not mentioned at all. 
Giving the river space to flow seems to be just a “slogan” which sounds modern and 
politically correct and there is an obvious inconsistency in the statements of the inter-
viewees. In Cologne the interviewees are fully aware of the challenge of non-structural 
measures due to economic and political interests; however, they perceive it to be the 
only possibility to live in harmony with nature.  
The Chinese interviewees showed more attachment to traditional Chinese flood man-
agement culture which is interpreted to be engineered by the interviewees. Mao’s 
ideology of defying nature seems still to have some influence on especially local 
governmental officials. In Cologne a change has taken place. One has departed from 
the belief that man can conquer nature and put nature at his service to his pleasure. 
Especially through the political environmental movement and the past flood experi-
ences one has started questioning the positivistic approach. 
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1.6. The role of the military (Excursus) 
“In 1998, China experienced a special war and fought a battle in such a magnitude 
which one has rarely seen in the world history. 
Millions upon millions of Chinese people had to suffer from the great flood. But yet, with 
invincible will and incomparable hardiness the people fought against the enemies 
together and they neither fear toil nor suffer. With the inexhaustible fighting spirit they 
fought hand in hand against the flood and eventually captured a grand victory.” – The 
heading text of the TV documentary Juesheng (The Decisive Battle), China Central 
Television (CCTV), 1998 (Kramer, 2003: 327) 
Flood is an enemy whom one has to fight. No one is more legitimised to fight the war 
against floods than the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (the PLA). There is no doubt 
that the military in China plays a unique role during catastrophic flood events. This 
special role of the PLA is reflected in the perceptions of the flood management as well 
as the military itself.  
The involvement of military forces was frequently mentioned by the interviewees of the 
flood management in Wuhan when they recalled the previous flood events, especially 
the great Flood in 1998. The military is perceived to be indispensable in flood fighting 
both in terms of quantity and quality. One interviewee said: 
“One of the advantages we have in flood protection is that we can mobilise the military. 
Once there is a need, we can send thousands and millions of soldiers to protect dikes” 
(Interview 9, 22 September, 2005). 
Besides, the army can be sent to the most dangerous places and cope with the most 
dangerous situations when “normal” people fail. One interviewee who was in charge of 
the dike protection during the Great Flood in 1998 gave an example. A dike in the 
outskirt of Wuhan had a breach of 80 metres. None of the technical advisors in the field 
ventured to give any recommendations, since all believed that the dike could not be 
repaired and withstand the wave of the flood. However, a division of the army was 
appointed to protect the dike. A ship which passed by was stopped and sunk in front of 
the breach so that the soldiers could stand on the ship to lay sand bags. Thus, they 
managed to protect the dike for an entire week until they were commanded to give up 
the dike to avoid casualty due to lasting heavy rain. 
“Where there is a danger, there is the PLA; the soldiers are always there to protect the 
people” (Interview 8, 21 September, 2005), said one interviewee. The army as repre-
sentative of the system has the symbolic meaning of the ideal of self-sacrifice and 
heroism. The involvement of the army contributes to the reinforcement of these cultural 
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values and legitimating the leading position of the Chinese communist party through 
defeating water, as the communist party is the legitimate military leader (Kramer, 2003: 
341). 
The army has an identical self-image with other actors. An interviewee of the army said 
proudly:  
“Flood protection is a historical and holy task which requires our loyalty and sacrifice. 
During the Great Flood in Wuhan, many soldiers stayed in the field and didn’t go home 
more than one month. They didn’t leave the front even when they were sick and having 
high fevers…” (Interview 22, 13 December, 2006). 
The role of the military during flood events is translated into heroism and altruism by 
the official media such as the CCTV. In turn, the public perception of the PLA is influ-
enced. 
Compared to the unquestionable positive perception of the military by the Chinese 
interviewees, the German Federal Armed Force seems to have a normal position like 
all other actors concerning the involvement in flood management during flood events. 
Interviewees in flood management believe that the involvement of the military could be 
a great help in case of catastrophic flood events, however, they doubt if the military 
could be mobilised efficiently.  
The interviewee of the German Federal Armed Force stressed that the military in-
volvement in flood management is not always unproblematic. The military is only 
allowed to be involved if all other capacity of civil resources has been exhausted so 
that “fair market competition” can be ensured. As long as civil society including private 
enterprises is able to cope with flood situation, the army should not be involved. It is 
also perceived that the army in Germany has a negative image due to its past during 
the Second World War. 
2. FLOOD RISK COMMUNICATION 
In the last sub-chapter, flood risk management structure and problem dimensions in 
flood risk management in China and Germany are juxtaposed. These elements influ-
ence flood risk communication and vice versa. In the following chapter the interplay 
between flood risk perception and communication is observed in inter-agency commu-
nication and how communication affects cooperation; information exchange and 
dissemination among the general public and different interest groups e.g. environmen-
talists’, citizens’ groups.  Communication features are also reflected in how information 
impacts on administrative cooperation.  
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2.1. Inter-agency communication and cooperation  
2.1.a. Wuhan, China 
During flood events a hierarchical chain of command system proved to be efficient and 
functional in communicating with different agencies according to the interviewees: 
“During flood events, we do not need coordination. It is a command system; the higher 
authorities command the lower agencies” (Interview 3, 2 September, 2005). 
The local water management agency of Wuhan does not take any decision, but obey 
the orders issued by higher water authorities and implement the orders without ques-
tioning it. But yet, the orders are not always implemented smoothly. Especially when it 
comes to the decision as to flood retention areas, it occurs that provincial and local 
levels try to postpone the dike breach. They “use excuses such as that they still need 
more time to evacuate people etc”. But in general the interviewed local managers 
perceive this top-down approach during flood events to be efficient and effective. 
Interviewees highlighted the advantage of the hierarchical structure for communication 
and coordination during emergency management. 
But yet the field data reveals that there is hardly any communication between different 
agencies beyond flood periods. In fact, the agencies do not find it necessary to com-
municate with each other, for they largely rely on the command system during the flood 
events. This again shows the focus of fighting flood in flood protection instead of 
strengthening preventive measures in Wuhan: 
“During a severe flood event, all agencies and departments will get together and work 
together. The higher agencies and leaders coordinate the inter-agency cooperation. 
But if there is no flood, the agencies do not have much communication” (Interview 8, 21 
September, 2005). 
“There is no communication between the police, the Fire Brigade or the army, because 
we work according to the chain of command, we do not need communication in our 
daily work. During flood events, everyone has to absolutely obey the higher authorities 
without questioning. The orders will be issued by the leaders” (Interview 6, 7 Septem-
ber, 2005).  
One of the reasons why horizontal communication beyond flood periods is not intensive 
lies in how actors perceive their relationship to the other agencies and the flood man-
agement as such. For instance: 
“We are not interested in communicating with the department for dike construction and 
maintenance. We have our Environmental Law which we follow and implement. They 
have their own law to follow and implement” (Interview 11, 27 September, 2005). 
E RESEARCH RESULTS 2 FLOOD RISK COMMUNICATION 
 
 134 
The task and competence of the agencies are perceived to be the implementation of 
respective regulations and law. An interdependence between flood management and 
environmental issues is not acknowledged:  
“The focus of the Water Management Agency is flood protection. The focus of our work 
is to see if it is harmful to the environment. They make sure that dikes do not breach, 
we make sure that industries have a proper sewage system. … According to the 
Environmental Law, our work is not related to flood protection” (Interview 11, 27 Sep-
tember, 2005). 
The common scope of duty all agencies share is perceived to be the participation in 
flood fighting and dike protection: “In the first place our involvement in flood event is to 
protect the dike like every other citizen in Wuhan” (Interview, 2005/2006). 
However, some of the interviewees do see the lacking link between the agencies as a 
cooperation problem: 
“We have some problems in coordination between different agencies. For instance, we 
should have assessed the impact of the dike construction first before it was built. The 
environmental agency has to react to whatever has happened passively. The coopera-
tion is not as good as expected due to the independent duties” (Interview 11, 27 Sep-
tember, 2005).  
Another reason reported by the interviewees for the lack of inter-agency communica-
tion is the little leeway of the local agencies. One interviewee points out those local 
managers are not given much room to make decisions by themselves due to the 
organisational arrangement. Therefore they do not see the significance of communica-
tion with other agencies:  
“All is decided by the government anyway” (Interview 9, 22 September, 2005). 
As a consequence, horizontal communication is very seldom whereas communication 
between lower and higher authorities is more frequent. The communication between 
lower and higher ranking agencies takes place in two forms: official documents and 
meetings. Official documents on flood management policy are issued and disseminated 
in a top-down structure. The local agencies shall “study the documents”. These docu-
ments have the character of an issued order which is to be obeyed. This type of com-
munication is one-sided and allows no discussion or discourse. 
Even the communication in the form of a meeting does not leave much room for dia-
logue. A meeting in China is mostly a meeting for assigning tasks by the leaders. It is 
uncommon that participants of these meetings have chances to express their own 
views or discuss about issues: 
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“We also have meetings attended by different departments. But these meetings are 
held to listen to the leaders’ ideas. Once the leaders have some new ideas, they will 
call for a meeting. There will be a speech by a leader and this speech will be read 
loudly by the leader. In fact, the speech is drafted by a group of assistants and the 
leader will just read it. We do not have any discussions at these meetings. … There are 
advantages at these meetings though, because efficiency is ensured if there is no 
discussion. Otherwise we can have endless discussions without coming to a conclu-
sion and no problem can be solved without a conclusion” (Interview 18, 7 December, 
2006).  
Guanbenwei is another feature revealed by interviewees which hinders the inter-
agency communication. It is the way of thinking that agencies which have more techni-
cal focus such as environmental or meteorological departments are less important than 
the other governmental agencies. The interviewee of the meteorological department 
said: 
“As a technical agency we often feel like step children of the government. Our opinions 
are often not taken into consideration” (Interview 13, 29 September, 2005). 
Guanbenwei, this way of thinking values power the most. The higher the position one 
holds, the more weight is given to their opinion. This leads to communication difficulties 
between different agencies. The sixth assembly of the CPC pointed out that the Guan-
benwei way of thinking has become a disastrous hazard which impairs the societal 
development. (Zhang, 2002) Nevertheless this is still a common practice in Wuhan as 
the field data shows. It can also be observed by the researcher herself during her field 
work. 
On the one hand Chinese authorities emphasized the scientific/rationalistic approach; 
on the other hand, they are not interested in cooperation and communication with 
universities or the other scientific communities. The empirical data reflects this phe-
nomenon in different cases: as the researcher came to the field and tried to establish 
the contacts with respective authorities, a municipality official recommended the re-
searcher that it would be better not to mention that the researcher belongs to a univer-
sity. He elaborates, “Universities will not be taken seriously by government officials, for 
they do not have enough weight to influence the governments”. Similar experience in 
the field confirmed this argument. As the researcher contacted an official of the provin-
cial agency for water resources in Hubei to ask for an interview meeting, the researcher 
was informed: 
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“We are not giving interviews to universities in general; we only talk to official media 
such as CCTV. Or a researcher has to hold an official introductory letter from the 
Ministry for Water Resources which is the superior authority of the provincial agency for 
water resources” (Telephone communication with the Flood Protection Headquarters of 
the Hubei Province on 19 December, 2006). 
Being “official” means being powerful. Academic community or technical departments 
do not possess the same power as the other governmental agencies; therefore their 
opinions are often not heard.  
2.1.b. Cologne, Germany 
Inter-agency information exchange and communication take place both before and 
during flood events. The communication between agencies during a flood event takes 
place within the HSZ or Fire Brigade depending where the operational leadership and 
crisis management group (Einsatzleitung und Krisenstab) are located according to 
different water levels. All agencies have representatives within the group and the 
representatives maintain the communication with respective agencies.  
During the flood events in 1993 many agencies realized that there exists a communica-
tion gap among the agencies in Cologne. Cooperation and coordination consequently 
faced a number of challenges. Especially the responsibility of each involved agency 
was not clearly identified, thus, conflicts between agencies due to the question of 
authorities hindered the flood management in 1993. As to the cooperating agencies 
communication seemed to be essential for successful coordination. Working groups 
have been established after the flood event to improve the situation. These working 
groups consist of representatives of all the aid organizations and agencies to provide 
all actors a platform for information exchange and discussion.  
There are two different working groups in Cologne: one is hosted by the Flood Protec-
tion Centre and the other one is hosted by the Fire Brigade of the city of Cologne. The 
first working group focuses on discussions and information exchange on all the meas-
ures taken starting at relatively low water level. These measures mount to about 5,000 
items. Tasks and responsibilities are clarified at these monthly meetings.  
The second working group works mainly on coordination during emergency period 
once extreme flood event occurs. This working group is hosted by Fire Brigade and 
convenes on a monthly basis. 
In fact the coordination of agencies starts with the preparation before flood events at 
the working group meetings. The Flood Protection Centre Cologne sees the coordina-
tion between different agencies involved in flood management as one of their most 
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important roles. It is also integrated in their continuous preparation work for the next 
possible flood event. The meetings take place at the venue of HSZ or Fire Brigade 
depending on the host of the meeting. It can be observed at these monthly meetings 
(participatory observation during the field research, 2005/2006) that both working 
groups have detailed programmes and current issues to work on. Problems encoun-
tered by respective agencies and recommendations for improvements are discussed. 
Experiences of the previous flood events are exchanged. Nouvelle regulations and 
their implications as well as new technology are presented for further discussion. 
These meetings are held in an informal way to allow broad discussion and information 
exchange between the agencies as well as establishment of personal contacts 
amongst the actors. Nonetheless, they are well organized and efficient.  
The researcher can also observe the openness of the participants not only in the way 
they carry out their discussions, but also their attitudes towards external guests. The 
researcher herself could attend such a meeting twice without any formal procedure for 
permission by the organizer or the participants. For the researcher to be allowed to 
attend the meeting hosted by Fire Brigade, the head of the HSZ, to whom the re-
searcher was in close contact with, made a phone call to the organiser of the Fire 
Brigade for his permission. The researcher was also invited to the meeting hosted by 
HSZ. The researcher noticed that there are often external participants such as Dutch 
counterparts or researchers from universities attending these monthly meetings. Thus, 
a broader communication with transboundary river basin actors and scientific communi-
ties is facilitated.  
Interviewees believe that communication between agencies is essential for the success 
of flood management. The coordination between different agencies has improved due 
to the experience made during the flood event in 1993. It is a common feature of the 
statements of the interviewees that the coordination functions much better since they 
“talk more to each other”: 
“In 1995 the coordination between the agencies worked out well. We managed to 
reduce half of the damage. It was the first time that the agencies involved in flood 
management sat together and worked coordinated. It went really well. Yes, I can say 
that. It is much better than before, as all the agencies were only responsible for them-
selves and worked without communicating with each other. The cooperation was very 
bad. The communication and information exchange is very important. Only then coor-
dination becomes possible” (Interview 26, 23 December, 2005). 
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Personal contacts established during the working group meetings also contribute to a 
better cooperation: 
“We meet on a very, very regular basis … People get to know each other and estab-
lished a closer personal contact. If something happens, we simply call each other” 
(Interview 32, 26 October, 2006). 
Personal relationship seems to encourage the actors to maintain working contacts and 
facilitate communication. 
2.1.c. Synopsis 
In Wuhan the communication and cooperation between agencies are perceived to be 
efficient during a flood event. However, there is almost no communication between 
those agencies beyond flood periods. Although some interviewees demand more inter-
agency communication to improve coordination, most of the agencies do not see any 
need for inter-agency communication outside flood events, for they trust and rely on the 
chain of command during the emergency management. Interdependence of flood 
management between different agencies seems not to be recognised. On the contrary, 
the flood protection actors in Cologne identified many cooperation and coordination 
problems due to lack of communication between agencies during flood events, there-
fore they ascribe a paramount meaning to communication in improving and ensuring 
inter-agency cooperation. They believe that the inter-agency cooperation can only 
function well if the communication is guaranteed both before and during flood events. 
The agencies in Cologne also showed openness for discussion, debate and discourse 
towards each other and towards communication with other actors such as the scientific 
community. 
2.2. Information and risk awareness 
2.2.a. Wuhan, China  
According to the China Flood Control Law governments of different levels shall dis-
seminate flood knowledge amongst citizens living in flood prone areas and raise their 
flood risk awareness (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuxiling No. 88, 1997). Never-
theless no interviewees at local level have touched the topic of risk awareness 
amongst the general public. Some interviewees of the local water agency mentioned 
information campaigns on drinking water quality, water saving strategies like a Water 
Day or Water Week organized by local water agencies. But no flood risk information 
campaign has been organized. It seems that water quality raises more concern than 
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flood risk. This may be due to the general risk information policy in Wuhan. One inter-
viewee reported that the flood forecast in 1998 was kept as top secret. Not even the 
meteorological department had access to the flood information (Interview 13, 29 
September, 2005). 
In emergency cases like in 1998 only authorities in respective retention areas were 
informed about the evacuation plan in advance. The people who were to be evacuated 
from retention areas were only informed 48 hours before hand to avoid “general panic”.  
Some interviewees think that a flood event is far less serious than water shortage and 
drought in Wuhan, especially in rural areas. Some even blame the media to embellish 
flood hazard: 
“We took flood protection too seriously. We should reduce our fear of flood. 1999 the 
water level has reached 25 metres, everybody was so cautious. But now even if the 
water level reaches the same height, we don’t realise it, because the media is not 
inflating it any more. The government is not making a big fuss over it either” (Interview 
13, 29 September, 2005). 
The information policy towards the general public leads to the fact that most of the 
people are not aware of flood risk although they are involved in dike protection during 
severe flood events (Interview 23, 17 December, 2006) 
“After each flood event, people become more aware of the risk, but once water level 
drops, they forget about it very quickly. For them flood protection means 3 months in a 
year during the raining season to protect the dike” (Interview 23, 17 December, 2006). 
2.2.b. Cologne, Germany 
Information dissemination and raising risk awareness of the public 
In Cologne HSZ sees itself as a service agency which provides the inhabitants with 
information and assists them to take flood protection countermeasures at individual 
level.  
Raising risk awareness as part of the integrated flood management is one of the most 
important aspects highlighted by HSZ. 
According to the HSZ, the preparation for the next flood event includes preparation of 
the citizens and different agencies which are participating in flood management. The 
importance of information dissemination is emphasised and taken as an indispensable 
component of the preparation work.  
In all districts in Cologne an event informing the citizens about flood risks and coping 
possibilities takes place each year. At this event the risk map for the city of Cologne is 
introduced to the general public. The inhabitants can identify how they could be af-
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fected when flood events of different magnitudes occur. The Flood Protection Centre 
explains to the inhabitants which technical measures they can apply on an individual 
basis according to different water levels. The recommendations include information on 
the possibility of flood protection gate for individual houses; on whether pumping 
should be used or if one should rather allow water to run into the house to protect the 
building from being destroyed etc.  
The individual’s responsibility is also anchored in the Water Resources Act (Wasser-
haushaltsgesetz, abbr. WHG). Each individual who could be affected by flood is 
obliged to take preventive measures by their own means to protect themselves from 
flooding and to reduce damage. Especially, the individual is obliged to adapt their land 
use in such a way that potential damage of humans, environment and private property 
should be avoided (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2005). To sum up, HSZ informs individuals 
about their risk and in the mean time helps them to cope with it.  
Citizens’ groups in Cologne are also actively involved in flood protection. After the flood 
event in 1993, affected citizens started mobilizing others to take proactive actions for 
flood risk prevention. On one hand they try to gain more support from the government, 
on the other hand they also contribute to risk communication amongst the inhabitants. 
Especially, through the cooperation between citizens’ groups and the HSZ, flood risk 
information can be disseminated efficiently and many preventive measures have been 
carried out. These measures range form practical application of flood retrofitting meth-
ods such as safety measure for oil tanks, gas and electricity, to information campaigns 
for the inhabitants such as the dissemination of flood information leaflets. 
Having the advantage of the indigenous knowledge of the local situation and the 
closeness to the inhabitants, citizens’ groups can reach more people than governmen-
tal agencies in terms of information and warning. HSZ takes this as an advantage and 
provides the citizens groups with up-to-date flood forecasts, flood coping information 
and warning by personal contact via mobile phone during the flood event.  
The demand of citizens’ groups increased the work load of the HSZ at the beginning, 
but the close cooperation between the citizens’ groups and the HSZ proved to be 
feasible. In the following flood event in 1995 damage and losses were considerably 
reduced. Especially, personal financial damage was low compared to the previous 
event in 1993. 
To better inform the general public about flood forecast and warning as well as respec-
tive protection measures, a radio station is set up within the HSZ during flood event. 
The station has its own electricity provider and telephone. The radio sender provides 
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the general public with competent information, for they can confirm their information 
with flood management experts in the HSZ and in the mean time the HSZ has the 
opportunity to speak to the public when it is necessary, e.g. in the case of dike breach.  
The citizens’ groups as well as other NGOs reported great willingness of the HSZ and 
the water management authority of Cologne to provide information and consultancy 
upon their requirement (Interview 27/29, 2006). 
Spatial planning as information and communication channel 
Planning process of the regional government Cologne is an important channel for flood 
risk information dissemination to local community governments. The plan-approval 
procedure (Planfeststellungsverfahren) as part of the technical planning for flood 
protection measures and spatial planning for preventive flood protection involves a 
large number of stakeholder including community governments.  
Especially, the spatial planning process for preventive flood protection has been a long 
procedure with many meetings, public hearings and negotiations, one interviewee 
states: 
“The fact alone that flood protection has become part of the regional plan and in that 
we have produced the draft, also because the procedure took a long time, the commu-
nities became aware of flood risk at all. Many [construction] plans of the communities 
are given up, because risk awareness has been raised. Oh, be careful, this is a loca-
tion where we may encounter difficulties, let us rather take another location for con-
struction. Through the planning process alone, many intentions have been directed to 
the right track. Some applications for construction which would have been submitted for 
permission before are no longer submitted today. Even if there is still such an applica-
tion, the communities mostly accept the refusal of the regional planning bureau with 
much less reluctance than before” (Interview 33, 25 January, 2007). 
The communities are less insistent in their construction intention in flood prone areas 
and more willing to drop their plans due to the established risk awareness through the 
planning process. In some cases communities see no other alternatives for their 
construction intentions, but they are more willing to cooperate with the technical plan-
ning department of the regional government to find a solution for flood protection 
purposes.   
The spatial plan department of the regional government of Cologne highlights the 
“signal function” of the preventive flood protection plan and view raising risk awareness 
to be a significant component of flood management. 
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On the whole, the flood management in Cologne implements an “offensive” information 
policy and strongly advocates risk awareness and risk communication. How to cope 
with the remaining risk despite of technical flood protection measures is on the top of 
the agenda of the HSZ. They believe, engineered flood protection measures could give 
people an illusion of safety and consequently the damage and losses would be even 
greater. Also dike breach scenarios are a frequent topic for discussion at internal 
meetings and conferences (participatory observation at internal meetings and Rhein-
konferenz). 
“Flood is a natural event and we can not influence its onset as we can not stop an 
earthquake or an avalanche from occurring. Therefore there will never be a total 
coverage of safety despite of ever improving flood protection measures” (Düsterdiek, 
2005: 367-368). This belief is common amongst the interviewees. 
Perceived communication obstacles and deficiency 
Regardless of the success of risk information policy in Cologne interviewees perceived 
also obstacles and insufficiencies of risk communication. One of the interviewees 
believes that risk communication can be hampered by different perspectives of stake-
holders. The interviewee of the NABU Cologne, the representative of an environmental 
NGO, expresses his doubt about the potential for communication between different 
interests groups: 
“… [The communication between flood protection agency and the conservationists] 
would not be very successful I believe. The people in flood protection agency are 
engineers who think that they must always develop a kind of technical solution. And 
flood risk can be controlled. But the conservationists advocate that possibly nothing 
should be altered within the wet land, while the engineers want to make sure that every 
inch of the wet land should contribute to the reduction of water level [through technical 
solutions]. These are completely contradictory opinions colliding with each other” 
(Interview 30, 21 September, 2006).  
In regard to the public risk awareness a certain media dependency can be observed. 
An interviewee said that the flood warning and forecast were not taken seriously by 
people in 1993 due to the lack of flood experience and trust towards the HSZ. Only 
after flood events have been covered frequently by the media, especially after the flood 
event in 2002 which impacted large areas of Europe, risk awareness increased 
amongst the general public and penetrated the political sphere (Interview 26, 23 
December, 2006).  
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But even after the flood events in 1993 and 1995 in Cologne as well as the flood event 
in 2002 in the Eastern part of Germany, risk awareness is still lacking amongst the 
general public: 
“My impression is that the people today are still not aware of the risk they are facing, 
although the risk map exists and one knows where and how high water level will be. 
Where I live, I am probably the only person who is aware of the fact that it could be 
flooded. People are not aware that they are living in the old flood plain. The first floor 
could possibly be flooded up to one metre high” (Interview 28, 21 August, 2006). 
The reason for the lack of risk awareness is seen to be insufficient information and lost 
memory of previous flood events. 
2.2.c. Synopsis 
In Wuhan no interviewee mentioned the importance of informing the general public 
about the flood risk; whereas the flood management units in Cologne all emphasise the 
significance of public risk awareness. The HSZ view risk information for the citizens as 
part of their preparation work for the next flood event. Therefore they not only inform 
the citizens about the flood risk by publishing the risk map for the city of Cologne, but 
also provide citizens with flood retrofitting consultancy. In addition they cooperate with 
citizens’ groups to improve risk information dissemination. In Wuhan the agencies do 
not seem to encourage the dissemination of risk information and sometimes even deny 
the public access to risk information in order not to arouse “disquietedness”. 
Whereas interviewees in Wuhan perceive the media to be embellishing flood risk, the 
interviewees in Cologne wish for more media coverage for risk awareness especially in 
“flood free” periods to maintain the collective memory.  
Doubtlessly, flood managers in Cologne advocate an offensive information policy 
towards the general public to enable and encourage individuals to take their own 
responsibilities. In Wuhan the agencies see the individual responsibility in involvement 
in dike protection and flood fighting. Risk management is seen as the responsibility of 
the authorities and experts. 
In Cologne uncertainty and remaining risks despite of all prevention and protection 
measures are highlighted to raise the risk awareness, whereas in Wuhan, no such risk 
communication can be observed.  
In addition to the information campaign initiated by the HSZ, regional spatial planning 
also contributes to risk communication among communities. The signal function of 
spatial planning is regarded as an important component of risk awareness. 
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2.3. Questioning of authority 
2.3.a. Wuhan, China 
In Wuhan questioning of authority is not broached on, for the organisational structure is 
highly hierarchical: 
“The leader shall distribute task and authority to different agencies and personnel and 
we just follow his instructions” (Interview 1/6, 2005). 
In each agency there is a written definition of tasks. The task definition is put into a 
frame and displayed on the walls of every office. The researcher observed that the last 
item of the board is the same in every agency and it reads: “Other tasks: any tasks the 
leader assigns one to accomplish.” On the one hand, there is a definition of tasks, but 
on the other hand the definition has great flexibility due to the last item. Based on a 
hierarchical structure of administration, authority personnel with authority are entitled to 
assign anyone to do anything and no discussion is allowed. Therefore there exists no 
questioning of authority amongst agencies.  
2.3.b. Cologne, Germany 
There were problems about overlapping authorities of different agencies in flood 
management during the flood events in 1993. The responsibilities and leadership of 
administrative agencies and aid organizations were not clear cut during the flood event. 
The reason for it is seen to be lack of flood experience and ongoing inter-agency 
competition. Also the municipal government of Cologne was blamed for not being in the 
position to hold the supervision of the leadership.  
“The city government seemed not to be aware of its responsibility in flood protection in 
1993” (Interview 32, 26 October, 2006).  
Especially after the aid organizations were involved in flood protection there was a lack 
of coordination and cooperation between these organizations and the Fire Brigade. 
They did not know how to complement each other’s work.  
Authority as to who should take the leadership in flood management during a flood 
event seems to be an unsettled problem. This is confirmed by different perceptions of 
leadership of different agencies and stakeholders. Citizens’ groups recognize the 
authority of the Flood Protection Centre (HSZ) as in charge before, during and after the 
flood periods. However, the federal army perceives the Fire Brigade to be holding the 
leadership. This is due to the different experiences and interactions of different stake-
holders with the HSZ.  
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Officially the flood protection agency in Cologne does not have the authority to com-
mand other agencies. This is seen as one of the obstacles in flood management 
structure. “This arrangement is actually wrong. This is very clear. The problem is that 
this arrangement is a historical legacy. […] Until a couple of years ago the Flood 
Protection Centre has been seen more like a coordination centre, but not only an 
information centre. This may be due to the flood events in 1993 and 1995. This position 
is even accepted by the other agencies” (Interview 26, 23 December, 2006). 
However, this is just an informal practice in flood management in Cologne. The director 
of HSZ explains: “On the one hand, they all accept our role and it was also practiced 
during the flood events, actually we issued some kind of order. On the other hand, it is 
not officially announced that we have the authority. Maybe this has to be changed. But 
it has always been like this; no one volunteers to cede authority” (Interview 26, 23 
December, 2006). 
This is seen as one of the greatest challenges in flood management in Cologne by the 
Flood Protection Centre. Once water levels reach 10.70 metres, responsibility is shifted 
to the Fire Brigade of the City of Cologne. It is argued that the shift of responsibility is a 
disruption and disturbance, especially when the situation is becoming more critical. At 
the water level of 10.70 metres the Flood Protection Centre will be flooded; therefore 
the command centre will have to be moved to the Fire Brigade. This is a physical 
relocation which will interrupt the work of the Flood Protection Centre. Additionally, “the 
Fire Brigade does not have the know-how in flood preventive measures, spatial plan-
ning etc. It would be better if there would be a special work force for flood protection. 
This work force could be a link between the operation forces and the technical service 
agencies” (Interview 26, 23 December, 2006).  
However, the Fire Brigade argues that it is trained to cope with unexpected events 
which cannot be handled like routine work while the flood protection centre is seen as 
not used to the “surprises”. The work style of the HSZ is described by the Fire Brigade 
as “chaotic”: 
“In my view working in such a chaotic form is not feasible once a catastrophic event 
really occurs. One has to work like in military service. If the water level is under 10.60, 
it might function more or less. It is obviously not an ideal condition to work in. It is more 
like voting in these bureaucratic agencies. There is a representative from each agency 
and they endeavour to find a consensus. But once they are in a situation, in which 
thousands of people are involved, the instrument HSZ has available will not function at 
all. To a certain point he has to admit that from now on it is pure civil protection (Ge-
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fahrenabwehr), you have to take over the leadership, and we cannot cope with it 
anymore. Then the responsibility will be transferred from him to here” (Interview 28, 21 
August, 2006). 
The tension between Fire Brigade and Flood Protection Centre roots in competitive 
competence thinking and different approaches of management. The Fire Brigade is 
more military style whereas HSZ has a more egalitarian approach. The HSZ believes 
that the Fire Brigade “does not want to have anything to do with the people”, whereas 
the HSZ pursues popularity and trust of the people. The Fire Brigade perceives the 
working style of the HSZ to be “typically bureaucratic” which is not efficient enough for 
emergency management. This difference is also reflected in the different attitudes 
towards the decision whether the radio station should be located inside the HSZ during 
a flood event. The Fire Brigade as well as the police do not like the idea of having a 
radio station located inside the Flood Protection Centre, for “they do not like to be 
observed by journalists who could report every mistake they have made”. But the HSZ 
insists on its information policy that openness to the general public and the media is 
essential to gain trust. The journalists are perceived to be instruments to disseminate 
information to the general public. 
On the whole, the Flood Protection Centre as a coordination centre enjoys general 
acceptance among different agencies involved in flood management. This fact is due to 
the role the Flood Protection Centre played during the previous flood events especially 
in 1993 and 1995. Trust has been established during those experiences.  
“[In the media] I am known as the pope of flood due to my role during the flood events 
in 1993, 1995 and 2001 etc …” (Interview 26, 23 December, 2006). 
Trust is also one of the strong arguments for why the role of the Flood Protection 
Centre as a coordination agency should be instrumentalized according to the HSZ. 
Trust of the other agencies was observed in the interviews and the meetings with the 
other agencies.  
One can observe that this informal coordination structure is an exceptional case. In 
most of the other federal states it is the Fire Brigade which takes over the responsibility 
of the flood management. The interviewee of the HSZ admits that the Fire Brigade has 
advantages in managing and coordinating the flood management. But he also points 
out that it has a disadvantage due to its training background. Members of the Fire 
Brigade are usually trained to cope with fire but not flooding, therefore they lack exper-
tise in managing flood. The interviewee of the HSZ highlights the special role of the 
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HSZ in Cologne which is due to the personal contribution of the director. This is ex-
pressed by other interviewees as well.  
The informal establishment of the position of the HSZ also impacts the perception of 
agencies towards the regional government. One can observe that the regional govern-
ment is not present in the consideration of the agencies. Some even perceive this 
management level to be “completely unnecessary”: 
“It is an extra head which no one needs. I cannot tell what they are doing. It is an 
intermediate level between the City of Cologne and the federal state. But it does not 
really have any concrete authority and therefore can be ignored. The regional govern-
ment also has a crisis management group or something similar. However, this body 
does not make any decisions, nor does it implement anything. It is just there.” (Inter-
view 32, 26 October, 2006). 
This reveals a general problem of the authorities. Beyond the local flood management, 
no unified leadership which has transboundary competence reaching further than one 
federal state is agreed on in emergency cases. This is perceived as a typical problem 
of the German “Föderalismus” which “hampers a centralistic operation style”. Question-
ing of authority both at local levels and beyond remains unsolved.  
2.3.c. Synopsis 
In Wuhan the question of authority is not perceived as a problem. All tasks and compe-
tences are defined by higher authorities. Although the definition of tasks is not clear cut, 
the agencies seem to accept any tasks they are assigned to. In Cologne the competi-
tion for more authority between the agencies in emergency management seems to be 
an unsolved problem. Especially due to the broad recognition of the leading role of 
HSZ among agencies and the credibility gained amongst the general public, HSZ 
established a coordinating position for emergency management in the last flood events 
which it is not officially endowed with. Föderalismus is regarded as one of the greatest 
coordination problems between different management hierarchies such as federal state 
level and state level in Germany.  
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F THEORETICAL ANALYSIS   
The research results presented in chapter E have revealed the commonalities and 
differences in risk perception and communication features in Wuhan, China and Co-
logne, Germany. From a historical and generic perspective it has been analysed why 
these differences emerge and how they are embedded in historical and cultural con-
texts by integrating data interpretation into the data presentation.  
The empirical data covers a wide spectrum of characteristics of the flood management 
in Wuhan and Cologne. How can these risk management traits be structured and 
bundled by a common denominator, which can serve as a general benchmark in 
different cultural spaces?  This requires a scientific theory which provides a specific 
pair of lenses through which patterns can be made visible. In the following chapter the 
research results will be further analysed by using an established scientific theory to 
deepen the understanding of the Chinese and German cultural contexts and to explain 
the differences in risk perception and communication. On this matter, no analytical 
model can be seen as extensive that it covers all aspects of the issue at hand. It is 
essential to be critical about each approach available to social science examining the 
risk phenomenon so that the improvement of theories could be achieved. Nevertheless, 
an integrative position is taken in the reflection of various concepts and approaches, 
namely that one should bear in mind that every endeavour to conceptualise risk and to 
address risk issues has made its contribution to understanding the phenomenon better 
and to cover more and more perspectives of it. It is rather like putting the puzzles 
together than one approach working against another. No perspective can be judged as 
better than the other, but each tries to find its own truth through its own perspectives. In 
the following chapter different approaches of addressing the risk issues from different 
perspectives of the observers will be illustrated and their implication for analysis will be 
broached.  
1. TWO APPROACHES OF RISK ANALYSIS 
The most prominent approaches applied in empirical risk perception studies are the 
psychometric approach and the approach from the cultural perspectives (Rippl, 2002: 
147, Plapp, 2003: 21). According to Bradbury the psychometric approach in risk per-
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ception studies, as developed by Slovic and his associates, has controversial implica-
tions for policy design as to which role the public shall play in the risk communication. It 
is criticised to “straddle technical and social paradigms uneasily” (Bradbury, 1989: 384). 
Under the umbrella of the concept of risk as a social process, prominent cultural 
scholars such as Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky and Michael Thompson developed 
the cultural theory on risk which emphasised the conception of risk as a social con-
struct. In the following chapter a brief introduction will be given to the psychometric 
approach, as it has often been applied in cross-cultural risk perception studies. The 
cultural approach as the analytical framework for this research will be elucidated in 
greater detail. 
1.1. The psychometric paradigm  
The psychometric paradigm originated from the pioneering effort of Starr to develop a 
method to identify the trade-off according to the public opinion between technological 
risks and their benefits. The research question targeted was “how safe is safe 
enough?” His findings show that acceptability of risk from an activity is proportional to 
the third power of the benefits for it; risks of voluntary activities are roughly 1,000 times 
as acceptable as involuntary risks. To test the validity of the many assumptions in the 
revealed preferences approaches, Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read et al. con-
ducted an analogous psychometric analysis. Later on many other studies were con-
ducted within the psychometric paradigm (Slovic, 2000). These studies found out that 
perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable.  
The concept of risk means different things to different people. Experts’ judgement of 
risk is highly related to the annual fatalities whereas lay people judge risk more accord-
ing to other hazard characteristics such as catastrophic potential, threat to future 
generations etc. 
Studies of expressed preferences within the psychometric paradigm also revealed that 
people view current risk levels to be unacceptably high for most activities. Factors 
which influence the relationship between perceived risk, perceived benefit and risk 
acceptance include familiarity, control, catastrophic potential, equity and level of knowl-
edge (Slovic, 2000: 223-224). 
The factor labelled “dread risk” (see figure 2) is defined “at its high end by perceived 
lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences and the inequitable 
distribution of risks and benefits” (Slovic, 2000: 225). Under this factor nuclear weap-
ons and power score high on the characteristics that make up this factor. The factor 
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“unknown risk” is defined “at its high end by hazards judged to be unobservable, 
unknown, new and delayed in their manifestation of harm.” The risks of chemical 
technologies rank high within this category. Findings have shown that lay people’s 
perceptions and attitudes are closely related to the position of a hazard within the type 
of factor space. Especially the factor “dread risk” seems to yield significant links to 
people’s perception. The higher the score for the characteristics of the factor, the 
higher the perceived risk, consequently, the more people desire to reduce the current 
risk. However, the results on the experts’ perception yielded contrary findings: Their 
perception level is only related to the annual mortality (Slovic, 2000: 226).  
Figure 2: Location of 81 hazards on factors 1 and 2 derived from the interrelationships 
among 15 risk characteristics. Each factor is made up of a combination of characteristics, 
as indicated by the lower diagram 
 
Source: Slovic, 2000: 225 
 
F THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 1 TWO APPROACHES OF RISK ANALYSIS 
 
 151 
The results from these studies have been used for forecasting people’s acceptance of 
and opposition to specific technologies. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons were 
frequent topics of the analysis within the psychometric paradigm. A consequence of the 
research is the attempt to educate people and improve people’s intuition. However, risk 
perception research suggests that people’s perceptions and attitudes are determined 
not only by the sort of one-dimensional statistics used in such tables, but also by the 
variety of quantitative and qualitative characteristics. People have a broader concept of 
risk than ‘expected number of fatalities’. The most important message of the research, 
Slovic concludes, is that there is both wisdom and error in public perception. Lay 
people have a richer conceptualisation of risk than the experts and their perception 
reflects legitimate concerns ignored in expert risk assessment. Slovic recommends a 
two-way process for risk communication and management. “Each side, expert and 
public, has something valid to contribute. Each side must respect the insights and 
intelligence of the other” (Slovic, 2000: 231). 
Bradbury criticises the psychometric paradigm for its contradictory statements and 
ambiguous policy implications as to risk management and risk communication. On the 
one hand, representatives of the psychometric paradigm contend that the “goal of risk 
communication should not be to diffuse public concerns and avoid action”, on the other 
hand they indicate the goal of risk communication is to “produce an informed public that 
is involved, interested, reasonable, thoughtful, solution-oriented, and collaborative” 
(Bradbury, 1989: 386-388).  
Apart from the common criticism on the psychometric paradigm, such as the small size 
of the samples and the laboratory questionnaires, Mary Douglas adds the “most seri-
ous criticism”: the respondents are faced with a limited list of risks that the researchers 
have defined. She argues, no one can guarantee the spectrum of selected risks gives a 
fair view of the life choices an individual has to weigh (Douglas, 1997). 
However, the fruit of the risk perception study with psychometric approach is that one 
discovered another possibility of calculating risk apart from the measurement in natural 
science and technical domain (Kleinwellfonder, 1996: 82). 
1.2. In the light of the cultural theories 
Cultural scholars have developed their own risk concept which views risk as a social 
construct and process. The main theoretical foundation of observing risk through 
cultural lenses was laid by Douglas and Wildavsky. Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 
contributed to the further development of cultural theories with their book “Cultural 
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Theory” which spelled out the cultural theories in a more pronounced way. Since then, 
many cultural scholars added to the credit of the cultural theories on risk. In this chap-
ter, the main statements of the cultural theories on risk analysis as well as their predic-
tion for risk perception will be illustrated. 
1.2.a. Culture: An ambitious and ambiguous concept 
Culture is a concept which has many facets. In daily language culture can refer to 
literature, painting, architecture and the traditional performing arts like theatre, opera 
etc. as some of the Western belletrists describe as the “restrict view” of culture. The 
commonality of all these is that they are artefacts, which means they are human 
products. These products are different from those products with practical application 
such as a pair of shoes or a piece of furniture. Besides, these products require creative, 
intellectual and artistic abilities. Both the production and the appreciation of these 
products are seen as a special gift of a certain group of people (Hansen, 2003: 11-13).  
Sometimes people also talk about culture as a specific life style which includes per-
sonal traits such as humanity, tolerance, sensitivity and savoir-vivre. These two under-
standings of culture both refer to a specific part of our societal life which is not func-
tional and not practiced by every member of a society, but only by more ‘cultivated 
people’, thus, this concept of culture is not neutral but judgmental (Hansen, 2003: 11-
13). 
Also, political entities and organisations try to find their own concepts of culture. The 
1982 World Conference on Cultural Policies gave culture an anthropological frame 
which resulted in a definition widely used among international organisations today: “[…] 
culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of a society or social group, and […] encompasses, in addition to art 
and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” 
(UNESCO, 2002:18)  
The less common usage of culture in daily life originated from the Latin word “colere” 
meaning “care for” or “look after” used in the context of agriculture (Schäfers, 2000). 
Another meaning of “colere” means “worship”. These two meanings of the Latin word 
reflect the differentiation between human beings and animals through agricultural 
activities and worshipping of gods. Only human beings have these abilities to change 
both their own nature and the nature outside their bodies through work (Hansen, 2003: 
14). 
Cicero (106 BC - 43 BC) introduced the concept of “cultura” referring to material and 
spiritual products and abilities (Schäfers, 2000). A similar neutral concept of culture we 
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are also confronted with refers to customs, convention, manners, religion etc., in short, 
all characteristics of a group of people. Not only artefacts such as literature, but also 
artefacts with practical application are incorporated into this concept. The American 
expression “way of life” is a fitting description of it (Hansen, 2003: 11-17). 
There are still other attributes to the concept of culture in social science. Böhme states 
that cultures must have the function of symbolic power which provides a group or 
individuals with orientations in a world of open horizon and timelessness (Böhme, 2006: 
33). Culture produces competition for limited goods (knappe Güter) as well as re-
sources of meaning and knowledge. Culture also produces inequality and aggravates 
instability and crisis which, on the other hand, shall be overcome by culture (Böhme, 
2006: 33). Culture has no other task than to enhance social order and avoid coinci-
dence (Böhme, 2006: 33).  
On the whole, within the Western framework of culture there has never been a consen-
sus about the concept of culture. Kroeber and Kluckhohn summarised 164 different 
definitions of culture (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952). A wide range of discussions have 
been raging over e.g. whether culture can be subject to objective scientific analysis or 
humanistic interpretation, or whether cross-cultural generalizations are possible 
(Rosaldo, 1989). 
However, it is vital to define culture in the context of a scientific research project, 
especially in order to strengthen validity of cross-cultural studies (Johnson, 1991: 143). 
Since this research applies cultural theories as its theoretical and analytical framework, 
the definition of culture within the Cultural Theory as established by Thompson, Ellis 
and Wildavsky will be adopted for this research. 
1.2.b. Cultural theories and their approach to risk analysis 
Why do we need cultural lenses for risk issue? 
“Can we know the risks we face, now or in the future? No, we cannot; but yes, we must 
act as if we do” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 1). The authors of “Risk and Culture” 
argue, no single person can be informed about all risks, hence, no one can calculate 
what risks we are facing. (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 1). In fact, neither could they 
deal with all of the risks, even if the existence of these risks is known to them.  
Psychology tries to explain people’s attitude towards risk by categorizing people’s 
personality. Some people are more risk taking whereas some others are more risk 
averse. But psychology fails to explain why the same people are more afraid of certain 
risks than they are of others. If the environment determines how risky a situation is, 
then, one can ask, why different people react differently in the same environment? 
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Cultural Theory explains this phenomenon positing that the perception of risk is a social 
process. The selection of risks to be given priority depends on the way of life one 
chooses to support (Thompson et al., 1990: 62). 
In addition, Douglas and Wildavsky contend, the disagreement about risk is a problem 
deep-seated and widespread in the Western world. Different people have different 
concerns about risks they are facing or not facing. The programmes to reduce risks are 
not convincingly feasible. Hence, “substantial disagreement remains over what is risky, 
how risky it is, and what to do about it” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 1).  
It would be ideal to be able to put all risks in a ranking list, so that one would know 
which risks bring about most damage and in what order one should cope with them. 
Unfortunately, this is an unrealistically ambitious undertaking for the reason that risk is 
seen as a combination of knowledge about the future and consent about the most 
favourable possibilities. One can put the risk problems into perspective like the follow-
ing (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 4-5): 
 
Table 7: Four Problems of Risk 
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Solution: 
? 
 
Source: Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 5 
  
In an ideal case both knowledge and consent are not questioned. When the problem is 
technical, the solution is calculation. If knowledge is certain but there is no consent, 
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disagreement can be overcome by coercion or discussion. If there is a lack of informa-
tion, the problem can be solved by research. However, the situation will become a 
dilemma, if one neither has certainty about knowledge, nor consent. In this case only 
social consent can enable to reduce the need for new knowledge and focus on a few 
subjects. The risk perception is therefore a social process. Social principles guide 
social behaviour and frame “judgement of what dangers should be most feared, what 
risks are worth taking, and who should be allowed to take them” (Douglas and Wil-
davsky, 1983: 6). 
Therefore, cultural theory of risk perception sets out to explain how community consen-
sus confers moral meanings to natural dangers. Dangers are used as an instrument to 
draw public attention to certain objects of social criticism and are related to social 
blame (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 7).  
The guiding assumptions of cultural theory of risk perception are “that any form of 
society produces its own selected view of the natural environment, a view which 
influences its choice of dangers worth attention. Attribution of responsibility for natural 
disasters is a normal strategy for protecting a particular set of values belonging to a 
particular way of life. Consequently, research into perception based on a cultural model 
would try to discover what different characteristics of social life elicit different responses 
to danger” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 8). 
Forms of social organisations determine which risks are taken and which are ignored 
according to its values. These values and beliefs make sense out of people’s diverse 
behaviour patterns and positions. By the same token, changing risk selection and risk 
perception means altering social organisation (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 9). 
According to the cultural theory, the choices of risks are determined by social forms 
which have their own typical risk selection characteristics. “Common values lead to 
common fears (and, by implication, to a common agreement not to fear other things)” 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 8). A certain “way of life” fears the risks most which 
may endanger the basis of its worldview and its social organisational form. Risk selec-
tion shall serve the purpose to strengthen one of these ways of life and weaken others. 
Cultural theory intends to look at “social norms or politics that are being attacked or 
defended” behind perceptions of physical risks (Plapp, 2003: 38). 
Douglas and Widavsky criticized the explanation that wealthier societies put more 
emphasis on risk aversion because they can afford to be more cautious. They raise the 
question why rich people are not more afraid of economic disaster, crime or war. 
Maslow’s theory of stages of wants argues that an individual’s political demands are 
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material such as food and shelter if his perspective is narrow. At a higher level of 
economic stage the individual can afford the luxury of a social conscience. Once the 
“basic needs” are satisfied, well educated people begin to devote themselves to public 
interests. However, as Douglas and Widavsky show, psychological and historical 
explanations seem to refute this theory. In an affluent civilisation the privileged are not 
necessarily concerned about the poor. Furthermore they argue, the empirical evidence 
of the last 100 years does not comply with Maslow’s argument that public altruism 
comes to surface after material successes of industrial development, since the Western 
industrialised countries are rich enough to be considered being in this last “altruistic 
phase” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 13-15).  
Sjöberg tested Maslow’s model on a hierarchy of needs. It was expected that people 
are less worried about remote risks before their most urgent needs have been met. But 
the model did not fit to their findings (Sjöberg et al., 2000). 
Thus, cultural approaches pose the question of “why certain risks get selected from the 
range of dangers that always threaten” seem to be more feasible to explain risk per-
ception (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 14).  
Definition of culture in Cultural Theory 
Instead of seeking a united definition of culture, Cultural Theory introduced three 
domains to explain the concept of culture: cultural biases, social relations, and way of 
life. “Cultural bias refers to shared values and beliefs. Social relations are defined as 
patterns of interpersonal relations”. A way of life is a viable combination of social 
relations and cultural bias (Thompson et al., 1990: 1-2). 
The social relations and cultural bias are given the same priority, for the reason that 
they are reciprocal, interacting and mutually reinforcing. If one adheres to a certain 
pattern of social relationship, one will also have a certain way of looking at the world. 
Likewise, a certain kind of world view legitimizes a corresponding type of social rela-
tions. In other words, every epistemology has a corresponding ontology. The viability of 
a way of life is only ensured if a particular cultural bias and a particular pattern of social 
relation mutually support each other (Thompson et al., 1990: 1-2). 
Objectives of the theory 
Cultural theory sets out to explore “the different perceptual screens through which 
people interpret or make sense of their world and the social relations that make particu-
lar visions of reality seem more or less plausible” (Thompson et al., 1990: xiii). The 
question cultural theory intends to answer is not how different cultural types emerge, 
but how these cultural types sustain and change. The assumption of cultural theory is 
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that preferences and ways of perceiving risk are generated through and, in turn, sus-
tain those relations (Thompson et al., 1990: 2).  
Social relations 
One of the domains of the Cultural Theory is social relations. Social relations, accord-
ing to Mary Douglas, can be captured by two dimensions of sociality: group and grid. 
“Group means the outside boundary that people have erected between themselves and 
the outside world. Grid means all the other social distinctions and delegations of 
authority that they use to limit how people behave to one another” (Douglas and Wil-
davsky, 1983: 138). The higher the degree of externally imposed prescriptions is, the 
less of life content is negotiable (Thompson et al., 1990: 5).  
The group dimension determines to which extend the individual’s life is incorporated 
into the group and how it is sustained by group membership. If a person has the same 
residence, shares work, resource and recreation, his group dimension is assigned a 
high rating. The higher the group dimension is, the more difficult to be admitted to the 
group and the clearer the boundaries between the group member and non-members 
(Thompson et al., 1990: 5).  
The term of grid is comparable to the idea of “social regulation” in Durkheim’s work 
“Suicide”. Douglas explains, a highly regulated (or high-grid) social context is signified 
by “an explicit set of institutionalized classifications [that] keeps [individuals] apart and 
regulates their interactions” (Thompson et al., 1990: 6). How one should behave is 
clearly defined. The lower the grid is, the more room there is for individuals to negotiate 
their relationships with the others.  
The focal point of grid-group analysis is social control. Individual choice is constricted in 
that he is bounded to group decisions or he has to follow certain rules of the group. 
“Social control is a form of power” (Thompson et al., 1990: 6). It is the form of power as 
to who is entitled to exercise power over others (Thompson et al., 1990: 6). 
Different types of social relations emerge due to different combinations of degrees of 
group and grid. Mary Douglas identifies three combinations: hierarchy, individualism 
and sectarianism (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 138-139). In “Cultural Theory” the 
authors added two more groups to complement the group-grid analysis: the fatalist and 
the hermit.  
According to the Cultural Theory, strong group boundaries joined with little prescrip-
tions produce egalitarian social relations (Thompson et al., 1990: 6). Egalitarian group 
or sectarian group, as Douglas and Widavsky call it, has strong group identities which 
distinguish them from non-members (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 139).  
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The egalitarian group does not tolerate inequality in any form. It advocates equality as 
its main goal. Within the egalitarian social group the role of members is not clearly 
defined. The relationship between two group members is ambiguous. No individual is 
granted the power to exercise control over the others, therefore internal conflict is 
difficult to be resolved. Individuals can only exercise power over other group members 
by speaking in the name of the group. In order to resolve conflict, members often have 
to be excluded from the group (Thompson et al., 1990: 6). The difficulty of decision 
making, the bargaining and the readiness to splinter off weaken the sustainability of the 
egalitarian group. Therefore the egalitarian group is always at the border of the society 
and not able to assume the power of a central organisation (Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1983: 120).  
Hierarchical social relations are characterised by strong group boundaries and binding 
prescriptions. Individuals in hierarchical groups are controlled by other members of the 
group and simultaneously they have to follow imposed social rules (Thompson et al., 
1990: 6). The characteristic of hierarchy is that all parts are oriented towards the whole. 
A hierarchical relation is a relation between larger and smaller or like the author of 
Homo Hierarchicus puts it, it is a relation between “that which encompasses and that 
which is encompassed” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 90).  
In comparison with the egalitarian group, the hierarchical group has a wide range of 
instruments to resolve internal conflicts including “upgrading, shifting sideways, down-
grading, resegregating, redefining”. Inequality and authority are justified on the grounds 
that different roles for different people enable people to live together more harmoni-
ously than other arrangements. Inequality is justified by the sake of the whole organism 
(Thompson et al., 1990: 6, Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 180). Since hierarchy does 
not view equality as necessary, good or possible, it is not the aim of hierarchy to 
establish equality. Instead, inequality “is written into its constitution”. Hierarchy attracts 
its members with stability and dignity which are supposed to be achieved through the 
encompassing relation between the whole and its parts (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 
180).  
The success of hierarchy is ensured by different strategies. For instance, it does not 
allow one member’s personal glory to be distinguished from the collective honour. 
Likewise, no single member is forced to take blame. Collective responsibility makes 
roles anonymous. Decision making is collectivised in such a way that it is not transpar-
ent and no one can be seen to making decisions.  
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Hierarchy relies on control mechanisms. Information control is another important 
strategy of hierarchy. However, hierarchy could lose its control of information due to its 
strong censorship and result in constraints of individual initiative (Douglas and Wil-
davsky, 1983).  
An individualistic social context, also called market by Douglas and Wildavsky, does 
not bind individuals to any group incorporation or prescribed roles. The social relations 
depend on continuous negotiation between individuals. In such a social context indi-
viduals are relatively free from control by others; nevertheless they try to control the 
others (Thompson et al., 1990: 7). 
Individualistic social group structure commits to social equality, but it is not as consis-
tent as the egalitarianism. In a market system every citizen has the right to enter the 
market for exchange and to enjoy the immunities and protections which, in return, 
sustains the functionality of the market. However, temporary inequality due to the ups 
and downs of the market is accepted. The big promise of the market is individual 
success. The fundamental justification is faith in free exchange. Decisions should be 
made based on personal judgement rather than collective control (Dake, 1992: 29). 
When people are subject to binding prescriptions but excluded from group membership, 
they practice the fatalistic way of life. Along the grid dimension the fatalists are similar 
to hierarchies; their sphere of individual autonomy is restricted. Their choices as how to 
spend their time, with whom they associate, where to work and live etc. are restricted. 
The difference between the fatalists and hierarchies is the group dimension. They are 
excluded from membership in the group which makes decisions that determine their life 
(Thompson et al., 1990: 7). 
If an individual withdraws from all social involvements and refuses to control or manipu-
late others and at the same time if he escapes the social coerciveness to be controlled 
by others, he chooses the hermit way of life. 
All these five social relations are illustrated in the following figure with grid and group 
dimensions. 
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Figure 3: The five vignettes mapped onto the two dimensions of sociality 
 
Source: (Thompson et al., 1990: 8) 
 
Thompson et al demonstrate five social relations with vivid examples. At one end of the 
scale are a high-caste Hindu villager and a member of a self-sufficient Western com-
mune who both have a strong positive group context (see figure 3). At the other end of 
the scale are a self-made Victorian manufacturer and a weaver who is employed by the 
manufacturer and does not belong to any union. It is prescriptions, grid dimension, 
which separate the Hindu villager from the Western communard and the mill owner 
from his employee. The high-caste Hindu villager and the mill worker both have posi-
tive grid contexts. They are restricted in their freedom through imposed social coer-
civeness. The self-made manufacturer and the self-sufficient communard both have 
negative grid contexts and see themselves to be free to act (Thompson et al., 1990: 7). 
The individualist self-made manufacturer advocates success in material terms and 
competition. His moral justification is that he can only prosper if he serves the others 
due to the market mechanism. He believes that human skill, enterprise and spirit of 
venture create a “positive-sum” game for both the manufacturers and the workers 
(Thompson et al., 1990: 8).  
The mill worker finds himself on the receiving end of all this. He does not belong to any 
unions, but he is highly prescribed. He believes that he can not do anything to change 
his life. His life is like a lottery. His environment, on which he has no influence, is 
responsible for both good and bad things happening to him. All depends on chance 
(Thompson et al., 1990:  8-9). 
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The high-caste Hindu enjoys many privileges such as access to land, water etc. com-
pared to his fellow villagers. His social coerciveness due to his high grid level does not 
impair his interests. On the contrary, these regulations serve him to manipulate the 
others. These regulations are “self imposed” to differentiate himself from the others and 
keep him up. Within such an environment all has been regulated and everything has its 
own place. The goal is to keep everything in its place (Thompson et al., 1990: 9).  
The Western communard as an egalitarian rejects any form of inequality and coercive-
ness of the wider world. He separates himself from the outer world by a “wall of virtue” 
which protects those on the inside. The organisational problems due to the low grid but 
high group dimension are solved by fission. Fission is not viewed to be disastrous, 
since organisational refinement and market clearance are not their concern. “Their 
business is criticizing” (Thompson et al., 1990: 10). 
Different from all four social relations, the hermit does not wish to manipulate the others; 
neither does he wish to be manipulated by the others. His choice is to escape from 
both group and grid dimensions. He aims to achieve autonomy: “a relaxed and unbe-
holden self-sufficiency” (Thompson et al., 1990: 10). 
To avoid misunderstanding, Mary Douglas stresses that the typology of cultures is 
derived from cultural biases. It is not like some of the critics assumed that communities 
are divided into egalitarian, individualist or hierarchical groups. People do not form 
hierarchical, egalitarian or individualist “groups” within a given society; rather, persons 
who do not belong to any “groups” as such share the same cultural bias (Douglas, 
1997: 128). 
Cultural biases 
Cultural biases are defined in Cultural Theory as shared values and beliefs. It is also 
called world views and cosmologies which correspondent to different patterns of social 
relations (Dake, 1991). “A cultural bias is a point of view, with its own framing assump-
tions and readily available solutions for standardized problems” (Douglas, 1997: 128). 
Cultural biases are protected by using a perceptual screen to filter facts (Thompson et 
al., 1990: 22). 
Ways of life 
Culture, also called ways of life in Cultural Theory, is the viable combination of the 
cultural biases and social relations. It would not be a concern if values and beliefs 
caused social relations or social relations caused values and beliefs. Thompson et al 
state that “values and social relations are mutually interdependent” (Thompson et al., 
1990: 21). Ways of life are made viable by defining certain behaviours as worthy of 
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praise and others as undesirable or even unthinkable. Individuals are supporting their 
way of life consciously or latently depending on their cultural awareness. These biases 
and relations cannot be mixed and matched arbitrarily, since the way of life can only be 
viable if certain biases support certain relations. Cultural biases help to justify and 
legitimate the social relations and social relations generate preferences and percep-
tions which in turn sustain those relations (Thompson et al., 1990: 2).  
Cultural Theory claims that there are five ways of life which meet the requirement of 
viability. These five ways of life exist parallel to each other and are rivals, yet indispen-
sable for each others survival. If one of them were distinguished, the others would lose 
their justification of existence due to lack of a target. However, this does not mean that 
all ways of life are equally represented within a single country and at a given point of 
time (Thompson et al., 1990: 4).  
Following the classification of the typology the five ways of life, also called five cultural 
types, are hierarchy, egalitarianism, fatalism, individualism, and autonomy (Thompson 
et al., 1990: 3).  
Human and nature concepts of Cultural Theory 
The development from primitive to modern society, especially the development of 
modern science, put us in a belief that we can view nature in a morally neutral manner. 
For modernisation and science give us the possibility to explain phenomena formerly 
regarded as mysteries and see the world in an entirely different light. In a premodern 
society people politicised nature by inventing mysterious connections between moral 
meanings and natural disasters as well as by their selection among dangers. So do the 
moderns (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 35). Douglas et al contend “each culture rests 
upon its own ideas of what ought to be normal or natural” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1983: 35). Nature is what the central establishment sees as natural. The belief that we 
as the moderns see nature through “neutral scientific lenses and laws” is much ques-
tioned by cultural scholars (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 48). 
Thompson et al state, ideas of nature, whether physical or human are socially con-
structed. The ways of life individuals adhere to determine what is natural and unnatural. 
However, this does not mean the ideas of nature can be anything (Thompson et al., 
1990: 25). Nature has to be conceived in such a way that makes the five ways of life 
viable (Thompson et al., 1990: 28). By the same token, the conception of human nature 
has to match the social relations (Thompson et al., 1990: 33).  
The Cultural Theory introduced five myths of nature matching the five ways of life. The 
model of the nature concept is derived from the model developed by ecologists. These 
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five myths of nature are simple models of ecosystem stability. Holling et al. and 
Thompson et al. contend the myths of nature are both true and false. They all repre-
sent part of reality (Holling, 2002: 10, Thompson et al., 1990: 26), but each of the myth 
is the only truth and reality for those whose way of life is based on that conception of 
nature (Thompson et al., 1990: 26).  
Five myths of nature have been identified: Nature Benign, Nature Ephemeral, Nature 
Perverse/Tolerant, Nature Capricious, and Nature Resilient. These myths explain how 
nature works and the implication of the assumptions determines subsequent policies 
and actions (Holling, 2002: 10). Nature Resilient belongs to the hermit’s myth; however, 
it is not taken into account here due to the lack of involvement of the hermit in societal 
life. The four myths of nature can be illustrated by the following figure: 
Figure 4: The four primary myths of nature 
 
 
Source: Thompson et al., 1990: 27 
 
According to the myth of Nature Benign the world is in a state of equilibrium. When the 
ball that represents the state of nature is knocked, it always returns to the bottom of the 
basin (Thompson et al., 1990: 26). It imposes a static goal on a dynamic system 
(Holling, 2002: 12). The subsequent policy of managing institutions can have a laissez-
faire attitude. As long as one does “exuberant, individual things”, a “hidden hand” will 
be guidance for him toward the best possible outcome (Thompson et al., 1990: 26-27).  
Nature Ephemeral is the opposite of nature benign. It tells a story of the world as a very 
unstable and unforgiving place. Even the smallest jolt can bring the ball out the basin 
leading to the collapse of the current state. The policy implication would be precaution. 
Social activity is focussed on maintaining the status quo. Only a decentralized system 
which has a minimal impact on nature is able to persist. “Small is beautiful”, because 
the inevitable catastrophe of any policy can be kept localised (Holling, 2002: 13, 
Thompson et al., 1990: 26).  
Nature Perverse / Tolerant Nature Ephemeral Nature Capricious Nature Benign 
hierarchical egalitarian individualistic fatalistic 
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Nature perverse/Tolerant forgives most of the events but the ball can be hit over the 
threshold by an occasional knock. Managing institutions must regulate to avoid sur-
prises (Thompson et al., 1990: 27). The exuberant behaviour should never go too far to 
keep the ball inside the basin. “Certainty and predictability, generated by experts, 
become the dominant moral concern” (Thompson et al., 1990: 26-27).  
Nature Capricious world view sees the world as a random place. Institutions holding 
this view do not manage but cope with stochastic events. “Life is, and remains, a 
lottery” (Thompson et al., 1990: 27).  
It is the institutions which supply people with their myths to direct their attention toward 
certain features of their environment and away from the others. Each myth belongs to 
one way of life: the skill-controlled cornucopia belongs to the individualist; nature 
tolerant/perverse belongs to the hierarchist; nature ephemeral belongs to the egalitar-
ian; the lottery like cornucopia belongs to the fatalist. A particular way of life has a 
specific set of conviction of the world (Thompson et al., 1990: 28-29). 
The fifth myth Nature Resilient belongs to the hermit whose strategy is withdrawal. The 
hermit pursuits the oneness of man and nature as well as the unity of opposites. 
Whereas the other four myths have captured part of the reality and truth, the hermit’s 
myth abandons the duality of man and nature and turns its attention to transformation 
of the world (Thompson et al., 1990: 29-31).  
Like the models of physical nature justify the way of life, the conception of human 
nature fits in with how people wish to relate to each other. Social relations and concep-
tions of human nature cannot be mixed and matched (Thompson et al., 1990: 34).  
A malleable characteristic is stressed by egalitarians. Egalitarians’ conception of 
human nature tells that human beings are born good but corrupted by evil institutions. 
On the contrary, a non-coercive, egalitarian society can make human beings very good. 
The optimistic conception of human nature is essential to keep egalitarian social 
relations viable and convince the egalitarian members to follow a high-group and low-
grid mode to organise their life (Thompson et al., 1990: 34). 
For individualists human nature is as stable as the physical nature in their conception. 
Irrespective of what institutional settings are prevalent, human beings are and remain 
essentially self-seeking. Individuals only think of their own interests and pursue their 
own benefits. The subsequent best form of social organisation is a competitive political 
system. This is not accepted by egalitarians and hierarchies, because it denies that 
individuals can be motivated by pursuing the common good for the collective (Thomp-
son et al., 1990: 35). 
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Hierarchies postulate the belief that human beings are born sinful. However, this can 
be redeemed by good institutions. This conception of human nature justifies the way of 
life rich in institutional restrains: “It was the task of the higher powers of conscience and 
reason to regulate, discipline, and restrain the lower, baser passions and impulses, 
which, left to themselves, would escape control and wreak havoc” (Thompson et al., 
1990: 35). 
Human nature and society is unpredictable for fatalists. People may be good and 
helping, but they can also be hostile. Fatalists never know how the others react to them, 
therefore they distrust the others. This justifies their exclusion from the other ways of 
life (Thompson et al., 1990: 35).  
The hermit seems to have a contradictory conception of human nature. The belief in 
goodness of man becomes evident through the hermit’s insistence that unlike the 
hierarchists and egalitarians no one needs to do anything to save the others. However, 
the hermit sees the ignorance of man as a kind of sinfulness. For instance, it is inevita-
ble to eat living things even if one is a vegetarian (Thompson et al., 1990: 36).  
Characteristics of different culture types and their risk portfolio 
Cultural theorists contend the perception of risk is a social process. Preferences for risk 
can be explained “by the function those preferences serve for an individual’s way of 
life” (Thompson et al., 1990: 63).  
The success of hierarchical institutions lies in the collectivizing responsibility. No single 
person is so outstanding that he could out-manoeuvre collective honour; likewise, no 
one is to be blamed for failure. “Collectivizing responsibility is done by making roles 
anonymous. Decision making should ideally be so collectivized that no one is seen to 
decide” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 90-91). In hierarchies, goals are multiple and 
not clearly defined. This makes it easier to rationalise retrospectively the outcomes. 
Hierarchical structured institution maintains its functionality by avoiding “attempting to 
know too much about future consequences” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 93). 
Information in a hierarchical system is strongly selected, hence it often easily misses 
some important points, is unable to perceive the unexpected and taken by surprise. 
Hierarchies do not seek risks deliberately, but they are not always aware of the risks 
they are facing due to their blind spots (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 93-94).  
From the side of the individuals within a hierarchical system, they contribute to the 
sustainability of a hierarchical structure by subscribing to common values. The most 
important values are the organisation and its long future, the traditions and rules 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 90-91).  
F THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 1 TWO APPROACHES OF RISK ANALYSIS 
 
 166 
Hierarchical society places higher value on maintenance of the bureaucratic organisa-
tion than on individual survival. It is convinced of sacrificing the few for the good of the 
whole (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 101). 
Hierarchists do not hesitate to set acceptable risks at high levels as long as the deci-
sions are made by experts who are expected to do the right thing (Thompson et al., 
1990: 64). However, risks of war are not acceptable to the hierarchists because the 
focus is placed on dangers of foreign relations. The judgement of the hierarchists about 
risks is questionable, since he cannot always tell if the risks are real or not due to its 
“bad intelligence” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 188).  
The opposite form of hierarchical organisation is the individual market. Individuals’ 
autonomy is the fundamental element to keep this system functioning. Every individual 
is given the same right to contract and withdraw from it on the basis of public accep-
tance. In contrast to the hierarchical organisation, individual goals are distinct. No 
individual should be given the privilege to turn the free market into monopoly. The 
common values of free market organisation are equality and self-help. This principle is 
accepted by everyone but people who cannot keep up with the others. Everyone is 
self-seeking and share the value of the exchange system. The state is seen to be an 
instrument to oversee that fair play is secured and contract, competition as well as 
standard measures are protected and enforced. Personal success is highly appreciated 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 95-96). 
The common fears led by common values would be the loss of resources in the market 
and anything endangering the exchange system. Regarding time, individualists do not 
live by history and tradition. Instead they are always short of time (Douglas and Wil-
davsky, 1983: 96-101). 
Because the hierarchists and individualists “are both concerned to uphold the present 
social system and neither is able to envisage any different future, they can trust and 
mutually support each other in regard to environmental risk” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1983: 100).  
The individualists see risk as opportunity. If there would not be uncertainty or risk, there 
would not be personal reward and no scope for entrepreneurs. The free individualistic 
way of life fears state control, limitation to freedom and war which may interrupt their 
free market activity. The collapse of economy is the major fear of the individualists 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 188). 
The sectarian/egalitarian way of life has the myth of nature ephemeral. The egalitarians 
are very careful to ensure the stability of the equilibrium between anthropogenic activi-
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ties and nature, since they are more concerned about the world decline and environ-
mental problems due to technological development. They strongly support human 
equality, democracy and participation of citizens (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 188, 
Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 9).  
The members of sectarian/egalitarian culture are concentrated on their internal politics 
and do not have “anything to say about society at large”. They are small in size and 
autonomous but not necessarily averse to hierarchical structure. Members of these 
communities join them to avoid social commitment on a voluntary basis. They are 
critical about the other part of the human society which has a short distance to power. 
They do not speak up until they feel encroached upon by central authority. Some of 
them are hierarchists although hierarchical structure is a response to problems of scale. 
Douglas and Wildavsky contend, hierarchy is a solution voluntary organisations use to 
solve their problems of sustainability. Once the voluntariness of membership is reduced, 
the voluntary organisation will change its character into hierarchy (Douglas and Wil-
davsky, 1983: 103).  
The risk portfolio of sectarian culture is different from individualistic and hierarchical 
cultures. Risk discourse often takes place among the closed sectarian communities. 
The sectarian culture’s attitude towards risk is systematically incompatible with collec-
tivism and individualism (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 102-103). 
In general, sectarians are interested in bad news, because this is a sign for the corrup-
tion and pollution of the outside world and their criticism of the outside world are then 
justified. They are sensitive to risk with expected large-scale damages, though, like 
hierarchists, they also tend to ignore the long term and low probability risks. Risks are 
used as political instrument to prove the negative side of the outside world. Their aim is 
to denounce large organisations as such. Compared to hierarchical culture, sectarian 
culture is pessimistic and focuses on possible disaster. Because sectarians are against 
institutions, they rely on good human nature as the basis for good society. Since 
science has replaced God as the possibility to explain how the world shall function, 
sectarians use nature as a powerful instrument to maintain their way of life. They need 
enemies to structure the world into saints and sinners. The eminent difference between 
hierarchical and sectarian organisations lie in the attitude towards technology, for 
technology symbolises worldliness such as social distinction, pursuit of wealth, labour 
division, attributes which are criticised by sectarians (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 
122-124). 
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Risk perception is classified by the principles of organizations. A certain form of organi-
zation will favour certain risk selection. The more hierarchical an organization is, the 
more it is interested in internal control. It gives very little attention to a message of 
catastrophe. Sectarians are, on the contrary, more concerned about the future, be-
cause they believe that the future is endangered and it is not sure that disaster can be 
averted. But they are convinced that the origins of disasters are over-sized organization 
and new technology (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 126-127). 
Since the hermit’s strategy is withdrawal from societal life, it is very difficult for the other 
ways of life to impose risks on him. Therefore, the hermit is not the attention of risk 
discussion (Thompson et al., 1990: 64). 
Each way of life sees risks through the lenses of their cultural biases. They pick up 
some risks which bring their rewards but inevitably ignore the others which are picked 
up by the other ways of life.  
As a summary Schwarz and Thompson collected the traits and risk portfolios of the 
four ways of life in the following table: 
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Table 8: The four political cultures  
 
 Hierarchical Egalitarian Individualistic Fatalistic 
Preferred way of 
organizing 
Nested bounded 
group 
Egalitarian bounded 
group 
Ego-focused 
network 
Margins of 
organized patterns 
Certainty (myth of 
nature) 
Nature perverse/ 
tolerant 
Nature ephemeral Nature benign Nature capricious 
Rationality Procedural Critical Substantive Fatalistic 
View of resources Scarce Depleting Abundant Lottery 
Scope of knowledge Almost complete 
and organized 
Imperfect but 
holistic 
Sufficient and timely  Irrelevant 
Learning style Anticipation Trial without error Trial and 
error 
Luck 
Social context Positive group/ 
positive grid 
Positive group/ 
negative grid 
Negative group/ 
negative grid 
Negative group/ 
positive grid 
Desired systems 
properties 
Controllability 
(through inherent 
orderliness) 
Sustainability 
(through inherent 
fragility) 
Exploitability 
(through inherent 
fluidity) 
Capability 
(through inherent 
chaos) 
Ideal scale Large Small Appropriate - 
Engineering 
aesthetic 
High-tech virtuosity Frugal and 
environmentally 
benign 
Appropriate (as 
cheap and cheerful 
as possible) 
- 
Ideal of fairness Equality before the 
law 
Equality of result Equality of 
opportunity 
Not on this earth 
Cultural bias Ritualism and 
sacrifice 
Fundamentalism/ 
millenarianism 
Pragmatic 
materialism 
Inconsistent 
eclecticism 
Preferred economic 
theory 
Bureaucratization 
through increasing 
transaction costs 
(0. Williamson) 
'Buddhist' and 
'thermodynamic' 
economics (E.F. 
Schumacher and N. 
Georgescu - 
Roegen) 
Neo-Austrian: 
competition without 
equilibrium (F. 
Hayek, A. Alchian) 
Marginalization 
through structural 
imbalance (neo- 
Marxist) 
Energy future Middle of the road 
(technical fix) 
Low growth (radical 
change now) 
Business as usual What you don't 
know ... 
Perception of time Balanced distinction 
between short and 
long term 
Long term 
dominates short 
term 
Short term 
dominates long 
term 
Involuntary myopia 
Preferred form of 
governance 
Leviathan Jeffersonian Laissez-faire It doesn't matter 
who you vote for … 
Salient risks Loss of control (i.e., 
of public trust) 
Catastrophic, 
irreversible and 
inequitable 
developments 
Threats to the 
functioning of the 
market 
- 
Model of consent Hypothetical consent  Direct consent Implicit consent Non consent 
Method for applying  
model of consent 
Natural (or other 
ideal) standards 
Expressed 
preferences 
Revealed prefer-
ences 
- 
Risk-handling style Rejection and 
absorption 
Rejection and 
deflection 
Acceptance and 
deflection 
Acceptance and 
absorption 
Latent strategy Secure internal 
structure of 
authority 
Survival of the 
collectivity 
Preservation of the 
individual's freedom  
to contract 
Survival of individ-
ual 
Commitment to 
institutions 
Correct procedures 
and discriminated 
statuses are 
supported for own 
sake. Loyalty 
Collective moral 
fervour and 
affirmation of 
shared opposition to 
outside world. Voice 
Only if profitable to 
the individual. If 
not, then exit. 
- 
Source: Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 66-67 
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1.2.c. Constraints and significance of cultural theory 
Despite of the application potentials of the cultural theory in risk research related to 
different social contexts, the lack of empirical evidence through its authors or other 
researchers remains one of the frequent critiques on cultural theory. Thus, the empiri-
cal validity of the theory is challenged.  
The empirical studies in risk research using cultural approaches are mostly of quantita-
tive nature. The studies conducted by Dake (1991, 1992), Marris et al. (1998), Breton 
et al. (1996), Sjöberg (1998) and Rippl (2002) for instance have not yielded clear 
validity of the theory about the relationship between cultural biases and risk perception 
as the theory intended to predict (Plapp, 2003: 47, Wiedermann and Eitzinger, 2006: 7). 
Karl Dake and Aaron Wildavsky claim that they found a statistically significant correla-
tion between the cultural biases and risk perception, similarly the study of Palmer 
confirms these findings (Palmer, 1996: 722). However, John Adams has disputed the 
strength of these correlations. He argues that the methodology used in the research of 
Dake and Wildavsky is “founder in tautology”, since they put the respondents into the 
categories of cultural theory and use the categories to account for their beliefs (Wilkin-
son, 2001: 10). This shortcoming is also expressed by Boholm: “since the conclusions 
are already contained in the premises, these ‘predictions’ can hardly be considered as 
proper hypotheses. What is to be proved is identical with the proof” (Boholm, 1996: 71). 
Later studies applying the methodology of Dake and Wildavsky could not find such 
convincing results. This may be due to the different measures of public perception. 
Sjöberg concludes that “cultural theory explains only a minor share of the variance of 
perceived risk and it adds even less to what is explained by different approaches” 
(Wilkinson, 2001: 10). Tansey contested this argument: “few social theories could 
stand up to a testing regime that is imported directly from the natural sciences” (Tansey, 
2004: 362)  
In addition to the criticism about validity, Grendstad and Selle (2000) discovered 
through their empirical study that the myths of human nature and myths of physical 
nature as two aspects of the cultural biases or world views are not as consistent as 
cultural theory claims (Grendstad and Selle, 2000: 27-37). They pointed out that the 
position of man within the nature myths is not clearly defined in cultural theory. During 
their study a respondent raised the question: “is man a part of nature or just an annoy-
ing factor?” (Grendstad and Selle, 2000: 31). 
A further criticism is that cultural theory distorts the social reality of risk perception by 
rigidly conforming it to the categories of cultural biases (Wilkinson, 2001: 11). The 
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relationship between individuals and the grid group structure is seen as stable to fulfil 
the purpose of the functionality of a certain cultural type. For instance people from 
hierarchical educational backgrounds tend to look for a hierarchical work environment 
etc. 
Cultural theory is criticized for its simplistic typology which cannot cover the complex 
social context of contemporary societies. Also it is argued that cultural theory’s four 
ways of life are too rigid, inflexible and static whereas ways of life can be pluralistic and 
dynamic. Empirical studies of Dake show that subjects of the surveys do feel belonging 
diverse ways of life (Dake, 1992, Renn, 1992: 75).  
Besides, Cultural theory can not describe change. According to cultural theory indi-
viduals commit themselves to a much too stable structure due to their cultural biases. 
Consequently, risk perception is rigid as well (Plapp, 2003: 49). Boholm concludes that 
the social dynamics of risk perception are far more complex than the cultural model 
could provide. “Relativism” as represented by cultural theory viewing risk as a social 
construct is not sufficient to tackle risk problems (Boholm, 1996: 74-79, Boholm, 2003: 
175). 
The success of cultural theory, Sjöberg concludes, is “largely an example of the per-
suasive power of speculation” (Sjöberg, 2000: 6). 
Methodologically provoked questions include whether cultural bias is measured at 
individual level or organisational level. This may lead to difficulties in research design 
(Plapp, 2003: 47). However, Rayner seems to understand cultural theory to be an 
approach which enquires the interpersonal relations. He criticised the “methodological 
individualism” which investigates social action by mounting up individual behaviour 
(Rayner, 1992: 86). Dake argues that orienting dispositions guide the perception of risk 
both at the collective and individual levels (Dake, 1991: 61-63). Other researchers such 
as Steg and Sievers believe that cultural theory can be applied at individual level (Steg 
and Sievers, 2000). Different interpretations are possible here, since cultural theory 
does not provide a clear answer to it. Empirical studies have been carried out basically 
based on the understanding of researchers (Plapp, 2003: 50).  
Luhmann found deficiency in cultural theory in its explanatory power as why risk has 
become an important issue in societies and why hazard is now perceived as risks 
(Plapp, 2003: 51).  
Although cultural theory as partial perspective is inadequate for conceptualising the 
complexity of cultural dynamics through which people negotiate the meaning of risks, 
Wilkinson concludes nevertheless that despite of all the empirical difficulties and the 
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limitation of cultural theory, it still serves to be an indispensable mean of inquiry of 
cultural complexity. He refers to Max Weber for his reasoning: 
“All knowledge of cultural reality … is always knowledge from particular points of view. 
When we require from the historian and social research worker as an elementary 
presupposition that they distinguish the important from the trivial and that he should 
have the necessary ‘points of view’ for this distinction, we mean that they must under-
stand how to relate the events of the real world consciously or unconsciously to univer-
sal ‘cultural values’ and to select those relationships which are significant for us… To 
be sure, without the investigator’s evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of 
selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of concrete reality” (Wilkinson, 
2001: 16) (citing Weber, 1949: 81-82).  
Especially for perception research cultural theory offers a general research framework 
and a testable set of hypotheses regarding risk perceptions, belief systems, and social 
relations, since risk perception is an interpersonal experience based in moral commit-
ments to particular ways of life (Dake, 1992: 28). 
Furthermore, Renn states, “cultural analysis has demonstrated to the risk professionals 
that the concept of risk assessment as well as the rational behind it cannot claim 
universal validity and legitimizing power among all groups and cultures. There are 
different worldviews that determine how different groups cope with the universal ex-
perience of potential outcomes of actions and events” (Renn, 1998: 62). 
Thus, this research uses the cultural approach as an analytical model to explore risk 
perception in different cultural settings and its relations to the cultural biases.     
2. CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION STUDIES 
Over the last decades, there has been an increasing recognition of the significance of 
cross-cultural studies of risk perception, since little was known about the way in which 
the public in other countries understood risks. The most empirical studies in this area 
have been conducted in the United States followed by Europe. Only a few studies are 
available from Australasian countries (Boholm, 1998: 137, Rohrmann and Chen, 1999: 
220, Rohrmann, 1999). These cross-cultural risk perception studies aim to examine the 
way specific societal categories and groups perceive risks. These groups could be e.g. 
women as opposed to men; people of different educational or professional background 
etc. At theoretical level two theories have been deployed: the psychometric paradigm 
and cultural theory. These researches aim to test the generality of results by deploying 
psychometric paradigm regarding the qualitative dimensions of risk perception and to 
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investigate how risk is culturally constructed deploying cultural theory (Boholm, 1998: 
137).  
Most of the cross-cultural comparative studies deploy the psychometric paradigm 
(Boholm, 1998: 153). Only a few attempts have been made to test cultural theory. 
Boholm suggests the reason for it may be the challenges to translate cultural theory 
into a design for measuring data due to the ambiguity of the theory and its diverse 
interpretation potentials (Boholm, 1998). 
Among these studies Rohrmann (1994) applied cultural theory and investigated the 
commonalities and differences of risk perception between Germany, New Zealand, and 
Australia. He examined the difference of perception between “sub-groups” as defined 
to be “technical”, “ecological”, “monetarian” and “feminist” groups within one country as 
well as between the three countries. The finding most relevant to cultural theory is that 
the differences between the sub-groups are stronger in Germany than in Australia 
whereas the findings in Australia and New Zealand are similar. Yet, the study could not 
relate the four sub-groups to the grid-group structure (Boholm, 1998: 152-153).  
Another comparative study was conducted by Rohrmann and Chen in 1999 comparing 
the risk perception between Chinese and Australians “utilizing psychometric instru-
ments” combined with a cultural analysis. The study showed that cross cultural dispari-
ties are evident in variation in risk perception in China and Australia. The research 
results revealed strong influence of cultural context on risk evaluations, though the 
empirical basis gained so far (sampling focused on student and researcher groups) is 
not sufficient for generalization and a wide range of cultures needs to be examined to 
clarify the influence of cultural factors (Rohrmann and Chen, 1999: 219). Similar 
studies include the investigation by A.D. Eisler and H. Eisler juxtaposing risk percep-
tions of German, Japanese, Swedish and American students on global risks (Eisler and 
Eisler, 2006: 109-115) and the study by Kleinhesselink and E. A. Rosa comparing 
Japanese and American students’ risk perception (Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991). It is 
worth mentioning that all these researches listed here are of quantitative nature. 
In the endeavour of comparing risk perception within “Eastern” and “Western” cultures 
little is known about countries such as China. Keown’s study in 1989 was one of the 
first attempts to compare the risk perception between Hongkongese and Americans. 
He based his study on psychometric paradigm and adopted the list of hazards devel-
oped by Slovic. The questionnaire used in this study was a replication of Slovic’s 
previous study in 1979. Convenient sampling of university students to rate different 
risks is deployed. His findings showed that the difference of the risk perception of the 
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Hongkong and American students is not radical, though some differences may be 
explained by cultural influences (Keown, 1989: 401-405). 
A recent study on risk perception comparison between Chinese and Americans was 
conducted by Duan. She examined how people’s perception of environmental risk, 
preference in risk management, and perspectives of participatory decision processes 
vary in different social, cultural and political systems using samples of university stu-
dents (Duan, 2005: ii). She applied a structural equation model (SEM) to explore the 
correlations of social factors such as social trust, social value and risk experience and 
the relationships of social factors to risk perception and preference in risk management. 
Among her findings, the Chinese were more concerned about environmental risks. The 
Chinese believe that the environmental issues are more risky to health, to the environ-
ment and to economic development than the Americans. Chinese participants are less 
likely to support the policies which require them to participate financially and prefer that 
the government takes actions to reduce risks. They are also more likely to support 
educational strategies to help people change behaviour to reduce environmental risks 
(Duan, 2005: ii-iv). 
Apart from these comparative studies between China and a Western country, there are 
a few other studies on risk perception in China. For instance the studies of Zhang 
(1993) and Lai et al. (2003) examine the perception of environmental hazards in 
mainland China and Hongkong. Both of the studies applied the research method of 
Fischhoff et al. using psychometric paradigm combined with a cultural analysis in-
formed by cultural theory. Their findings have only limited relevance to cultural theory 
(Lai and Tao, 2003: 669-671, Zhang, 1992: 509). Further quantitative research con-
ducted by Xie, Wang and Xu combined different models including cultural theory to 
analyse risk perception of the people in mainland China, though cultural analysis in 
terms of cultural theory seemed not to be the focus of their analysis (Xie et al., 2003: 
685-694). 
The survey conducted by Wong and Zhao (2001) focused on flood victims’ perception 
after a flood event in 1994 in Beijiang, China. This study provides one of the first 
insights into the perception of the people who have suffered a natural hazard (Wong 
and Zhao, 2001: 190-201). However, this study has not deployed any theoretical 
framework. On the whole, still little is known about risk perception in China. 
Although cultural approaches provide an enriched theoretical background for empirical 
risk perception studies (Cvetkovich, 1991, Rayner, 1992, Sjoeberg, 1997) and the 
cultural theory of Douglas and her colleagues has been applied to a broad spectrum of 
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cross-cultural topics (Dake, 1991: 78), only limited forms of cross-national research 
using cultural theory have been launched, thus, the full potential of the theory for cross-
cultural research has not been tested (Caulkins, 1999: 109). Especially in the domain 
of cross-cultural risk perception research it seems that only few studies have explored 
the potential of cultural theory with qualitative methods. China is one of the countries 
which have only received very little attention in risk research using cultural theory. Thus, 
the following discussion will offer a new dimension of qualitative risk analysis deploying 
the Cutural Theory as an analytical framework.   
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G DISCUSSION 
1. LINK BETWEEN THEORY AND EMPIRICISM 
1.1. Ways of life: Social relations and cultural biases 
According to the collected data, the hierarchical way of life, as described in cultural 
theory by Douglas and Thompson et al., dominates flood risk management in Wuhan, 
China. In contrast, a mixture of egalitarian, individualist as well as hierarchical ways of 
life are characteristics of flood management institutions in Cologne, Germany. Even the 
interviewees of environmental agencies and NGOs in China did not show egalitarian 
characteristics as shown in previous studies (Rippl, 2002). Rippl and her colleagues 
discovered through their survey that in general egalitarians show a much higher eco-
logical risk perception than any other cultural types, whereas hierarchical cultural types 
show the lowest perception on ecological risk. At the same time, people with hierarchi-
cal orientation show the strongest perception for risk of disturbance of social order 
(Rippl, 2002: 161).   
Compared to the Chinese interviewees, the German actors showed a diverse mixture 
of cultural typological tendencies. Egalitarian, hierarchical as well as individualist ways 
of life share their presence among the interviewees. These traits of different ways of life 
within the Chinese and Germany actors in flood risk management can be observed in 
the domains of social relations and cultural biases.  
Social relations can be captured by grid and group typology which encompasses two 
dimensions of sociality. The Chinese flood risk management shows high grid and high 
group features. The group boundaries and binding prescriptions of the flood risk man-
agement are clearly defined. The strong group dimension is best revealed through the 
researcher’s difficulty to access the field research as a non-group member (see chapter 
D. 2.2). Central to the entire procedure of accessing the field is to be admitted to the 
group. The admission to the group required personal or official introduction of a Chi-
nese governmental agency, since only a group member or an agency which is located 
within the social control mechanism can be guarantor for someone who is to be admit-
ted to the group. Only then social control through group members can be ensured. This 
also explains why the provincial water management refused to accept the introductory 
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letter from the United Nations University (UNU) as an international organisation. As an 
independent research institution, UNU evades the social control of the Chinese gov-
ernmental units, thus a researcher of UNU can only be admitted to the group through a 
group member either as a person or as an “internal” unit. Even the physical admittance 
of the researcher to the office buildings of the interviewees was to undergo a strict 
examination of the guards at the entrance. Also the request to interview the affected 
people in Dujiatai after the use of Dujiatai Retention Area in 2005 was refused. The 
official reason was that no one in the flood protection agency of Wuhan could spare the 
time to accompany the researcher to the affected area. Mr. D. who assisted to coordi-
nate the field work of the researcher told the researcher that the actual reason was that 
the flood protection agency was “worried about the people there speaking too freely”. 
The urge for social control through group boundary (not allowing the researcher to 
access information which is only made available for group members) surfaces clearly. 
In contrast, the group dimension proved to be low in Cologne, Germany. The access to 
the group was simple as shown through the access to the field and the integration into 
the Flood Protection Centre (HSZ) during the participatory observation (see Chapter 
D.2). No clear group boundaries can be identified. This seems to fit into the description 
for individualist group traits, since both egalitarian and hierarchical social relations 
dictate high group identities.  
The grid dimension is reflected in many different aspects. Serving as a framework for 
the social coercion the institutional arrangement of the flood risk management is 
stringently structured in a hierarchical style in China but highly decentralised in Ger-
many. Therefore high grid among Chinese interviewees and low grid among German 
interviewees can be identified. In Wuhan each agency level is assigned different tasks 
and power. The roles of the actors are prescribed according to their ranking in the 
hierarchy. Power is concentrated at the highest level of the hierarchy. Local actors 
hardly have any room to make decisions. They function solely as technical advisors 
and implementers. The agencies at the same level often do not communicate with each 
other, since the definitions of their roles and powers do not allow them to interfere with 
other agencies’ business. Inter-agency conflicts are “mediated” by “leaders” who are 
assigned power over the lower levels. Between the agencies at different levels such as 
central and local communication flows in a top-down manner: the local agencies are to 
implement the orders of the higher authority and obey; at the same time, higher au-
thorities expect the local agencies to report to them on local “facts”. Communication 
between the higher and the lower agencies is understood as task assignment and 
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issuing orders. Interference with the affairs of higher levels in form of critique or dis-
course is not welcomed and even carries the risks to be punished. These social rules 
are translated into behavioural codes such as “unquestioning obedience”, “self-sacrifice 
for bigger interests” and “altruism”. In turn these values are praised and held high. At 
the same time protection of individual and local interests is seen to be “bargaining” with 
the state which represents the most superior interests of all and is therefore untouch-
able. Interests of individuals and communities have to be orientated towards the whole, 
the state’s interests. Like one of the interviewees stated: “If there would not be the big 
family (the state), the small family (communities and individuals) will never exist” 
(Interview 1, 30 August, 2005). If one is not willing to sacrifice oneself, one becomes a 
social outcast and is punished. The case of Jianli County (see chapter E 1.3.) provides 
a vivid example of how a high group social experience is strengthened. Altogether 
60,000 people had to abandon their homes in order to protect the “bigger interests of 
more important areas” such as the city of Wuhan. As the Governor of the County and 
local people tried to resist the dike breaching operation ordered by higher flood protec-
tion agency, the response was enforcement through violent police force and punish-
ment of the responsible persons as well as moral sanctions which are the common 
instruments to resolve internal conflicts as described by Thompson et al (see chapter 
F.2.2.b). Even the journalist who was reporting this event tried to persuade the local 
people to give up their resistance by reminding the people of the moral obligation (grid) 
and the values (cultural bias) praised by Chinese society: “For the interests of all, you 
shall sacrifice your own small homes. We are going to report your great sacrifice to 
all the Chinese people. The people will remember your sacrifice” (Chapter E.1.3.a.).  
It is clear how cultural bias and social relations support each other in this case. Rayner 
states: “The objective of considering grid and group simultaneously is not merely to 
describe patterns of solidarity rules and social classifications governing the allocation of 
roles. The fundamental purpose of grid/group analysis is to provide a framework within 
which a cultural analyst may consistently relate differences in organisational structures 
to the strength of arguments that sustain them” (Rayner, 1992). Hierarchical culture 
dictates people’s behavioural codes on the one hand; on the other hand, values as part 
of the cultural bias support the enforcement of these codes. By the same token, without 
social coerciveness values can not be sustained as only few group members would 
follow the given societal rules.  
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The informal arrangement of the Governor of Hubei province as leader of the Yangtze 
River flood protection is another example of how cultural bias and social relations 
reinforce each other (see chapter E.1.1.a.).  
However, one can raise the question: why do the urban elite deserve more protection 
than the rural poor? Why should people living in retention areas be sacrificed for the 
urban population but not vice versa? The concept of equality would be a non-starter to 
provide convincing explanation. Equality is not part of the programme of the hierarchy 
(see chapter F.2.2.b). Social injustice and inequality are justified on the grounds that 
sacrifice of some is necessary to ensure the survival of the whole. There is no wonder 
that the word Daju (see chapter E.1.3.a), holistic thinking, belongs to the favourite 
vocabulary of the Chinese flood risk management. Equality and fairness as the most 
frequently used indicators to measure cultural bias in quantitative studies (Grendstad 
and Selle, 2000: 32) also are distinguished mark in this qualitative study. The data 
shows that equality and fairness are not important criteria in China. Instead the survival 
of the whole is emphasised. At the same time values such as sacrifice, altruism and 
morality are held high, thus, a highly collectivist group ideology of mutual aid and 
responsibility is well revealed as asserted by Schwarz and Thompson (Schwarz and 
Thompson, 1990).  
In Cologne individuals, local communities and local flood management agencies as 
well as NGOs are all heavily involved in the decision-making process. This reveals 
dominant egalitarian social relation traits. No agent is given more right to exercise 
power over the others and no strict prescription is imposed on particular agents. Nego-
tiation between different agents takes place permanently which results in an extensive 
flood risk communication network both in horizontal and vertical dimensions. Equality 
as the most important value cherished by egalitarians and individualists is guaranteed 
by large-scale intensive public participation (see Chapter E1.3.b). 
In contrast to the distinctive features of hierarchical social relations and cultural biases 
in China, it is difficult to identify if the low grid traits both shared by egalitarian and 
individualist cultural types and reflected in the behaviour of the actors come from the 
egalitarian or individualist tendency. Furthermore, hierarchical thinking can also be 
observed especially among actors like fire brigade and the army, however, egalitarian 
thinking is not lacking among these actors either. The critique on cultural theories to be 
too rigid and simplistic seems to be affirmed by this finding (see Chapter E.2.2.c). As in 
China the fatalist type is not present among the German actors. The characteristics of 
the existing three cultural types can not be assigned to groups with clear boundaries. 
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As previous studies have shown, one can not rule out that a single agent has traits of 
different cultural types at the same time (Renn, 1992, Dake, 1992). 
Blame is another important indicator for different social relations which lead to different 
problem solving strategies (Douglas, 1992). Douglas recommended seeing culture as 
essentially a dialogue that allocate praise and blame (Douglas, 1997). Tansey stated 
that cultural theory asks indirect questions such as “At whom is the finger of blame 
being pointed? Who is being held accountable? What is being rejected and what is 
being defended in a particular collective social action?” to identify how a society is 
organised (Tansey, 2004: 29). 
In pre-modern Chinese society people believed that disasters occurred, because the 
emperor misbehaved. Natural disasters are signs of punishment by gods. As the 
mediator between the gods and human beings, the blame and responsibility as well as 
the mandate of mitigation rested with the emperor (Weggel, 1997). Who is to be 
blamed in modern secular society or mixed society in which the explanation of god is 
not anymore satisfying to most people (although in rural China the blame may still rest 
with god)? Nature itself can serve to be a good objective to be blamed, because nature 
can not defend itself and be called for answers. The responsibility is then shifted 
conveniently to nature. Flood is seen as a monster and an enemy. As Douglas con-
tends that an external enemy is the major blame of hierarchy (Dougals, 1992: 6). The 
mitigation strategy is to fight with it like a Chinese idiom precisely describes: “If the 
enemy comes, we can fight them with our soldiers; if flood comes, we stop it with dikes”.  
This fighting spirit and the Western rationalistic ideology brought to China during the 
New Cultural Movement at the beginning of the 20th Century (Hu et al., 2005), reinforce 
each other. Thus, scientism has assumed an unshakable position in flood mitigation 
strategies. Baum observed that one of the characteristics of modern Chinese culture is 
the propensity to idealise science, to reify and universalize its precepts, thereby elevat-
ing it from a method of inquiry to the status of canonical dogma (Baum, 1982: 1172). 
Scientific evidence is instrumentalised to justify the Chinese flood mitigation strategies 
(see Chapter E.1.3.a). Scientism, on the one hand, filled in the vacuum of Confucian-
ism after its collapse in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; on the other hand, doc-
trinal orthodoxy enhances the political legitimacy of ruling elites (Baum, 1982). 
Fact and value dichotomy is convenient for those exponents of science that informs 
policy seeking clear and simple solutions to complex problems (Rayner, 1992). In 
hierarchical culture a thing is either known to be true or false. A fact is a fact: “Hierar-
chy, both as a system of governance and a type of culture, assumes that the world is 
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up to a point knowable, and that itself, the hierarchy is organized according to the 
principles which run the universe. Consequently, the consensus that upholds the 
political system upholds the authority of facts” (Douglas, 1992: 32). Confucianism and 
Chinese communism clearly share a formalistic propensity to categorize. This propen-
sity is a natural outgrowth of a cultural style that emphasizes psychological tension-
reduction through the denial of ambivalence and doubt (Baum, 1982: 1181). The 
strength and durability of Chinese Confucianist cultural traits is a result of their high 
degree of stylistic consonance with the ideology and political ethos of Chinese commu-
nism (Baum, 1982: 1167). This is how they survived the passing of China’s traditional 
social and political order (Baum, 1982: 1180).  
The other major blame factors are population, lack of financial capacity and lack in 
“quality” of local officials and people. Population as the result of historical development 
in the past cannot be blamed. It is convenient to say that no sustainable strategies can 
be applied due to a huge population. The focus on problems caused by population 
distracts people from other issues at hand. Politicians can continue their business as 
usual without being questioned for their credibility. The lack of “quality” of people and 
local officials (see Chapter E.1.3.a) is more likely to be the reason for the failure of the 
implementation of the new water policy. However, it is another convenient justification 
for the failure of the policy implementation. All these constructed blames are strategies 
to draw off the attention from the other existing weaknesses within the hierarchical 
flood risk management system. 
In Germany among the interviewees in Cologne the “förderalistische” system and the 
representatives of the economy such as local politicians and big corporations are 
blamed frequently. This appears to fit within the egalitarian type of blaming. As an 
opponent of the government and big business, the egalitarian’s task is to criticise these 
power structures (see Chapter F.2.2.b). However, surprisingly, not only environmental 
agencies and environmental NGOs show this egalitarian tendency, but also govern-
mental agencies share this critique, likely to be result of individualism common in a low 
grid society like Germany. Low group allows the expression of individualistic values of 
originality and self-reliance.  
Information is a further important instrument of the entire control mechanism (see 
Chapter F.2.2). As the empirical data including field experience revealed information in 
flood risk management in China is treated with great restriction. Even the flood protec-
tion and emergency management plan belong to the category of confidential docu-
ments. Non-group members such as the researcher have little access to information. 
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This field finding was confirmed by other researchers from Chinese universities (per-
sonal communication with Professor Fang of the Beijing Normal University). Within the 
group information is regulated according to the rankings within the hierarchy. The 
higher the ranking is, the more access to information one has. Flood development 
information has not even been made available for some of the technical departments. 
The general public is entirely excluded from evacuation planning until action has to be 
taken (see chapter E.2.2). The casualty number during natural disasters has been kept 
as a state secret until 200518 (WWW.XINHUANET.COM, 2005). All these indicators 
show a strong information selection and reservation behaviour which is a typical trait of 
a hierarchical system. It serves the purpose to collectivise responsibilities in decision-
making so that no individuals can be pinned down to answer for failures (see Chapter 
F.2.2.b). Social institutions construct their organisational cultures in the process of 
operation, that is, of decision making. The different social and cultural environments in 
which policy actors operate will lead them to respond differently to decision-making 
situations (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 68-69, Coyle, 1997: 60).  
Similarly, the discourse of individuals is constrained by the constitutive premises of the 
social environment they live in. While there is little distinction between individuals and 
their roles at low grid, the roles and statues of individuals at high grid are clearly de-
fined. People’s behaviour is strongly prescribed as how to behave at different occa-
sions. In China, interviewees always make sure that they are not criticising but praising 
their own system in front of the external interviewers.  
Apart from the hierarchical way of life no other ways of life can be clearly identified 
among China’s flood management actors. NGOs which usually represent the egalitar-
ian way of life are not a common phenomenon in China. The only two NGOs involved 
in flood issues in Wuhan are either working closely with the government as in the case 
of the WWF, or they are fully under the government control. The head of the inter-
viewed “non-governmental” NGO in Wuhan is a governmental official in the environ-
mental agency of the Municipal Government of Wuhan. According to him, the NGO 
was set up as “the government saw the necessity”. Thus, the egalitarian way of life 
does not show any identifiable presence according to the field data. Neither does the 
fatalist way of life. The reason for this probably roots in the fact that most of the inter-
viewees are governmental officials and only people of hierarchical way of life seek and 
are welcome to work in a governmental organisation. However, the strong emphasis on 
                                               
18 To improve the disaster management in China, the Chinese central government abolished the regulation 
about the casualty and made it accessible to the public in 2005. 
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economic growth indicates an increasing market-orientated individual way of life which 
seems to coexist cross-fertilising with the hierarchical communist system, with regard 
to environmental risk as observed by Douglas (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 100) 
(see Chapter F.2.2.b.). 
The mono-cultural dominance of hierarchy within the flood risk management and other 
agencies involved may change over time as the individual way of life might gain 
strength with the economic development in China. This development requires further 
investigation and therefore is beyond the research objectives of this study. Moreover, 
despite of the government control of the NGOs, egalitarian concern about environ-
mental risks can be observed in public discourse. In an article on the interdependency 
of the ecological systems Yu criticises the purely engineered flood mitigation philoso-
phy for its negative impact on environment and strongly advocates a more holistic 
approach taking into account the interdependency of the entire ecological systems in 
flood risk management. He especially points out the detrimental influence of dike 
construction and hydropower stations on river systems (Yu, 2005). His critique pro-
voked a debate among water managers. A proponent of opposing views, such as 
Zhang, a water engineer, argues: “…Dike construction cannot be seen to have any 
negative impact on the ecological system, on the contrary, it protects the independent 
river systems, furthermore, it is an indispensable component of our civilisation” (Zhang, 
2005: 6). He contends that the engineered measures to control river systems do not do 
any harm to rivers, rather, the existence of engineered constructions are “powerful 
weapon to realise the harmony between man and nature” (Zhang, 2005: 7). The 
controversial discourse taking place on public forums of the website of the Chinese 
Ministry for Water Resources (http://www.mwr.gov.cn/) reveals that on the one hand, 
the hierarchical way of water engineering is still very strongly presented among water 
mangers; on the other hand, egalitarian concern is paving its way to make itself heard.  
1.2. Conception of human and nature  
According to cultural theory hierarchical culture believes that man is born sinful to 
justify the imperative to rely on regulating institutions. This conception of human nature 
as part of the cultural bias seems to have some contradiction to one of the traditional 
views of the Chinese on this matter. Mencius, a Confucianism thinker stated that man 
is born good and they can become better through “education”, “cultivation” and “self-
discipline” (Weggel, 1997: 52). However, the Chinese Fajia, a philosophical school, 
advocating the regulations through the law, believes that humans are inherently bad. 
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Legal regulations should be issued to control people (Franke and Trauzettel, 1999). 
The field research in China seems to affirm the observation of the cultural theory and 
the thought of Fajia. The strict social control mechanism is a strong indicator for the 
underlying belief of bad human nature. This is shown in particular through blaming the 
lack of high quality of local official and people as the impediment in implementing flood 
protection policy. This seems to be another indicator for the belief that humans have 
shortcomings which have to be regulated by institutions (see Chapter E.1.3.a.). How-
ever, the field research in China could not yield any direct evidence as how human 
nature is construed.  
In Germany the tendency to believe that human beings are self-seeking and therefore 
do wrong things due to their “stupidity” and “greediness” (see Chapter E.1.5.b.) is 
reflected in the statements of the interviewees. Even the interviewee with egalitarian 
traits did not reveal the belief that man is born good. An overall complaint of the inter-
viewees is that people both referring to the general public and politicians tend to forget 
bad experience and are not in the position to learn lessons from the past, therefore 
they tend to repeat their mistakes and failures.  
In regard to the conception of nature the Chinese actors appear to believe that nature 
is tolerant, since they do not fear the consequences of the intervention in nature 
through engineered measures. At the same time they believe in human capability to 
control nature through science and they are confident to trust in expert judgement with 
“scientific methods” (see Chapter E). These features seem to be in line with the analy-
sis of cultural theory on the conception of nature of a hierarchical type of culture. 
Besides, hierarchists believe that exuberant behaviour should not go too far so that the 
balance between man and nature is not disturbed. However, no obvious concern about 
offensive intervention into natural environment can be identified in China and seems to 
be acceptable to all the Chinese actors. This trait seems to reveal a coincidence with 
the individual and market orientated cultural type, which does not come as a surprise 
due to the recent economic development in China and the strong emphasis on pro-
gress through economic growth (E.1.3.a). 
Compared to Chinese actors the German interviewees again reveal more diverse 
conceptions of nature. Whereas all interviewees, particularly environmental agencies 
and NGOs expressed the egalitarian tendency to believe that nature is ephemeral, the 
demand of some politicians and corporations for more construction sites and less 
regulations on building restrictions betrays their belief in individualist notion of nature 
being benign. A hierarchical attitude towards nature cannot be identified, however, it 
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can not be completely ruled out, for it might be hidden behind the individualistic behav-
iour. One may believe that nature can be tolerant to a certain extend, therefore it 
demands more flexibility of construction in flood plains, but this might be due to his 
belief that the limits of nature’s tolerance have not yet been reached.  
1.3. Risk selection and risk discourse 
1.3.a. Risk selection 
Flood risk as a single risk does not seem to fit into the cultural analysis of risk selection 
at the first sight. But yet, if flood risk is observed in a broader risk context, the risk 
selection becomes evident and inevitable. According to the empirical data, the major 
risks to be selected are flood events as risk, environmental risk, which is closed linked 
to flood mitigation strategies, and risk of constraints for economic development.  
In Wuhan the focus and priority are clearly given to economic development. To ensure 
unconstraint economic development engineered flood protection is chosen and prac-
ticed as the major mitigation strategy. At the same time the mitigation of environmental 
risks is compromised and largely ignored. There are several reasons for this: environ-
mental risks are long term risks with future consequences. Hierarchical organisation 
maintains its functionality by avoiding knowing too much about the future (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1983: 93). Resources have to be allocated for dealing with the most urgent 
problems. “Limiting data, not expanding them, is their guide. Most possible alternatives 
and consequences are ignored” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983: 93). Economic devel-
opment plays such an important role in China that the credibility of the communist party 
is largely relying on it (Yang, 2005), therefore, compromising economic growth is not 
considered to be an option. Under such circumstance, the entire attention is drawn to 
flood events as natural hazards which can have high negative impact, because the 
perceivers of risks are not individuals but institutions and organisations that are driven 
by organisational imperatives to select risks for management attention or to suppress 
them from view (Rayner, 1992). Flood seen as a natural event serves as an external 
enemy and a convenient target which draws attention from the human system. By 
doing so, a complex issue which requires considerations both in social as well as 
political spheres is reduced to a war between mankind and nature (see Chapter E1.6). 
Flood risk management, thus, becomes a technical problem and is depoliticised.  
Moreover, flood risk can also be utilised as a device to strengthen social solidarity as 
Rayner posits: “Of all the things people can worry about, they will be inclined to select 
for particular attention those risks that help to reinforce the social solidarity of their 
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institutions” (Rayner, 1992: 91). Flood risk indeed has become a chance for these 
institutions. Cultural biases such as self-sacrifice and obedience are strengthened 
through allocating praise and blame. A natural catastrophe is conferred the meaning to 
be caused by nature when it is utilised to justify reductionist mitigation strategies. The 
reversion from risk to danger serves the very purpose. Pohl contends that one can 
distance oneself from danger much easier than from risk, because risk is always 
related to decisions. He also observes a great coalition of the natural scien-
tists/technicians and politicians. They can prove their capacities by taking nature as 
their object to be altered and manipulated. The politicians can delegate their responsi-
bilities to nature in case of great losses. Especially in the developing countries where 
decision-making is less transparent, it is an important strategy to define risk as fact and 
fate (Pohl, 1998). His observation coincides with the findings of this research which 
also affirms Schwarz and Thompson’s assertion that one of the shrewdest political 
moves is to get the problem at hand labelled “technical” to avoid contending versions of 
the problem. Pohl argues this is also the very reason why hazard research from social 
science perspective is often affronted from two sides: the natural scientists want to 
exclude society as much as possible and the politicians who only take on the responsi-
bilities which would contribute to their own benefits (Pohl, 1998).  
At the same time it is the leading institution which is praised to lead people “from 
victory to victory”19. The emphasis on emergency management requires and therefore 
justifies a hierarchical chain of command which enables the human and material 
resources mobilisation. Flood fighting calls for social solidarity. The success and good 
memory of these institutions are stressed and kept alive through ceremonies and 
rituals, at the same time values and societal rules are produced and consolidated 
(Böhme, 2006, Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983) (see Chapter F.2.2.b and Picture 2). 
                                               
19 Popular slogan of the Chinese Communism Party 
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Picture 2: The People’s Hall: Venue of the ceremony to praise the Chinese military for 
their achievement in flood fighting during the Great Flood 1998 
 
Source: Xinhua News Agency, 1998 
 
In Cologne, Germany, all the three major risks mentioned above are picked up by 
different agents. As all three cultural types seem to co-exist, each agent representing 
his own way of life tries to draw the attention to his own risk priority. Environmental 
agencies and NGOs highlight environmental risks and advocate a more passive flood 
risk management which takes into account environmental interests, whereas big firms 
and local politicians are more in favour of an engineered flood risk management which 
ensure maximum land use. Equality and democracy are the values praised amongst 
the interviewees. Blames go to the “system” and the politicians. The managing agen-
cies tend to keep bad experiences and lessons learned of the past alive. Among the 
management institutions exists a strong focus on possible disaster which is clearly an 
egalitarian trait. 
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1.3.b. Risk discourse 
“Problem solving is a social activity. It is not the problem itself but the relationship 
between the problem and those who are engaged in solving it that we must try to 
understand” (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 138-139). Sometimes those involved 
have the same understanding what the problem is, sometimes not. Sometimes one 
definition suffices, because all agree on it, or those who subscribe to that definition 
managed to get rid of the rest and become the dominant one. Before one formalises 
risk assessment in technical terms, different perceptions und understandings have to 
be taken into account to shun the depoliticisation of the risk (Schwarz and Thompson, 
1990). Douglas summarised three types of dialogues about risk in “any industrial 
society” (Douglas, 1997: 129): 
Hierarchy is based on government and administration. Its reasoning style is reduction-
ist and it is concerned with measurability, since it requires objective bases which justify 
the decisions it makes. Hierarchy prefers a risk research vocabulary that can be formal-
ized without being politicised. Information is strictly controlled which may lead to at-
tenuation of risks. Whereas these traits can be clearly observed in Wuhan, the German 
interviewees did not reveal any strong propensity to formalizing flood risk.  
Although characteristics of the individualistic way of life can be identified in Germany, 
the perception that keeping risk issues within the technical domain to minimise risks, as 
Douglas posits, is not prevalent among the risk managers in Cologne.  
Douglas asserts that the radical critics (called egalitarian by Thompson and Wildavsky) 
use the context of risk as a convenient arena for their dialogue. They contend that risks 
have been concealed and the public misled. Egalitarians are accused of amplifying 
risks. None of these described traits can be identified among the Chinese interviewees. 
In contrast, the German interviewees showed a strong inclination of criticising their 
system as such and stressing risks. Again, this was not only observed among environ-
mental agencies and NGOs but also among governmental agencies. However, some of 
the interviewees felt accused of amplifying flood and environmental risks (see Chapter 
E). 
A three-sided policy struggle is expected with fatalists assuming a neutral position; 
however, one of the discourses dominates the rest (Douglas, 1997: 129-130). This 
proves to be true in both China and Germany, although the egalitarian way of life can 
only be observed in public discourse instead of among the interviewed agents in China. 
The dominant way of life is squarely the hierarchical cultural type alongside the individ-
ual tendency. In Germany, egalitarian way of life has a strong position among the 
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agents, yet, characteristics of individualist way of life are claimed to be dominant 
among politicians and enterprises by the interviewees.  
It is worth to note that high risk is accepted by hierarchists when decisions are made by 
experts who are expected to do the right thing. This is especially true in the case of 
China during the Great Flood 1998 as Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Prime Minister as-
sisted by technical experts had to decide if the Jingjiang retention area shall be used or 
not. Consequently, the style of consensus is highly hypothetical. It is assumed that the 
decisions made by experts are acceptable for all.  
In contrast, decision-makers are being held responsible in a country like Germany. 
Pohl contends: “… In our society the ‘anger of God’ is no longer an acceptable expla-
nation [for catastrophe], however such an explanation is needed to be the punching 
bag, therefore it is just too convenient to grab the decisions and decision-makers. By 
doing so the political dimension is reached” (Pohl, 1998: 160). Thus, natural events 
become natural hazard as soon as people are involved. They become risk, if we have 
the freedom to make decisions (Pohl, 1998: 163). As a consequence, public participa-
tion as an important instrument to take into account the risk discourse of all stake-
holders is widely practiced in Cologne, Germany.  
Compared to Germany, participation in flood management is not yet practiced in China 
as the field research revealed. The social question here is “not whether and how to let 
the so-called ‘outsiders’ in, but of whether it is sane and feasible to keep the ‘insiders’ 
(the risk bearers) out” to achieve efficiency (Bradbury, 1989: 390). Thus, the depolitici-
sation of flood risk in China becomes the logical consequence of the decision-makers 
excluding the general public and local communities from the decision making process. 
1.4. Synopsis 
Cultural theories have been developed in the light of technological utilisation and 
nuclear accidents. The prediction and observation have been made to analyse the 
political nature of the problems caused by technological risks in industrial societies. 
This study deployed cultural theories not only to a post industrial country like Germany 
but also a transitional country such as China in the area of risk of natural disasters 
such as flood. The empirical findings seem to largely fit into the cultural model of risk 
analysis. The risk predictions of different cultural types were affirmed. This has the 
implication for future research that the cultural model can also be applied to natural 
disaster research despite of its original departure for technological assessment and risk 
issues.  
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However, it has been a big challenge to clearly differentiate between the traits shared 
by two cultural types as which traits belong to which cultural types. This seems to affirm 
the critiques the grid-group typology has received for being too simplistic. It could not 
completely capture the complexity of the ways of life in reality.  
A more critical point revealed by the findings is that some institutions have egalitarian 
cultural biases but individualist group definition as in the case of the Flood Protection 
Centre in Cologne. This means that cultural biases are not matching the social rela-
tions they supposedly sustain. Consequently, the assertion of the cultural theories that 
cultural biases and social relations have to match each other is not consistent in these 
cases.  
Overall, cultural analysis with Douglas’ grid-group typology provided a useful pair of 
lenses to structure the empirical findings of this study, although the data cannot be 
categorised stringently. Nevertheless, one can clearly identify the dominant way of life 
among the other ways of life existing parallel to each other. 
2. GENERALISATION AND TRANSFERABILITY 
Can the research results be generalised and transferred to other regions within Ger-
many and China, and even to other countries? As discussed above, the applicability of 
the cultural theories in China is affirmed by this study. Also previous studies (see 
Chapter F) deploying cultural theories suggest that cultural theories can be applied 
both in industrial and developing/transitional countries. In the following single aspects 
will be discussed in the context of empirical findings.  
In terms of institutional arrangements, China has a nation-wide unified organisational 
form which lays the foundation for the generalisation of the findings, although the 
geographical, demographical as well as economic and social determinants are far from 
uniform in China due to great regional disparities (Wang et al., 2002a). In Germany, the 
regional disparity may not be as big as in China, however, the decentralised organisa-
tion and the subsidiary principles of the flood risk management leads to the fact that 
each federal state issues its own laws and regulations for flood management. Devi-
ances in management policies and implementation between the federal states are 
inevitable. This appears to be a constraint for the generalisation. But yet, the aspects 
investigated in this study including spatial planning, decision-making process, conflict 
of interests and reconciliation (Chapter E.1.2.b, E.1.3.b) follow federal spatial plan and 
the fundamental principles of a democratic political system which applies across the 
entire country. These frameworks make the generalisation of the findings possible, 
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whereupon the findings about the mutual perception of different stakeholders (Chapter 
E.1.4.b) may differ from region to region due to each region’s specific institutional and 
social context. In China the institutional arrangement of flood management and the 
orientation of the local and regional units as parts toward the state as a whole oversee 
all organisational principles at lower levels. Thus, transferability of the findings seems 
to be unproblematic. Even the perception of different stakeholders is heavily influenced 
by the overseeing principles.  
The human-nature relationship may more distinctively be embedded in space; there-
fore it is questionable about its transferability to other regions both in China and in 
Germany. 
In regard to risk communication style, information policy and question of authority, the 
findings in China can be generalised due to its stringent hierarchical structure. In 
Germany, however, it can be differing from region to region, since these aspects do not 
comply with the general principles and overruling regulations which are valid for all the 
German federal states due to communal autonomy. 
3. LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH 
Limitations of the application of the cultural theories have been discussed in Chapter 
F.1. Another constraint of utilising theory for an empirical study is that whatever theo-
ries are applied, they can only capture part of the truth, as Rayner states: “risk analysts 
of different scientific disciplines grasp a different part of the beast and characterise the 
whole by the parts” (Rayner, 1992: 94). The broad scope of sociological perspectives 
and the inclusion of social experience of risk close the gap that is overlooked by the 
other perspectives on risk. However, each analysis is limited by the paradigm which is 
chosen to be the analytical framework. Moreover, the complex reality offers almost any 
perspective. This leaves social actors enough space to choose the perspectives which 
best serve their interests and ignore the other perspectives which are conflicting with 
their interests (Renn, 1992: 72). The question remains, is a theory which covers all 
aspects of risk possible? If yes, can it be operationalised? These questions have to 
remain unanswered here. 
The limitation of methods in the framework of this research lies in validity of data, 
sampling and research subjects. 
Validity of data was ensured through both “within-method triangulation” and “inter-
method triangulation” (Seipel and Rieker, 2003) in this research. Different methods 
such as semi-structured interviewing, participatory observation and informal interview-
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ing were applied. During the interviews, other information through observation of the 
interaction between actors and their environment was collected to affirm the data 
generated by conducting interviews. Internal documents of the interviewed agencies 
and literature served to be another possibility of triangulation of data. However, sam-
pling was a great challenge in China due to the limited field access (see Chapter D.2.2) 
and it led to some constraints in data collection, therefore, triangulation of data could 
not be ideally carried out. 
Closely linked to the data triangulation is the limitation of research subjects. This study 
focused on the perception and communication of the flood managers and experts. 
However, as the findings show, the affected people and vulnerable social groups, 
especially the rural settlements within the retention areas, deserve more attention than 
this research could provide both due to the time constraint of a PhD work and the 
restricted field access (see Chapter D.2.2 and Chapter F.1.2).  
The field experience also shows that the Chinese interviewees tend to give rigid an-
swers during the interviews probably due to their propensity towards the cognitive 
formalism20 (Baum, 1982: 1168). This has the implication for the future research that a 
combination of qualitative research and standardised questionnaires may serve well 
within the Chinese cultural context. 
 
                                               
20 Cognitive formalism connotes a propensity to perceive and interpret the world of natural and social 
events in terms of pattered configurations of proximate phenomena.  
BAUM, R. (1982) Science and Culture in Contemporary China: The Roots of Retarded Modernization. 
Asian Survey, 22, (12) 1166-1186. 
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Zhuangzi and Huizi walked on the bridge over Hao River. 
Zhuangzi: “The fish are swimming leisurely. They are happy.” 
Huizi: “You are not a fish, how do you know that the fish are happy!?” 
Zhuangzi: “You are not me, how do you know that I do not know that 
the fish are happy?!? 
Huizi: “I am not you, surely I do not know about your perception. 
However, you are surely not a fish; therefore you do not know if the 
fish are happy. This is a matter of course.” 
Zhuangzi: “Let us go back to the root. You said ‘how do you know that 
the fish are happy’, this means that you know that I know. Well, I just 
learned it on this bridge.” 
– Zhuangzi (369BC-286BC), Qiushui 
–  
 
Are the fish happy? One can say that fish are not happy, but neither are they unhappy. 
Fish are beyond the notion of happiness. It is the human who confers the meaning of 
happiness to the fish. The conception of happiness is a human/social construct. So is 
risk. Risk is not something just ‘out there’, rather it is a concept construed by human 
beings. This research is one of the first attempts to penetrate Chinese and German 
flood management practices to investigate how flood risk is construed and communi-
cated within the social processes in different cultural contexts. The research results 
have shown both similarities and differences. In this chapter, the research results will 
be summarised to answer the research questions raised at the beginning of the re-
search: 
1. How do different actors involved in flood management in China and Germany per-
ceive flood risk? 
2. How is the perception of these actors embedded in their respective cultures? 
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3. How is flood risk communicated among these actors and to the general public?  
4. Which cultural features are reflected in flood risk communication in China and 
Germany? 
In doing so, similarities and differences in risk perception and communication will be 
illustrated and the role of culture elucidated. 
1. FLOOD RISK PERCEPTION AND ITS CULTURAL CONTEXT 
In Wuhan flood risk is viewed as a physically given attribute and perceived mainly as a 
technical problem. Risk is objectivised and depoliticised. Consequently, mitigation 
strategies are engineered and hazard-led which have a strong focus on emergency 
and crisis management. These characteristics are clearly reflected in the large-scale 
engineered measures carried out in the city of Wuhan through dike construction and 
the corresponding hierarchical institutional arrangement, which ensures a military 
styled flood fighting management in crisis situations (chapter C.3.1 and Chapter 
E.1.1.a). 
In Cologne the flood risk management ideology seems to have evolved over time. 
Especially after the flood in Elbe river basin in 2002 a rethinking process concerning 
efficiency and benefits of technical flood mitigation was initiated. This process reduced 
the confidence in technical flood management, consequently flood managers and 
experts began to explore the potential of an integrated approach combining structural 
and non-structural measures. A change from engineered measures to a more inte-
grated approach has taken place over the last decade. Flood risk is no longer per-
ceived to be solely a technical problem, but rather seen as a social process which 
balances different interests through sophisticated and time consuming negotiations 
amongst stakeholders representing different and often conflicting interests (Chapter 
E.1.3.b). A broad range of mitigation measures is now practiced including structural 
measures, such as extended construction of flood walls, mobile flood walls and an 
improved drainage system. Non-structural measures include information dissemination, 
flood insurance, educational efforts to improve people’s coping capacity as well as 
spatial planning. 
Especially the significance of spatial planning as a prevention tool has been recognised 
and enhanced by the Federal Spatial Plan of 2003 in Germany. A more passive mitiga-
tion paradigm allowing the river more space to flow by creating more retention area and 
giving back the space rivers need has become a leitmotif of flood management in 
Germany. This shows that a rethinking process on the harmony of man and nature is 
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under way. Spatial planning is seen as a powerful instrument to implement this new 
integrated approach. However, the implementation of the retention policy is not without 
challenges. The actors from the political and economical sectors see it as a constraint 
for economic development due to limited land use potential and fear of the conse-
quence of shrinking labour market which could have negative impact on voters. Spatial 
planners as well as NGOs feel impelled to compromise their desired retention plan. 
Nevertheless, spatial planning not only largely contributes to flood prevention but also 
has a “signal function” which enhances risk communication amongst stakeholders 
(Chapter E.1.2.b, Chapter E.1.3.b and Chapter E.2.2.b). 
In contrast, spatial planning in Wuhan, similar to other flood mitigation strategies, has a 
dominant technical focus to ensure the economic expansion through structural meas-
ures. Although human settlements and economic activities within retention areas have 
been rapidly increasing, retention areas are utilised according to technical principles to 
efficiently allocate flood water. In addition, flood protection largely relies on using gated 
and controlled retention areas. Thus, conflicts emerge during flood events as to which 
retention area has to be used to release the pressure on big cities such as Wuhan. 
Since the compensation law for flooding retention areas has not yet been well devel-
oped, the people living within retention areas are facing the loss of their livelihoods and 
homes in case of flooding. 
Due to the Chinese cultural and political context, decision-making is based on the 
principles of “state’s interests are superior to community interests that are superior to 
individual interests”. This principle gives little room for public participation and sees the 
people as part of the state whose survival determines the survival of each individual 
and communities; therefore, the interests of individuals and local communities have to 
be sacrificed for the survival of the state. This leads to vehement conflicts between 
local communities and higher flood management units as the case of the county Jianli 
has shown (Chapter E.1.3.a) and risk redistribution from big cities to less developed 
areas. This decision-making style is deeply rooted in the hierarchical Chinese culture 
and justified and reinforced by cultural values. 
At the core of these conflicts lie settlement, population and economic development 
within the retention areas. This is not only a historical legacy of the “Great Leap For-
ward Movement” in the 1950s and 1960s, but also a result of the mismatch of the 
central government’s policy and local implementation due to clashing goals of eco-
nomic development and sustainable water management. “Local protectionism”, as one 
of the consequences, leads to uncontrolled development within retention areas, which 
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in turn increases the conflict potential in the case of utilisation of these retention areas. 
Risk distribution through externalising flood risk from the urban and economically highly 
developed areas to rural or less developed areas leads to inevitable clashes between 
these stakeholders. 
Compared to the top-down approach in Wuhan, decision-making in regard to flood 
management in Cologne is based on democratic participatory principles. All stake-
holders are involved in the decision-making process and consensus is reached through 
dialogue and negotiation amongst relevant stakeholders. Efforts are made to accom-
modate for the interests of all stakeholders represented and taken into account equally. 
Most importantly, flood risk is not externalised to other regions without the consensus 
of the population in those regions. The advantage of this participatory approach is 
stakeholder satisfaction and therefore smooth implementation of flood management 
decisions. A disadvantage pointed out by the interviewees is the complicated and time 
consuming bureaucratic process which requires heavy allocation of human resources. 
As a consequence, some of the protection measures cannot be implemented and thus 
are not in place in case of flooding events before the decision has been finally author-
ised. Democracy seems to have touched its limit as said by one of the interviewees. 
As shown in Chapter E.1.3.a, conflict reconciliation in Wuhan both within management 
units and among stakeholders is a hierarchical top-down approach. It ensures on the 
one hand the efficiency of the decision-making and implementation in emergency 
cases, on the other hand, it misses the opportunity to amend the blind spots and 
correct the mistakes which could be pointed out by other stakeholders. In some cases, 
the conflicts due to this decision-making approach greatly impair social stability as the 
Chinese government has already realised. 
In contrast, in Cologne, conflicts are reconciled through dialogue and negotiation with 
other stakeholders. Individual and community interests are well represented and 
protected by the German legal system and the institutional arrangements. In the later 
case, for example, through the strong representation of community representatives in 
the regional council, which takes the final decision in unsolved conflict cases (Chapter 
E.1.3.b). 
The cultural perceptions of the human-nature relationship in Wuhan and Cologne seem 
to explain the different approaches of the flood managements in these cities. In Wuhan, 
influenced by traditional Chinese water management paradigm and fuelled by the 
Western rationalistic concept, the belief that man can conquer nature is deep-rooted 
amongst the flood managers. Especially the Maoist/communist ideology coinciding with 
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Confucianism, the most dominant traditional philosophical school strengthens this 
belief even more (Chapter E.1.5.a). Engineered flood protection measures are not only 
viewed as vital to flood management, but also taken as a foundation or even a 
“weapon” for a harmonious human-nature relationship. 
In Cologne, all interviewees agree that the harmony of the human-nature relationship is 
essential for the sustainable development of human society. Only more passive flood 
management strategies can ensure such harmony. This is an indicator for the depar-
ture from the belief that man can put nature at his service to his pleasure. 
 
In both Wuhan and Cologne, engineered flood protection measures are implemented. 
In both cases, a rethinking of flood management has taken place. However, the re-
thinking process in Wuhan is still at the beginning and the new ideas of flood manage-
ment have not yet caused tangible change in the flood mitigation strategies. 
As research results have shown (Chapter E), the difference in flood risk perception in 
Wuhan and Cologne is deeply embedded in its political and cultural contexts. The 
selection of risks to be dealt with and its mitigation strategies reflect the way of life each 
society sustains. Flood management in Wuhan, taken as a specimen for the hierarchi-
cal cultural context, advocates engineered and hazard-led technical flood mitigation 
strategies to justify its hierarchical institutional organisations which require high social 
coerciveness to be sustained. By the same token, the dominant Chinese cultural 
biases of human-nature conception, the values of societal solidarity and sacrifice 
support the hierarchical social relations. 
In contrast, the flood management in Cologne dominantly represents the individualist 
and egalitarian way of life. The decentralised organisation and democratic, participatory 
approach reflecting strong low group and low grid traits emphasise the paramount 
meaning of equality as the most important value of individual and egalitarian ways of 
life. Management strategies are more passive and cautious due to the egalitarian 
human-nature conception.  
2. FLOOD RISK COMMUNICATION AND ITS CULTURAL CONTEXT 
Based on the hierarchical social relations in Wuhan, risk communication has strong 
top-down dominance. Horizontal inter-agency communication is rare, especially in 
flood-free periods. Vertical communication during emergency management between 
lower and higher agencies functions in a chain of command style. Risk communication 
is perceived to be efficient in emergency cases; however, the interdependence of 
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agencies’ work for flood prevention measures between two flooding events is largely 
ignored.  
In Cologne, risk communication between flood agencies is emphasised and to ensure 
the smooth cooperation and conflict reconciliation between these agencies. Yet, the 
question of authority rises due to unclear hierarchies of agencies and the German 
Föderalismus. 
As in regard to flood risk communication between flood management and the general 
public, risk information in Wuhan is selected and reserved for dissemination. Only 
higher ranking agencies and officials have access to important information. The gen-
eral public is largely excluded from the information flow. Risk awareness of the general 
public is not encouraged to avoid “disquietedness” among the general public.  
In contrast, flood management in Cologne stresses the importance of risk information 
dissemination, in particular amongst the general public. Actions are taken to enhance 
risk awareness and public education in terms of flood retrofitting measures. Risk 
communication takes place in diverse forms including information dissemination, 
awareness raising activities and communication through public involvement in develop-
ing flood management measures and spatial planning process. 
The differences in risk communication between Wuhan and Cologne lie in different risk 
discourse styles of the dominant cultures. The hierarchical way of life as in Wuhan 
sees risk management as a state issue. This finds its echo in the traditional view of 
flood management in China. Therefore it is the experts who shall be in charge of the 
management and information. In Cologne, the individualistic and egalitarian way of life 
encourages individuals’ self-responsibility. In addition egalitarians tend to amplify risk 
and to use risk as a political tool to sustain its way of life by weakening the other ways 
of life through criticism.  
3. FINAL REMARKS: “…RESIDING IN RIVERS AND LAKES FORGETTING EACH 
OTHER” 
This research identified the commonalities and differences in flood risk perception and 
communication between Wuhan, China and Cologne, Germany and analysed their 
embedment in cultures. Are the practices of such different cultural settings transferable? 
If yes, who should learn from whom and what? These questions seem to be trivial, yet, 
the answers can be controversial. 
Doubtlessly, the integrated flood mitigation approach is widely accepted and advocated 
by international communities. Yet, as the research has shown, the implementation of 
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such an approach depends on fundamental values and beliefs of a society as well as 
the social relations each society prefers.  
Especially viewing risk as a social process requires extensive public participation which 
is one of the most important categories for good governance according to the democ-
ratic principles. It enhances policy efficiency and legitimacy, when citizens and other 
institutions have a chance to influence how rules are formulated and implemented (Van 
Ginkel et al., 2001: 18). However, countries such as China have completely different 
value systems and world views. It appears that a political and cultural change is 
needed to adopt the Western democracy-based management approach. Yet, any such 
change can only take place ideally from within. If the purpose of culture research is to 
find out features of certain existing cultures and adapt or formulate one’s own policy 
accordingly to work with but not against this culture, it is beneficial to improve hazard 
management. However, the intention to change or form a new risk culture through a 
culture study is doomed to fail, for any cultural change takes place in a very long-term. 
And organizational culture in particular is very resistant to change (Johnson, 1991: 144). 
In addition, the desirability of Western modernity in countries like China is questionable. 
Although Western modernity is in the process of successfully projecting its self-image 
upon the rest of the world, it manifests limits in radically different societies (Deuchars, 
2004: 203). It removes from the story the richness of cultural diversity and space and 
place specificity (Deuchars, 2004: 205). 
Deuchars contends: “All known societies do order their world to confront the dangers 
perceived there, however, and so to privilege one form of risk management as being 
universally superior is a form of conceit” (Deuchars, 2004: 203).  
Yet, the existence of commonalities across national and cultural borders can serve as 
the key to transferability of different practice and thinking. The Chinese Yin-Yang 
principle as an essential part of the Chinese traditional cultural heritage is based on a 
pluralistic approach. It encompasses both active and passive approaches which seem 
to have found echo in the Western rethinking process about flood management. Bal-
ance and stability, according to this principal, can only be reached by combining both 
passive (non-structural) and active (engineered) measures. The best flood mitigation 
strategy as proposed by Jia Rang about two thousand years ago to give river space to 
flow originates from this tradition.  
Chinese Taoist thinking represents the wisdom of the hermit way of life which superim-
poses with the egalitarian caution. The new water policy in China recognises the 
strength of the passive approach. Even if the implementation of the new water policy is 
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still facing a great challenge, however, the development towards a more pluralistic 
approach allowing and encouraging different cultural types to co-exist finds its echo in 
the thinking of Western scholars.  
All worldviews such as the approach of the conservationists or free market models are 
correct in the sense of being partially tested and part of reality (Holling, 2002: 3). Yet 
each of the views is only part of the reality. For instance, ecologists limit their under-
standing and propose inadequate actions by ignoring the realities of human behaviour, 
organisational structure and institutional arrangements that mediate the relationships 
between people and nature (Holling, 2002: 5). Integrated world views are advocated, 
since the process of developing policies and investments for sustainability requires a 
world view that encompasses ecological with economic with institutional with evolution-
ary theory. The aim is to overcome disconnects due to limitations of each field (Holling, 
2002: 5).  
Cultural theorists Thompson and Schwarz also advocate pluralism of cultures and 
contend that blind spots can only be avoided by taking into account all viewpoints of 
different cultural biases: “A nation in which ways of life are nicely balanced (or, at least, 
‚never entirely excluded’) is less prone to being surprised and will have a wider reper-
toire to draw from in responding to novel situations” (Thompson et al., 1990: 96, 
Schwarz and Thompson, 1990 151). Checks and balances, space for lateral thinking, 
pluralism in innovation, caution and regulation are all prerequisites for the management 
of flood risks (Dixit, 2003: 177). 
The link between ancient Chinese wisdom and the novel Western (re)thinking appears 
to be a key to facilitate political and cultural change. The uniqueness of Chinese 
civilisation is not only the existence of a hierarchical culture which has been well 
established and functional for millenniums, but also the richness and diversity of 
thinking. Truly, the functionality of the Chinese society relies on values of social solidar-
ity and sacrifice based on Confucianism tradition; yet, Chinese thinkers such as 
Zhuangzi advocate other alternatives: “…it was better if the fish would be residing in 
rivers and lakes forgetting each other instead of ventilating each other with one’s 
saliva…” (Cheng, 1983). Despite of all the differences in current flood mitigation prac-
tice between China and Germany, the commonalities in thinking, whether new or old, 
are the strong link which serves to be the common ground for experience exchange 
and mutual learning. 
 
-The end- 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 
Wasser ist einerseits unverzichtbar für das menschliche Leben. Es dient nicht nur als 
natürliche Ressource, die für die Entwicklung menschlicher Zivilisation unentbehrlich ist, 
sondern nährt auch die geistige Inspiration. Andererseits manifestiert sich die Macht 
des Wassers auch in seiner Vernichtungskraft. Hochwasserereignisse haben häufig 
negative Auswirkungen auf das Wohl der Menschheit. Sie fordern nicht nur Menschen-
leben und verursachen ökonomische Verluste und Degradierung der Ökosystem-
Dienstleistungen, sondern führen auch zu Gesundheitsproblemen und beeinträchtigen 
aus historischer und kultureller Sicht bedeutende Gebäude und Anlagen. 
Die Menschheit kann Hochwasserereignisse weder verhindern, noch ist sie bereit, auf 
Wasserressourcen und die Nutzung von Flussgebieten als menschliche Siedlungsräu-
me zu verzichten. Dies bedeutet ein Leben mit Chancen und Risiken. Vor dem Hinter-
grund dieser in vielen Gegenden der Welt auftretenden und dauerhaft anhaltenden 
Risikosituation stellt sich die Frage, wie unterschiedliche Gesellschaften mit ihren 
Hochwasserrisiken umgehen, vor welchen Herausforderungen das Hochwassermana-
gement steht, wie diese angegangen werden und ob bzw. inwiefern das in den unter-
schiedlichen Gesellschaften gesammelte Erfahrungswissen gegenseitig nutzbar 
gemacht werden kann. Zu diesen Fragen scheint Kultur, verstanden als Lebensweise 
nach der Kulturtheorie, ein Schlüssel zu sein, da sie das kollektive und individuelle 
Verhalten gegenüber Bedrohungen, Risiken und Auswirkungen von Katastrophen 
mitbestimmt. Kultur ist ein entscheidender Faktor, der die Verwundbarkeit und die 
sozioökonomische Auswirkung eines Desasters determiniert. 
Im Kontext dieser Überlegungen wird deutlich, dass Einblicke in kulturelle und organi-
satorische Eigenschaften einer Gesellschaft, in das menschliche Verhalten und die 
Wechselwirkungen zwischen Mensch und Natur unabdingbar sind - sowohl für die 
Katastrophenvorsorge und –reduzierung, als auch für die Konzeption effizienter und 
wirksamer Strategien zur Schadensbegrenzung.  
Daher hat diese Dissertation zum Ziel, Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten der Risi-
kowahrnehmung und Risikokommunikation exemplarisch am chinesischen und deut-
schen Kulturkontext aufzuzeigen und zu analysieren, wie Wahrnehmung und Kommu-
nikationsmuster in den jeweiligen Kulturen eingebettet sind. Die Städte Wuhan am 
Yangtze (China) und Köln am Rhein (Deutschland), wurden für die empirische Arbeit 
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als Untersuchungsräume ausgewählt. Die Auswahl dieser Untersuchungsräume beruht 
auf der Vergleichbarkeit der Hochwassergefährdung und des sozioökonomischen 
Gewichtes der untersuchten Städte. An ihrem Beispiel werden Probleme im Hochwas-
sermanagement identifiziert und Erkenntnisse darüber gewonnen, wie diese mit kultu-
rellen Eigenschaften zusammenhängen. Blindflecken, die innerhalb eines kulturellen 
Blickwinkels verborgen bleiben, werden durch den Vergleich sichtbar. Darüber hinaus 
wird untersucht, inwiefern gute Praxisbeispiele übertragbar sind und wie hoch das 
Potential ist, aus beiderseitigen Erfahrungen zu lernen. 
Die zentralen Fragestellungen der Dissertation sind: 
1. Wie nehmen die am Hochwassermanagement beteiligten Akteure in China und 
Deutschland das Hochwasserrisiko wahr?  
2. Wie ist die Wahrnehmung des Hochwasserrisikos dieser Akteure in den jeweiligen 
Kulturen verankert?  
3. Wie wird Hochwasserrisiko unter diesen Akteuren sowie zwischen den Experten und 
der Bevölkerung kommuniziert?  
4. Welche kulturellen Merkmale spiegeln sich in der Hochwasserrisikokommunikation 
wider? 
Zur Annäherung an die Forschungsfragen werden zuerst allgemeine Problemfelder in 
der Hochwasservorbeugung und -bewältigung thematisiert. Problemfelder entstehen 
dadurch, dass verschiedene Akteure unterschiedliche Deutungen des Begriffs „Risi-
kos“ haben. Diese unterschiedlichen Risikobegriffe führen wiederum zu unterschiedli-
chen Ansätzen und Strategien zur Risikoreduzierung. Da derjenige, der das Mandat 
hat, Risiko zu definieren, auch festlegen kann, welche Lösungsansätze als rational 
gelten, werden je nach Definition unterschiedliche Optionen zur Risikoreduzierung als 
die besten oder die effizientesten betrachtet - entsprechend werden in Abhängigkeit 
vom Risikoverständnis unterschiedliche Maßnahmen implementiert. 
Da alle Beteiligten durch ihren technischen oder politischen Hintergrund unterschied-
lich geprägt sind, werden risikorelevante Entscheidungen aus den jeweiligen spezifi-
schen Perspektiven getroffen. Zusätzlich wird die Risikobewertung durch Datenverfüg-
barkeit und besonders durch die von den Akteuren vertretenen Interessen beeinflusst. 
Da Hochwasservorsorge und –bewältigung als integriertes Management enge Zusam-
menarbeit, Koordination und effiziente Kommunikation zwischen allen Beteiligten 
erfordert und der Mangel an einer der genannten Komponenten zu Problemen im 
Hochwassermanagement führt, ist die Identifizierung der Diskrepanzen in der Risiko-
wahrnehmung und der Kommunikationslücken essentiell. Nur durch Überwindung 
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dieser Diskrepanzen kann den Herausforderungen im Hochwassermanagement 
begegnet werden.  
Um diese in Wahrnehmung und Kommunikation der Akteure bestehenden Unterschie-
de aufzudecken, wurden qualitative Forschungsmethoden, insbesondere Leitfadenin-
terviews, informelle Interviews und teilnehmende und nichtteilnehmende Beobachtun-
gen angewendet sowie Dokumentanalysen durchgeführt. In der Feldforschungsphase 
wurden zwischen 2005 und 2007 Gespräche mit Entscheidungsträgern verschiedener 
Behörden geführt, wie z. B. mit Hochwasserschutzzentralen bzw. Hochwassermana-
gementeinheiten und Umweltämtern, mit Vertretern von Nichtregierungsorganisationen 
(NGOs), Umweltschützern sowie dem Militär. 
 
Die empirischen Ergebnisse werden im Folgenden zusammenfassend dargestellt. 
Die organisatorische Struktur des Hochwassermanagements in China ist nach den 
Anforderungen von Hochwasserbewältigung und Krisenmanagement konzipiert, 
wohingegen in Deutschland Hochwasservorsorge eine zentrale Rolle im Hochwasser-
schutzkonzept spielt. In China ist das Hochwassermanagement hierarchisch organi-
siert, und das Risikomanagement wird als eine staatliche Aufgabe angesehen, wäh-
rend alle Individuen dazu verpflichtet sind, sich an der Hochwasserbewältigung zu 
beteiligen. In Deutschland ist die Organisation dezentralisiert. Individuen sind dazu 
verpflichtet, eigene Vorsorgemaßnahmen durchzuführen, um ihr Eigentum zu schützen. 
In China übernimmt die Regierung die Führung und die Hochwassermanagementein-
heit wird als technische Beratung verstanden. In Deutschland lässt es die organisatori-
sche Struktur zu, dass die operierende Hochwassermanagementeinheit auch größten-
teils eigene Entscheidungen treffen kann. Auf Grund des subsidiären Prinzips ist das 
durchführende Organ, wie z. B. die Hochwasserschutzzentrale, auch stark in den 
Entscheidungsprozess miteinbezogen. 
Die am chinesischen Beispiel deutlich zu erkennende hierarchische Struktur erweist 
sich nach der Meinung der Interviewpartner als effizienter Ansatz für das Krisenmana-
gement im Verlauf eines Hochwasserereignisses. Ihr Fokus auf bauliche Schutzmaß-
nahmen und Hochwasserbewältigung jedoch weist strukturelle Schwächen bezüglich 
Konfliktlösungen auf, was häufig zu Spannungen und Problemen zwischen den Akteu-
ren führt. 
 
In China versteht man unter Risikomanagement durch Raumplanung das Design 
baulicher Maßnahmen und die Verteilung des Hochwasservolumens. Daher legen die 
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Stadtplanungsbehörden in Wuhan einen Schwerpunkt auf bauliche Projekte. Trotz der 
Einführung eines neuen Wassermanagementkonzepts, welches für ein integriertes 
Wassermanagement plädiert, sind eine Prägung durch konfuzianische Tradition und 
ein sozialistisches Vermächtnis in der Raumplanungsideologie stark erkennbar. Das 
ambitionierte Konzept des integrierten Wassermanagements zielt darauf ab, die tief 
sitzende Annahme der universellen Wirksamkeit ingenieurwissenschaftlicher Lösungs-
ansätze für Wasserversorgung, Wasserkontrolle und Wasserqualität umzudeuten. 
Jedoch steht dieses Konzept vielen Herausforderungen gegenüber, besonders auf der 
lokalen Ebene. 
In Deutschland wurde ein Umdenken in der Hochwasserpolitik nach einer Serie von 
Hochwasserereignissen in Gang gesetzt, die in den letzten zwanzig Jahren stattgefun-
den haben. Diese Veränderungen zeigen sich in den Raumplanungsrichtlinien. Die 
Raumplanung erkennt kontraproduktive Effekte baulicher Maßnahmen und hebt die 
anthropogene Beeinflussung des Hochwasserrisikos durch die Besiedlung von Fluss-
gebieten hervor. Dieses neue Hochwasserkonzept wurde in gesetzlichen Regelungen 
umgesetzt, um ein vorbeugendes Hochwassermanagement zu gewährleisten. Aller-
dings enthalten die neuen Regelungen im Spannungsfeld wirtschaftlicher Überlegun-
gen und nachhaltiger Entwicklung viele Kompromisse. Nichtsdestotrotz wird nach der 
Ansicht der Interviewpartner Raumplanung als ein effektives Instrument für das Hoch-
wassermanagement in Deutschland angesehen. 
 
Die Forschungsergebnisse der Dissertation werden im Folgenden hinsichtlich der 
Teilaspekte Entscheidungsfindung, Interessenkonflikt und Konfliktlösung dargestellt. 
Die wirtschaftliche Reform Chinas führte zu einer zunehmenden Entfernung von 
Zentral- und Provinzregierung, da im Rahmen der Reformen Dezentralisierung gefor-
dert wurde. Folglich gewinnen die Provinzen und Regionen unter der Provinzverwal-
tung in den letzten Jahren größere Autonomie. Die Politik der Zentralregierung wird 
häufig verzerrt, bis sie die lokale Ebene erreicht. Die strukturelle Schwäche im politi-
schen und administrativen System lässt sich im Hochwassermanagement, insbesonde-
re während der hochwasserfreien Perioden, beobachten. Die Fehlanpassung zwischen 
Hochwasserpolitik und ihrer Implementierung auf lokaler Ebene führt zu lokalen Protek-
tionismus und zu Deichbau zweiter Ordnung, der auf Initiative von Gemeinden halb 
legal in von der Zentralregierung als Retentionsfläche ausgewiesenen Gebieten statt-
findet. Als eine Folge daraus verläuft die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung innerhalb dieser 
Retentionsflächen unkontrolliert, wodurch das potentielle Schadensrisiko steigt. Deich-
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bau zweiter Ordnung ist sowohl ein geschichtliches Vermächtnis des “Großen Sprungs 
nach Vorne”, als auch eine Reaktion auf die Anforderungen der Provinzen- und Zent-
ralregierungen an das Wirtschaftswachstum auf lokaler Ebene. Dies erklärt die Schwie-
rigkeit, zusätzlich zum ingenieurwissenschaftlichen Hochwasserschutz ein integriertes 
Wassermanagement zu implementieren. 
Der hohe Bevölkerungsdruck liefert eine weitere Begründung für die erkennbaren 
Unterschiede zwischen Anweisungen unterschiedlicher Autoritätsebenen und deren 
Nicht-Anwendung im konkreten Fall. Die hohe Bevölkerungsdichte ist ein starkes 
Argument von Seiten des chinesischen Hochwassermanagements, um zu erklären, 
weshalb eine Diskrepanz zwischen Politik und ihrer Implementierung besteht und 
weshalb Deiche zweiter Ordnung gebaut werden müssen, um Wohnungsbau und 
Lebensgrundlage für die auf Agrarproduktion angewiesene Bevölkerung zu sichern. 
Gleichzeitig werden die Menschen und ihre Lebensgrundlage in solchen Gebieten 
durch die Duldung der Besiedlung von Retentionsflächen zugunsten einer freien 
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung einem Risiko ausgesetzt, was nachgelagerte Konflikte 
zwischen den Akteuren auslöst und die soziale Stabilität beeinträchtigt. 
In Deutschland werden die Interessen der Kommunen durch die kommunale Verwal-
tungshoheit, die auf dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip beruht, gesichert. Das Gegenstromprin-
zip trägt dazu bei, dass die Implementierung der Hochwasserpolitik durch extensive 
Beteiligung der Interessenvertreter gewährleistet ist. Der Widerstand seitens der 
Gemeinden ist wesentlich schwächer als in China, obwohl die Gemeinden auch nach 
mehr Bauflächen streben, um die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ungehemmt voranzutrei-
ben. In diesem Zusammenhang muss berücksichtigt werden, dass die demographische 
Entwicklung in Deutschland eine gegenläufige Tendenz zur chinesischen aufweist. 
Auch die zögerliche Haltung von Investoren, die in den letzten Jahren  die Wirtschafts-
lage in Deutschland prägte, verringert den Bedarf an neuen Bauflächen. Die Raumpla-
nung als ein wichtiges Instrument zur Hochwasservorsorge hat in dem Kontext gute 
Voraussetzungen, die Landnutzung in Retentionsräumen und deichgeschützten Flä-
chen zu regulieren. 
Hinsichtlich der Interessenkonflikte in Wuhan und Köln sind folgende Merkmale er-
kennbar:  
In Wuhan ist der Konflikt  zwischen zentraler und lokaler Ebene aus dem Prinzip der 
Risikoverteilung gewachsen: „Staatliche Interessen genießen höhere Priorität als die 
Interessen der Gemeinden; die Interessen der Gemeinden genießen höhere Priorität 
als die der Individuen”. Auf Grund dessen werden Risiken nach Kriterien ökonomischer 
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Bedeutung und Bevölkerungsdichte verteilt. Das Hochwasserrisiko wird häufig externa-
lisiert und an ländliche und wirtschaftlich weniger bedeutende Gebiete umverteilt, um 
die Großstädte und die urbane Elite zu schützen. Jedoch erleben auch solche Gebiete 
seit Einführung der Reformpolitik Ende der 1970er Jahre rapides Wirtschafts- und 
Bevölkerungswachstum. Folglich wird dieser Konflikt sowohl durch die Differenz 
zwischen der Politik auf der höheren und ihrer Durchführung auf der lokalen Ebene, als 
auch durch das Vermächtnis des „Großen Sprungs nach Vorne“ verstärkt. Konflikte 
zwischen den Akteuren auf der administrativen und individuellen Ebene sind auf Grund 
des Risikoverteilungsprinzips vorprogrammiert.  
Im Vergleich dazu wird das Hochwasserrisiko in Köln nach dem Subsidiaritäts- und 
Gegenstromprinzip verteilt, was den Gemeinden ermöglicht, ihre Interessen zu vertre-
ten. Die Interessen der Individuen, insbesondere der Eigentümer, werden vom Gesetz 
weitgehend geschützt. 
In Wuhan existieren Konflikte hauptsächlich zwischen den Bauern und dem Hochwas-
sermanagement, das stets dem Willen der Regierung folgt. In Köln sind verschiedene 
Interessengruppen vertreten. Auch die Hochwasserschutzzentrale vertritt nicht immer 
die lokale Regierung. Konflikte entstehen oft zwischen verschiedenen operierenden 
Behörden und zwischen der politischen und administrativen Ebene. Ein Machtgleich-
gewicht im Entscheidungsprozess zwischen den Interessengruppen sichert die Be-
rücksichtigung aller Interessen. 
Nichtsdestotrotz wird die Effizienz eines Top-down-Entscheidungsprozesses und des 
Risikoverteilungsprinzips von den chinesischen Risikomanagern als ein “Vorteil des 
sozialistischen Systems” wahrgenommen. Die daraus resultierenden Probleme werden 
oft übersehen. In Köln beschwert man sich häufig über einen sehr mühsamen, langwie-
rigen Entscheidungsweg, und dass die „Demokratie an ihre Grenzen stößt“. Manche 
Interviewpartner wünschen sich einen effizienteren Entscheidungsprozess durch eine 
hierarchischere Struktur. 
Trotz aller Unterschiede zwischen Wuhan und Köln gibt es auch Gemeinsamkeiten. So 
taucht in beiden Fällen das Problem der behördlichen Konkurrenz auf. Kokurrenzden-
ken führt häufig zu Schwierigkeiten in der Kooperation und beim Informationsaus-
tausch. 
Die Wahrnehmung der Bevölkerung durch die Behörde ist durch folgende Merkmale 
gekennzeichnet. In Wuhan wird die Bevölkerung von den Interviewpartnern bei der 
Deichverteidigung als hilfsbereit und aktiv beteiligt wahrgenommen. Die Bevölkerung 
wird als eine wichtige „Streitkraft“ und deren Teilnahme an der Hochwasserbewältigung 
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als unentbehrlich angesehen. Die Partizipation der Bevölkerung in der Deichverteidi-
gung ist in höchstem Maß heroisiert und moralisiert. Im Gegensatz dazu kritisieren die 
Befragten in Köln das Anspruchsdenken und die Teilnahmslosigkeit bzw. Hilflosigkeit 
der Bevölkerung während eines Hochwasserereignisses. Dennoch ist dieses Verhalten 
der Bevölkerung nicht moralisch gewertet. Insgesamt hat der Hochwasserschutz in 
Wuhan eine deutlich tiefergehende moralische Dimension als in Köln. 
 
In Wuhan ist das Verständnis der Menschen-Natur-Beziehung, insbesondere der Frage, 
wie die Harmonie zwischen Mensch und Natur hergestellt werden kann, unter den 
Interviewpartnern sehr heterogen. In Köln kann man eine homogene Interpretation der 
Menschen-Natur-Beziehung identifizieren. Während sich auch in China die meisten 
Befragten darüber einig zu sein scheinen, dass ein Gleichgewicht zwischen Mensch 
und Natur wichtig ist, scheut jedoch gleichzeitig keiner der Interviewpartner vor techni-
schen Eingriffen in den Naturhaushalt zurück. Manche gaben an, dass bauliche Maß-
nahmen im Hochwasserschutz sogar eine unabdingbare Basis für eine harmonische 
Menschen-Natur-Beziehung sei. Auch in Köln befürworten alle Interviewpartner eine 
harmonische Beziehung zwischen Mensch und Natur. Man ist sich darin einig, dass 
bauliche Hochwasserschutzmaßnahmen Eingriffe in die Natur sind und als solche mit 
Vorsicht zu genießen sind. Eine passivere und kompromissbereite Schutzstrategie, 
welche Vorsorge durch Raumplanung erreichen soll, wird stark unterstützt. Abgesehen 
von den Bauernverbänden, die um die Lebensgrundlage der Bauern durch retentions-
bedingte Flächenverluste fürchten, scheint der Ansatz, dem Fluss Raum zu geben, 
allgemein willkommen zu sein. Manche plädieren sogar für noch striktere Bauvorschrif-
ten im Flussgebiet. 
Im Vergleich dazu glaubt man in Wuhan, dass eine solche passive Hochwasserschutz-
strategie nur sinnvoll ist, wenn bereits ausreichende bauliche Maßnahmen durchge-
führt worden sind. Selbst diejenigen, die den Ansatz unterstützen, dem Fluss Raum zu 
geben, sind der Meinung, dass bauliche Maßnahmen unverzichtbar sind. Negative 
Auswirkungen baulicher Maßnahmen werden nicht hinterfragt. „Dem Fluss Raum 
geben“ scheint für die Befragten nur ein Slogan zu sein, der fortschrittlich und politisch 
korrekt klingt. Die Aussagen der Befragten sind dazu oft inkonsistent, was auf einen 
beginnenden, noch nicht in aller Tiefe vollzogenen Umdenkprozess hindeuten könnte. 
In Köln sehen die Interviewpartner die nichtbaulichen Maßnahmen als einzige Möglich-
keit, mit der Natur in Einklang zu leben, jedoch sind sie sich der ökonomischen und 
politischen Herausforderungen solcher Maßnahmen bewusst. 
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Die chinesischen Gesprächspartner zeigten eine starke Neigung zur traditionellen 
chinesischen Hochwasserschutzkultur, die rein technische Ansätze verfolgt. Mao 
Zedongs Ideologie, die Natur zu bezwingen, scheint immer noch Einfluss auf die 
Hochwassermanager zu haben, insbesondere die auf der lokalen Ebene. In Köln hat 
man sich von dem Glauben verabschiedet, dass der Mensch die Natur besiegen kann. 
Besonders durch die Umweltbewegung und die Erfahrungen mit Hochwasser in der 
jüngeren Vergangenheit hat man begonnen, den positivistischen Ansatz in Frage zu 
stellen. 
 
In Wuhan werden Risikokommunikation und Kooperation zwischen den Behörden in 
der Hochwasserbewältigung als effizient wahrgenommen, während in hochwasserfrei-
en Zeiten kaum Kommunikation zwischen den behördlichen Akteuren stattfindet. 
Obwohl manche Interviewpartner mehr Kommunikation zwischen den Behörden 
befürworten, sehen die meisten Behörden diese außerhalb der Hochwasserperiode als 
„unnötig“ an. Sie verlassen sich auf die Befehlskette, die für das Krisenmanagement 
entworfen ist. Im Gegensatz dazu haben die Akteure in Köln die Probleme der Koope-
ration und Koordination auf Grund mangelhafter Kommunikation zwischen den Behör-
den und beteiligten Akteuren erkannt. Daher schreiben sie der Risikokommunikation 
eine große Bedeutung zu, um die Kooperation unter den Akteuren zu verbessern und 
zu sichern. Sie sind der Überzeugung, dass die Kooperation zwischen den Akteuren 
nur dann gut funktionieren kann, wenn die Kommunikation sowohl vor als auch wäh-
rend des Hochwassers gewährleistet ist. Sie zeigen Bereitschaft zu Diskussion, Debat-
te und Diskurs unter sich und mit der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinde. 
Bezüglich Informationspolitik und Risikobewusstsein lässt sich Folgendes feststellen: In 
Wuhan hat keiner der Gesprächspartner die Wichtigkeit, die Bevölkerung über das 
Risiko zu informieren, thematisiert, während die Interviewpartner in Köln die Bedeutung 
des Risikobewusstseins potentiell Betroffener stark hervorgehoben haben. Die Hoch-
wasserschutzzentrale in Köln sieht es als Teil ihrer Vorbereitung auf das nächste 
Hochwasserereignis, die Bevölkerung über das bestehende Risiko zu informieren. 
Daher stellt sie als Informationsmaßnahme nicht nur Risikokarten öffentlich zur Verfü-
gung, sondern berät auch die Bevölkerung dahingehend, wie auf individueller Ebene 
Hochwasservorsorge getroffen werden kann. Zusätzlich arbeitet sie zusammen mit 
Bürgerinitiativen an der Verbesserung der Informationsverbreitung. In Wuhan hingegen 
scheint die Wasserbehörde eine solche Informationspolitik nicht zu fördern. In man-
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chen Fällen versucht sie sogar, den Zugang der Bevölkerung zur Risikoinformation zu 
erschweren, damit keine „Unruhe“ verursacht wird. 
Während die Interviewten in Wuhan den Medien vorwerfen, das Risiko aufzubauschen, 
wünschen sich die Fachleute in Köln eher mehr Medienpräsenz, um das Risikobe-
wusstsein der Öffentlichkeit besonders auch in hochwasserfreien Perioden zu erhöhen. 
Das Hochwassermanagement in Köln betreibt eine offensive Informationspolitik und 
ermutigt die Bevölkerung, bei der Hochwasservorsorge eigenverantwortlich zu handeln. 
Im Vergleich dazu sieht die Wasserbehörde in Wuhan die individuelle Verantwortung 
im Hochwasserfall darin, dass sich die Bürger an Deichverteidigung und Hochwasser-
bewältigung beteiligen. Risikomanagement wird in der Zuständigkeit der Behörden und 
Experten gesehen. In Köln betont man das Restrisiko, um das Risikobewusstsein wach 
zu halten, während vergleichbare Risikokommunikation in Wuhan nicht zu beobachten 
ist. 
 
Die empirischen Daten decken eine große Bandbreite an Hochwassermanagement-
merkmalen in Wuhan und Köln ab. Um gemeinsame Muster zu erkennen, einen 
gemeinsamen Maßstab für zwei derartig unterschiedliche Kulturräume zu haben und 
um die herausgefundenen Schemata zu bündeln und zu strukturieren, ist eine theorie-
geleitete wissenschaftliche Herangehensweise notwendig. Die Kulturtheorie und der 
psychometrische Ansatz sind zwei gängige theoretische Ansätze, die für die Analyse 
von Risikowahrnehmung und -kommunikation angewendet werden. Die Entscheidung 
für die Anwendung der Kulturtheorie ist damit zu begründen, dass der psychometrische 
Ansatz für die in dieser Dissertation qualitativ erhobenen Daten kein analytisches 
Modell bieten kann. Quantitative Methoden, die thematisch für die vorliegende Studie 
nicht geeignet sind, wären eine erforderliche Grundlage zur Anwendung psychometri-
scher Ansätze. 
Die Kulturtheorie hat vier Kulturtypen/Lebensweisen herausgearbeitet: hierarchisch, 
fatalistisch, individualistisch und egalitär. Sie erhebt den Anspruch, das Verhalten der 
Menschen gegenüber Risiko anhand ihres jeweiligen Kulturtyps zu erklären, denn jeder 
Kulturtyp/jede Lebensweise hat ein entsprechendes Risikoportfolio. Die Haltung jedes 
Kulturtyps gegenüber dem Risiko soll dazu dienen, sowohl seine eigene Lebensweise 
zu unterstützen, als auch die anderen Kulturtypen zu schwächen. 
Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der hierarchische Kulturtyp das Hochwasser-
risikomanagement in Wuhan dominiert. Selbst die Umweltbehörde und die Nichtregie-
rungsorganisationen (NGOs) zeigen keine egalitären Charakteristika, wie es aufgrund 
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früherer, vergleichbarer Studien von diesem Kulturtyp zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Im 
Vergleich zu den chinesischen Gesprächspartnern haben die deutschen Akteure eine 
Mischung von Eigenschaften verschiedener Kulturtypen gezeigt: Egalitäre, hierarchi-
sche und individuelle Lebensweise sind gleichermaßen präsent. Nach der Kulturtheorie 
ist Kontrolle die Strategie der hierarchischen Lebensweise. Dies erklärt, weshalb im 
chinesischen Kontext die Hauptstrategie des Hochwasserschutzes der technische 
Ansatz ist. Im Gegensatz dazu ist die Hochwasserschutzstrategie in Köln vielfältiger 
und integrierter, da die vorhandenen verschiedenen Lebensweisen auch für verschie-
dene Schutzstrategien plädieren. Es fällt auf, dass die fatalistische Lebensweise in 
beiden Untersuchungsräumen nicht identifiziert werden konnte. 
Die empirischen Daten scheinen das analytische Kulturmodell und die Voraussagen 
des Risikoportfolios der Kulturtheorie zu bestätigen. Dies hat Implikationen für zukünf-
tige Forschungen: Der kulturtheoretische, analytische Rahmen kann auch für die 
Untersuchung von Naturrisiken eingesetzt werden, obwohl die Theorie vor einem 
Hintergrund technischer Risiken entwickelt worden ist. 
Eine Herausforderung bei der Anwendung der Kulturtheorie ist es, die Risikohaltungen, 
die von zwei Kulturtypen geteilt werden, zu differenzieren. Zum Beispiel befürworten 
sowohl der hierarchische als auch der individualistische Kulturtyp technische Lösungen 
für den Hochwasserschutz. Dieses Ergebnis bestätigt einen häufig angeführten Kritik-
punkt an der Kulturtheorie: sie versucht, mit einem reduktionistischen Ansatz die 
Komplexität der gesellschaftlichen Realität zu erfassen. 
 
Die organisatorische Struktur des Hochwassermanagements in China ist landesweit 
trotz großer regionaler Disparitäten hinsichtlich demographischer und sozialökonomi-
scher Faktoren einheitlich. Dies dient als eine Grundlage für die Verallgemeinerungs-
fähigkeit der empirischen Untersuchung. In Deutschland ist die regionale Disparität 
zwar nicht so groß wie in China, dennoch geschieht eine Verallgemeinerung nicht ohne 
Vorbehalt. Denn Deutschland hat eine weitgehend dezentralisierte Organisationsstruk-
tur auf Grund des Subsidiaritätsprinzips im Bereich des Hochwasserriskomanagements. 
Infolgedessen hat jedes Bundesland eigene Gesetze und Regelungen bezüglich des 
Hochwasserschutzes. Abweichungen in der Hochwasserpolitik und ihrer Umsetzung in 
verschiedenen Bundesländern sind unvermeidlich. Jedoch sind die untersuchten 
Aspekte wie Raumplanung, Entscheidungsprozesse und Konfliktlösungen dem bun-
desweit geltenden Bundesraumordnungsprinzip und demokratischen System unterwor-
fen. Dies bietet eine Basis für die Verallgemeinerung der Forschungsergebnisse, wobei 
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spezifische Besonderheiten in der Wahrnehmung von Akteuren auf Grund der spezifi-
schen institutionellen und sozialen Gegebenheiten von Region zu Region unterschied-
lich sein können. 
Dahingegen ist der Aspekt der Menschen-Natur-Beziehung stark im Raumfaktor 
verankert. Es besteht Zweifel, ob, und wenn ja, in welchem Maß man solche Ergebnis-
se regional übertragen kann, obwohl die Wahrnehmung dieser Beziehung auch in einer 
kulturell übergreifenden Ideologie eingebettet ist. 
Risikokommunikation, Informationspolitik und die Frage der Kompetenz können im 
chinesischen Kulturkontext verallgemeinert werden, da eine stringente organisatori-
sche Struktur dies ermöglicht. In Deutschland kann ein Unterschied zwischen den 
Ländern bestehen, da solche Regelungen dem kommunalen Hoheitsprinzip unterwor-
fen sind. 
 
Die Grenzen der vorliegenden Untersuchung bestehen hauptsächlich darin, dass die 
angewendete Theorie das untersuchte Phänomen nicht ohne Vorbehalt erklären kann, 
da diese Untersuchung eine der ersten Studien ist, die Kulturtheorie im kulturellen 
Kontext anhand qualitativer Methoden anwendet. Es besteht Bedarf, die Zuverlässig-
keit der Ergebnisse mit weiteren qualitativen Untersuchungen zu belegen, damit die 
Intersubjektivität der vorliegenden Ergebnisse gesichert werden kann. 
Methodische Beschränkungen bestehen darin, dass die Datenerhebung nicht ungehin-
dert durchgeführt werden konnte, da der Feldzugang zu den chinesischen Interview-
partnern teilweise erheblich erschwert war. 
Eine weitere Beschränkung besteht in der Auswahl der Zielgruppe der Befragung, die 
auf das Management und Experten fokussiert war. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass den 
Betroffenen und den verwundbaren gesellschaftlichen Gruppen, besonders denjenigen, 
die in Retentionsflächen leben, mehr Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet werden sollte. Auf 
Grund des Zeitrahmens einer Dissertation und des beschränkten Feldzugangs hätte 
diese Arbeit dies nicht abdecken können. 
 
Ohne Zweifel ist der Ansatz des integrierten Hochwasserschutzes weitgehend von der 
internationalen Gemeinschaft akzeptiert und befürwortet. Dennoch beruht die Imple-
mentierung eines solchen Ansatzes auf fundamentalen Werten und Überzeugungen 
sowie auf der präferierten gesellschaftlichen Organisation. Besonders der Ansatz, das 
Risiko als einen sozialen Prozess zu sehen, verlangt umfassende öffentliche Beteili-
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gung, den bedeutendsten Faktor für eine verantwortungsbewusste Regierungsführung 
entsprechend demokratischer Prinzipien. 
Im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs gilt die vorherrschende Meinung, dass es die Effizienz 
und Legitimität einer Politik fördert, wenn Bürger und Institutionen Gelegenheit haben, 
Vorschriften bei ihrer Formulierung und Implementierung zu beeinflussen. Jedoch 
haben Länder wie China ein gänzlich anderes Wertesystem und eine unterschiedliche 
Weltanschauung. Um der eingangs angeführten Position zu entsprechen, scheint ein 
politischer und kultureller Wandel notwendig zu sein, um den westlichen, auf Demokra-
tie basierten Ansatz anzunehmen. Sollte eine solche Veränderung gewünscht sein, 
kann sie idealerweise nur von innen stattfinden. Das Ziel einer kulturwissenschaftlichen 
Untersuchung kann es nur sein, Eigenschaften bestimmter Kulturen aufzudecken. 
Aufgabe der Politik ist es dann, die Ergebnisse zu implementieren und zum gesell-
schaftlichen Wohl beizutragen. Das Vorhaben, eine Risikokultur über die Veränderung 
des Risikomanagements zu reformieren ist zum Scheitern verurteilt, denn der diesem 
unterliegende kulturelle Wandel findet langfristig statt, und eine Organisationskultur 
selbst ist gegenüber Veränderungen sehr resistent. 
Auch ist es fraglich, ob ein Land wie China die westliche Moderne übernehmen möchte, 
selbst wenn diese Moderne ihr Selbstbild erfolgreich auf die ganze restliche Welt 
projiziert. Dieses Selbstbild unterliegt in radikal unterschiedlichen Gesellschaften 
Einschränkungen. Es entfernt sich von der Idee der Kulturvielfalt und raumbezogener, 
spezifischer Merkmale. Jede Gesellschaft hat ihre originäre Organisationsform, um die 
von ihr wahrgenommenen Risiken zu konfrontieren. Es wäre überheblich, eine Form 
des Risikomanagements einer anderen gegenüber als überlegen anzusehen oder gar 
als universell einsetzbar zu definieren. 
Dennoch dienen die Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Kulturen als Schlüssel zur Übertrag-
barkeit von Erfahrungen und Wissensansätzen. Das chinesische Prinzip von Yin und 
Yang ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil des chinesischen Kulturerbes. Dieses Prinzip basiert 
auf pluralistischer Denkweise und plädiert für ein Gleichgewicht passiver und aktiver 
Ansätze, und findet sein Echo auch im integrierten Risikomanagementkonzept. Auch 
wenn dieser Ansatz in China derzeit nicht praktiziert wird, so ist über die Vorstellung, 
dass Gleichgewicht und Stabilität nur dann erreicht werden können, wenn eine Vielfalt 
der Denkweisen zugelassen wird, eine Anschlussfähigkeit pluralistischer Denkweisen 
in der chinesischen Gesellschaft - auch in den Hochwasserschutzstrategien - grund-
sätzlich gewährleistet. 
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